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ABSTRACT
AN  I N T E R A C T I O N A L  S O C I O L I N G U I S T I C  S T U D Y  QF  
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS’ CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES
CLAUDIA MESQUITA
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1999
Supervising Professor: Pedro de Moraes Garcez
Storytelling is essential to human communication. Among the strategies used by 
storytellers to develop their narratives so as to promote and sustain audience 
involvement, the animation of the story characters’ voices figures prominently. Such 
animation constitutes an interactional phenomenon called “represented interaction,” in 
the form of “represented conversational exchanges.” In this study, represented 
interaction is characterized so as to include all verbal and non-verbal actions performed 
by fictional characters (“reported discourse”), as well as the socio-situational features 
relevant for the production and understanding of such actions (“reporting discourse”). 
Starting from the assumption that represented interaction shares some organizational 
structures with naturally occurring talk-in-interaction, the pivotal question in the present 
study was the extent to which the former can be regarded as “ordinary.” In order to 
answer that question, segments of represented interaction were first excerpted from 
short stories and novels and were, later, submitted to examination within a!n 
interactional sociolinguistic perspective that privileges participants’ (characters’) 
standpoints. The present analysis shows that a number of mechanisms employed by real 
conversationalists to the production and sense-making of interaction may also be used in 
the representation of characters’ interaction, which suggests that authors rely on their 
and the readers’ authority as members of a particular conversational community as the 
basis for represented interaction. The work also suggests that the representation of 
interaction is constrained by the activity in which it is embedded, by author’s selection 
criteria, and by external factors such as linguistic norms and literary canon. Finally, it is 
suggested that such forces have a decisive influence on certain features of represented 
interaction, namely the turn-taking system projected into it and the neat arrangement of 
characters’ utterances.
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RESUMO
AN  I N T E R A C T I O N A L  S O C I O LIN G U IS T I C  S T U D Y  OF  
FICTIONAL CHARACTERS’ CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES
CLAUDIA MESQUITA
UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SANTA CATARINA
1999
Orientador: Pedro de Moraes Garcez
Contar estórias é uma prática essencial à comunicação humana. Dentre as estratégias 
empregadas para contar-se uma estória e, assim, promover e garantir o envolvimento da 
audiência, a animação de vozes dos personagens tem papel de destaque. Tal animação 
constitui-se em um fenômeno interacional denominado “interação representada”. 
Entende-se por interação representada aquela que inclui todas as ações verbais e nãjo- 
verbais realizadas pelos personagens ficcionais (“o discurso relatado”), bem como todos 
os traços da situação social relevantes para a produção e para a compreensão daquelas 
ações (“o discurso que relata”). A partir do pressuposto de que a interação representada 
compartilha algumas das estruturas da organização dà interação face a face real, a 
principal questão que se apresentou para este estudo diz respeito a quão “comum” 
aquela interação se afigura em relação à outra. A fim de responder tal questão, foram 
inicialmente extraídos de contos e romances segmentos de interação representada que, 
posteriormente, foram submetidos a exame pautado numa perspectiva sociolingüistica 
interacional, que privilegia os pontos de vista dos próprios participantes (personagens). 
Conclui-se o estudo observando-se que muitos dos mecanismos empregados pelos 
interagentes reais na produção e na compreensão de sua interação também podem 
figurar na representação da interação dos personagens; o que, por sua vez, sugere que os 
autores de ficção fundamentam-se em sua própria autoridade, e na dos leitores, 
enquanto membros de uma dada comunidade conversacional como a base para a 
interação representada. O estudo sugere, outrossim, que a representação da interação se 
dá conforme: a atividade interacional na qual se insere, os critérios de seletividade do 
autor, e fatores externos tais como a normatização lingüística e o cânone literário. Por 
fim, o estudo indica que tais forças exercem influência decisiva sobre certos traços da 
interação representada, a saber, o sistema de tomada de turnos nela projetado e a forma 
superorganizadá que tomam as falas dos personagens.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The language phenomenon traditionally conceived of and referred to as “reported 
speech” has been the focus of continuous attention from investigators working in a 
number of diverse fields such as linguistics, literary criticism, philosophy, pragmatics, 
discourse analysis, among others.
Sometimes both extreme aspects of the phenomenon, namely direct and indirect 
reported speech, have been examined. Along this trend, emphasis has been placed in 
describing either the semantic and syntactic distinctions between one form and the 
other, or the pragmatic and literary functions of each type of reported discourse.
Such preoccupations have busied researchers for so long due to the fact that
recounting or reporting events lies at the very core of human social experience. Human
beings can only go through their experiences again and share these experiences with one
another by means of reviving them via their linguistic expression. The following
excerpt, reproduced from a radio interview with pop singer Amy Grant published in
Speak Up magazine (April 1998) can illustrate this:
Interviewer: The title of the project ‘Behind the Eyes’ is actually a phrase 
from one of the songs on the album and when I asked Amy about 
that song “Turn This World Around” she had quite a story to 
tell [emphasis added]:
Amy Grant: “Well, the music was written by Keith Thomas. And he actually 
had that line for the chorus—Turn This World Around. And my 
dear friend Beverly Darnall and I fleshed out the rest of the song.
I had a couple of experiences, one in particular that I’ll 
recount [emphasis added], I had a day down in Santa Monica
2and I went walking through a park, and while I was sitting on 
this bench a bagman came up. And he asked me if I would 
watch his things while he went to a public restroom [emphasis 
added] And I said: ‘All right! I ’ll be happy to.’ When he got 
back he said: ‘Do you mind i f  I  sit here fo r  a whileV And I said: 
‘No, that’s fine. Do you mind ifIkeep  doing what I  came here to 
do. I ’m just reading a book and listening to some music.' He 
said: ‘No, go ahead.’ And then... we visited, we talked we wound 
up telling each other about our lives. We talked for about two 
and half hours, and we walked down the side walk together, 
leaving. And I said: ‘I ’m telling you, I ’m a little nervous walking 
back to my hotel cause I ’ve trusted you. D on’t let me down, 
Johnny/’ And he said: 7  won’t let you down, Amy.’ And he 
never... He saw what hotel I  went to, he never came knocking on 
my door, he never came and looked for me. (...) All of that 
obviously eventually became a lyric in the song ‘Behind the 
E yes' (p. 19)
Another fact this short piece serves to highlight is how 
recountings/retellings/reportings of experiences are intimately related to storytelling. 
Also, it shows how such storytelling activity is closely connected to the direct or 
indirect incorporation of voices other than the speaker’s, or “reported speech.” Last, in 
this brief excerpt, we can also see how the recounter assigns direct reported speech 
(henceforth DRS) a more significant function in the storytelling than she assigns to 
indirect reported speech. This might perhaps explain why researchers have frequently 
paid special attention to the study of DRS, especially in narrative.
While some researchers have investigated DRS in narrative, particularly in written 
fictional storytelling, from literary or discourse analytical standpoints, this thesis 
resumes the discussion about DRS in written fictional narratives in the light of 
interactional sociolinguistics.
3The question which motivates the present study concerns the extent to which 
represented interaction can be regarded as similar to real face-to-face interaction in 
terms of the mechanisms which are operative In their organization. I believe that 
interactional sociolinguistic concepts and methodology constitute the appropriate 
framework to investigate such matters.
My initial assumption is that the structures which organize written storytelling 
activity happen to be very similar to the ones that organize oral storytelling. Only the 
former differ from the latter in that those structures have undergone the necessary 
adjustments to fit the written medium.
One such structure is the resource of assigning voice to characters in stories, or 
“reported speech.” In fact, reported speech plays a prominent role in storytelling in the 
sense that it is a strategy largely and frequently employed by storytellers as a means to 
make their narratives more trustworthy as well as more vivid, thus heightening 
audience’s involvement. The degree of audience involvement varies along a continuum 
which is parallel to the degree of directness employed in reporting. Consequently, the 
greatest degree of involvement can be achieved with the use of the most direct form of 
reporting, DRS.
I see DRS as one of the integral elements of the object of my concern in the 
present study. So I start up by focussing on three works which have dealt with the use of 
DRS in storytelling both in ordinary conversational storytelling and in written narrative.
In chapter two, I provide a detailed discussion of these studies in order to uncover 
how the phenomenon has been viewed and, consequently, how it has been analytically 
treated. The discussion of each of these works offers some useful insights which help 
me better characterize the object of my concern in this thesis, namely represented 
conversational exchanges, or, simply, represented interaction. In other words, my own
4view of the phenomenon is constructed little by little as I foreground the relevant issues 
raised by those studies. At the same time, this discussion provides me with the 
opportunity to introduce and discuss some fundamental interactional sociolinguistic 
concepts which support the analytical perspective adopted here.
Chapter three is partly dedicated to the second element which integrates 
represented interaction: context. The crucial role it plays in interaction has been paid 
little attention to, if any at all, in the works examined. Contrary to these approaches, my 
claim is that, if one is to account for the whole dynamics and complexity o f the 
phenomenon, context should be assigned the core position it deserves (Goodwin & 
Duranti, 1992).
Understood in a broad sense, context encompasses a set of phenomena ranging 
from the more immediate sequential location of the reported utterances (DRS) in 
relation to one another to the relationship of those utterances with the narrative 
discourse itself. The nature and scope of this relationship turns out to be a major factor 
in drawing the very limits o f the conversational exchanges (interaction) within the story.
Still in chapter three, once the interactional nature of the phenomenon is 
established, I proceed by presenting some of the implications of such a view on the 
present analytical work. I then discuss the limits and difficulties posed by the 
phenomenon under study both to the selection and preparation of the material and to the 
process of analysis.
Chapter four is devoted to data analysis. It starts with tum-by-turn analyses of 
longer extracts and later concentrates on the analysis of specific instances of certain 
types of activities such as correction, and so on.
Finally, in chapter five, I resume the results of the analysis and conclude by 
considering the direction these findings point to.
CHAPTER 2
“DIRECT REPORTED SPEECH,” “CONSTRUCTED DIALOGUE,” AND
I
“REPRESENTED INTERACTION:”
CONSIDERATIONS ON THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORKS
2.1 Different perspectives on direct reported speech (DRS)
In this chapter, I bring into current discussion some works in the fields of 
conversation analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA) which have dealt with DRS: 
Holt (1996), Tannen (1989), and Caldas-Coulthard (198)1, 1988, 1992, 1994).
Holt (1996) looks into the matter from a conversation analytical perspective, 
which means that, in examining DRS, she uses naturally occurring conversation as data 
and bases her assertions on what participants themselves demonstrably show orientation 
to. I believe that this is the appropriate starting point to investigate language in use 
(Clark, 1996; Duranti, 1998; Levinson, 1983; Pômerantz, 1990; Schenkein, 1978).
As for the two other authors, although they work in the field broadly known as 
discourse analysis (DA), their individual views are based on distinct theoretical 
perspectives and methodological frameworks. Tannen draws on the seminal works of 
interactional sociolinguistics—especially those by Gumperz and Goffman—and on the 
works of scholars such as Bakhtin and Voloshinov, for whom communicative action is 
regarded as a discursive practice. Caldas-Coulthard draws mostly on the Birmingham 
model of DA, which is grounded on a linguistic pragmatic tradition.
This theoretical and methodological difference leads their conclusions to 
contrasting results. Tannen, on the one hand, argues in favor of the similarities between
6DRS, or rather, “constructed dialogue,” in both conversational storytelling and its 
written literary counterpart. Caldas-Coulthard, on the other hand, makes a distinction 
between “reported speech” (factual reports) and “represented speech” (fictional 
exchanges), even though, she claims, they have a common characteristic. In spite of 
being grounded on “the knowledge of structural properties of real talk” (1988, p. 89), 
Caldas-Coulthard posits that both reported speech and represented speech are actually 
“reduced” and “simplified” versions of talk in terms of the “overall organizational 
features” and “structural properties” (p. 90) they exhibit.
Despite these contrasting viewpoints and findings, these stüdies still offer some 
enlightening contribution to my own view of the phenomenon, in particular because 
they highlight the significant role played by DRS among available storytelling 
strategies. I shall be discussing Tannen’s and Caldas-Coulthard’s contribution, as well 
as that of Holt’s, in detail in the next sections.
2.1.1 A conversation analytical view on DRS in conversation
In her article Reporting on talk: The use o f direct reported speech in conversation, 
Elizabeth Holt carries out a systematic analysis of the use of DRS in informal telephone 
conversation in order to characterize the essential design features of DRS and show 
what interactional jobs DRS commonly performs in conversation.
Although she adopts a conversation analytical methodology, Holt also draws on 
the works of researchers grounded in linguistic and pragmatic traditions to support her 
own claims. She draws particularly on those studies which establish the semantic and 
syntactic distinctions between indirect, quasi-direct, and direct quotation, as well as on 
those which discuss the functions these devices perform in discourse. 1
7Holt’s findings regarding the design features of DRS include three elements which 
characterize its production. The first element is “retention of ‘original’s’ deixis” (p.
222), that is, personal, spatial and temporal deictics and verb tenses alike. In the 
following illustration provided by Holt, the short arrows indicate the lines in which 
these types of deictic elements occur:
[Holt: S088(H) 1:3:15]
1 Hal: =An’ this American came tak’ to me geh- ^elderly
— ► 2 man ‘ee wa(h)s —‘n’ ‘ee said (0.2) ‘ee said you know= 
UVim: hm?3 Lesley:
— ► 4 “► Hal: =’ee said you’ve 'J'got somethink here. ‘Ee said you
— ► 5 - >
6 -► 
7
c’n 't'FEEL it. ,hh He seh I’ve been to England 
sev’ral times ‘n I feel the hhh you know (0.4) 
somethink s-s:tro4':nr- g.( )=
8 Lesley: *- ih Ye:s.
9 - * Hal =( V that p v o u ’re aoin’ t ’be here in /lshhundreds;
10 Lesley: L he- Yeh
— ► 11 Hal: = of years’vPtime. _  ‘ee said.
12 Lesley: L eYe:s that’s ri:ghr“  t.
13 Hal: But what
14 Tickled me see Lesley after ee’d been round the
15 Cathedral’n the Palace he came back outta the ga:te.
— ► 16
17 - >
18 _► 
19
(0:3) ‘n ‘ee said goodbye he said, an’ I sh’ 
come back in- in a hundred years ‘n see it 
again, .h an‘ you make sure you’re still stfh)ood 
o(h)on this Npga(h)ate (Holt, 1996, pp. 222-223)
The second design feature of DRS is “retention of the ‘original’s’ prosody” (p.
223), that is, when a current speaker’s change in prosody marks a shift from unreported 
speech to DRS.2 In the example below, the up and down arrows (/. 6, 7, 9, and 10) have 
been used to indicate such changes in prosody:
8[Holt:October 1988:1:8:10]
---- ^  1 Lesley: An’'Is then she rang me up ‘n said that (.) Joyce
2 Suggested that I (_  _  hel) 't'huh hah huuh
3 Joyce: L Ahhh::::_J Lohhh:::::::.
4 Lesley: hu-uh .hhhhh 'I'So I said um .khhh W’I’m sorr p y  I’m =
5 Joyce: ( )
----- ► 6 -► Lesley, ^teaching she said .hh 'I 'i 'O h : (.) 'hoh my dear, well how
7 —► lovely that you’re involved in 1s^tea4'ching. A#-n’ vUl: =
8 Joyce: Lohh:.
9 Lesley: =thought. .hhh i'W ell al'hright then p’haps I ’d like to
10 Lesley: suggest y o u /|sy|vf  the nex’supply pe(h)ers(h)on (Holt, 1996,
p. 223)
The third element which characterizes DRS, or rather reported speech, is the use 
of “DRS indicators” by current speaker (p. 224). By “DRS indicators,” Holt means 
structures formed with a pronoun followed by a speech verb such as “He said” (the long 
arrows to the left in the above examples point to the lines where such structures 
occurred). Holt argues that the use o f “DRS indicators” (p. 224)/“prefatory forms” (p.
225) is a feature which falls outside the boundaries of the quotation and which can
;
occur with any form of reported speech. Unlike this feature, both retention of deixis and 
of prosody establish a clear distinction between DRS and other types of utterances, 
especially indirectly reported ones (pp. 223-224), precisely because they are, in fact, 
constitutive elements of quoted discourse, or DRS.
Holt asserts that the fact that current speaker keeps the “deictic center in the 
previous interaction” (p. 234) allows for her/him to depict the reported context itself, or 
a whole sequence of events which may include utterances and thoughts as it were. 
Additionally, “changes in prosody can also be used to mark a shift from unreported 
speech to DRS” (p. 223), that is, a shift from current speaker’s own voice to a voice
9other than his. Both features can be used, Holt posits, to dramatize events in a story. 
Furthermore, it is this very possibility of dramatizing the events which “serves to make 
the story more effective” (p. 235), in that it allows for greater involvement of the story 
recipient.
As for the interactional jobs performed by DRS, Holt found that it is generally 
used as “an effective and economical way of providing evidence” (p. 225). By 
“effective,” Holt means that DRS allows its recipient to have “direct” access to what is 
being portrayed, which gives “an air of objectivity to the account” (p. 230). Also, DRS 
is seen as “economical” because “it can be used to convey various types of information 
at once” (p. 240). The use of DRS can give insight to the reported speaker’s, or 
speakers’, stance; it may be used to indicate that current speaker has resorted to a 
discursive practice that differs from the major conversational activity in which it is 
embedded; and it can even have “the pragmatic function of making a link between what 
is being discussed and a new topic” (p. 241).
If Holt’ s findings may, at first, appear too obvious, in the sense that they seem to 
provide no novelty to the subject, this is not at all the case. Indeed, her findings raise a 
number of questions which have a strong bearing on the present study.
First of all, she demonstrates that not only can current speaker report utterances 
proffered on previous occasions (by himself, or by other speakers as well), but current 
speaker can also report thoughts and non-linguistic actions as well, thus making it 
possible for current speaker to portray “a series of actions with their accompanying 
thoughts or utterances” (p. 234). In Holt’s corpus, a current speaker reports a sequence 
of events and thoughts as a means of describing a step-by-step process of deliberation 
leading her up to a certain action, namely that of making a telephone call to her 
recipient:
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[NB: 11:4:10]
1 Nancy
2
3 “►
4 “►
5 -►
6 Emma
7 Nancy
8 Emma
9 Nancy
10
By resorting to DRS (/. 3-5), therefore, current speaker can portray her 
deliberations and reactions in the form and order in which she claims they occurred in 
the original context. This, according to Holt, enables current speaker to “dramatize the 
events and the utterances that accompanied them” (pp. 235-236), thus allowing current 
recipient the opportunity to perceive how considerate the caller (current speaker) was in 
not calling the recipient until she was likely to be up.
In short, Holt’s finding serves to highlight the fact that what we ordinarily refer to 
as DRS may sometimes include much more than just words uttered on a previous 
occasion. It may also include the telling of other aspects/elements of the situation which 
form with the utterances spoken, then, an integral whole on its own—from current 
speaker’s point of view, of course. This is not trivial at all, for it suggests that current 
speaker’s point of view or stance can also be subtly embedded in DRS. If this is so, 
current speaker could actually be providing the recipients with the touchstone against 
which what they hear should be judged To put it in another way, current speaker can 
implicitly be signaling to the recipients that he believes in the state of affairs being
: Ah huh? t.hhhhhh OH I WZ JIST OU’WOH:SHING windo:ws: 
ih- a:nd uh my mother call led so I ca:me in ah thought 
w’l wahlT’m in here’n I looked the clo:ck’ uz Teven 
thirty in I thaw wul: (.) ther .hhh.hh 'Uther uhm (.) 
surely th*er Up yih kn*ow I knew it#- wz kahn - i ’v
[  Y e s  3
: a: p  s 1 e e -i p in d*a:jy but I did’ st g*et home 
*- A wee-
: til (.) hhhh two las’night I met a verv:.h 
very n:ice ^g*u:y. (Holt, 1996, p. 234)
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invoked by DRS and is leaving it up to the recipients to decide whether or not to agree 
with this point of view.
A second matter that deserves further commentary concerns the significance of 
prosodic features in the production of DRS. As Holt pointed out, current speaker can 
choose to try to imitate how the reported speaker produced the utterance in its original 
context by means of changes in prosody from preceding talk such as “shifts in 
intonation during the reported speech and reported thought” (p. 223). In so doing, Holt 
argues, current speaker avoids the use of speech/glossing verbs to account for pitch, 
loudness, and volume as well as for emotive aspects of voice. Most importantly to the 
present discussion, however, Holt suggests that this strategy is not available in written 
discourse:
Reported speech is generally preceded by a pronoun, such as I/he/she/they, plus a 
speech verb which is usually “said” but can be “says,” “goes,” “thought,” etc. 
“Said” is by far the most common, and one reason for this is that prosody then can 
be used to indicate the way in which the utterance was spoken, thus making 
unnecessary the kind of introductions that are common in novels, such as “he 
whispered” or “she moaned” [emphasis added], (p. 224)
It follows then that, in written discourse, retention of the reported speaker’s 
prosody is not quite possible, so, in animating the words of the portrayed characters, 
writers have but few alternatives left. They can either resort to glossing any prosodic 
feature of the quotation which they perceive as relevant or try and represent some 
features graphically.
My own data show instances where prosody is represented by means of speech 
verbs other than “say” such as “exclaimed” (conversational exchange 2, I. 23, p. 140), 
“exploded” (conversational exchange 6, /. 13, p. 142), “yelled” (conversational 
exchange 6, /. 33, p. 143), and “stammered” (conversational exchange 7, /. 21, p. 144). 
Also, in my data there are instances of “say” or other speech verb accompanied by 
certain descriptive adverbiais such as “said vaguely” (conversational exchange 4, I. 10,
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p. 141), “said bitterly” (conversational exchange 4, I. 20, p. 141), “said evenly” 
(conversational exchange 6, I. 9, p. 142), “asked rather timidly” (conversational 
exchange 4, /. 8, p. 141), “cried impatiently” (conversational exchange 5 ,1. 7-8, p. 142), 
“asked me, his voice rising” (conversational exchange 6, I. 27, p. 143). In addition, 
prosody also appears graphically represented in my data as in conversational exchange 
4, lines 4, 12, 14 (p. 141) and 25 (p. 142); and in conversational exchange 5, line 9 (p. 
142), where italics was employed.
In any case, in being a design feature of DRS, prosody (and situational aspects 
such as deixis as well) cannot be eliminated, for DRS is employed to allow the reader “a 
kind of access” (Holt, 1996, p. 230) to the scene depicted. In other words, what I dm 
claiming is that, if the scene/character portrayed in written storytelling is to retain any 
ordinariness, one should actually expect prosody to be represented either in the narrative 
discourse or within the quotation, or even in both, since prosody is ultimately a major 
signaling mechanism for producing “contextualization cues” (Gumperz, 1982) to guide 
the reader in the interpretation of what s/he reads (I discuss this in detail in chapter 3).
Finally, if the use of DRS in conversation allows for the recipient to take up a 
more active participation stance, since he is being offered an opportunity to judge things 
for himself, the same happens in written narratives. That is to say that writers resort to 
DRS to involve the reader in the scene being depicted. The reader, then, can make his 
own inferences about what is going on, instead of having to be told in so many words. 
Thus, Holt’s claim that DRS is usually employed in conversation to provide evidence 
turns out to be of utmost importance for my own view of the phenomenon. Neither 
DRS, nor any other form of quoted speech, as it were, constitutes an instance of an 
autonomous type of discourse: it always occurs within some major interactional activity.
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Therefore, the interpersonal component implicit in this discursive practice should be 
attended to by analysts.
Nevertheless, it is not infrequent for analysts to overlook, or even completely 
neglect this (see sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). It seems to me that, in her analysis, Holt 
herself has been caught in the pitfall, namely that of paying too much attention to the 
textual component of DRS (discourse itself) to the detriment of the interpersonal aspect 
embedded in this strategy.
Before she proceeds with the analysis of her own data, Holt brings in the findings 
of researchers who approached reported speech (in all of its forms: direct, indirect and 
quasi-direct) from either a linguistic or a pragmatic perspective. In the quotes of those 
who subscribe to these traditions, DRS is said to provide evidence because, in giving 
access to the event from the reported speaker’s point of view, it is “more authentic” in 
that it “implies greater fidelity to the source” (Li, 1986, p. 41, cited in Holt, 1996, p.
226), or because DRS is a kind of “demonstration” in the sense that it “depicts its 
referents” (Clark & Gerrig, 1990, p. 764, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226).
Similarly, Holt reports that the work of Philips (1986, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226), 
who dealt with reported speech in a courtroom trial, points to the fact that lawyers 
assume DRS to be “more accurate,” and thus, “more reliable” (Holt, 1996, p. 226). 
Furthermore, her own finding in relation to the function performed by DRS is that it is 
used “to provide evidence of a previous comment or interaction” (p. 226) “by depicting 
the reported utterance” (p. 226).
These results seem to foreground researchers’ concern with asserting the strict 
relationship between providing evidence and being “accurate”/“faithful”/“objective,” 
traditional labels often attached to DRS and used to explicate the distinction between 
this and other forms of quoted speech. Holt acknowledges the fact that this has been a
14
frequent preoccupation, but she does not explicitly take any definitive position in 
relation to it; she only goes as far as to suggest the existence of a paradox regarding 
DRS:
There is something of a paradox here, because, although DRS is structured as 
though it were the repetition of an utterance or utterances made on a previous 
occasion, analysis shows that this is unlikely to be the case. Clark and Gerrig 
(1990) argued convincingly against the assumption that DRS embodies the accurate 
quotation of former locutions, (p. 226)
Holt adds that Mayes (1990, cited in Holt, 1996, p. 226) has also challenged the
assumption that DRS is “accurate/“faithfur7“objective” by showing that, in her own
data, authenticity is doubtful in 50% of the cases. Moreover, Holt asserts, psychologists
have demonstrated that “verbatim recall is not often possible” (p. 226).
It seems to me that Holt herself may be influenced by the received linguistic view
whose main concern is the textual component of DRS: In discussing the design features
which characterize it, Holt asserts that features such as retention of deixis and prosody
serve to distinguish DRS from, for instance, indirect reported speech. Yet, Holt does not
provide one single counterexample to illustrate what characterizes indirect reported
speech, or any problematic case, as it were. Indeed, she uses Coulmas’s words
(Coulmas, 1986, cited in Holt, 1996) to introduce the section in which she discusses the
design features of DRS:
As Coulmas (1986) pointed out, what distinguishes DRS from indirect speech and 
from other kinds of utterances is that “it evokes the original speech situation and 
conveys, or claims to convey, the exact words of the original speaker in direct 
discourse” (p. 2). Thus, among the distinguishing features of DRS, pronouns, 
spatial and temporal references, and verb tenses are all appropriate to the reported 
speaker/context rather than the current one. (p. 222)
Starting from this assumption then, Holt goes on to analyze her own data in order to
argue her case, a recurrent strategy in the whole article. Therefore, I sense that, despite
her alleged CA stance, she misses an interactional fact that I perceive as crucial, the sort
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of interpersonal relationship DRS can establish between speaker/writer and his 
recipient.
'\
It strikes me that neither Holt nor any of her sources could work out a solution for 
the paradox she has referred to, namely that DRS can be effectively employed to 
provide evidence even though it is acknowledged that its alleged “accuracy”/ 
“fidelity”/“objectivity” is, at least, doubtful, if at all possible. I believe this remains 
unsolved because, as I have suggested before, the interpersonal (interactional) 
component has been overlooked while too much emphasis has been put on the linguistic 
expression. Therefore, I propose to shift the focus of the issue by asking what is the 
interactional reason/explanation for the fact that the recipient can perceive the use 
of DRS as conveying an “accurate”/“faithfuP7“objective” state of affairs? For, as 
the preceding discussion suggests, there is evidence that this happens to be the effect the 
use of DRS has on the recipient (see also Tannen’s, 1989, discussion on reported 
criticism).
In order to answer the above question, the notions “accurate,” “faithful,” and 
“objective,” deserve some consideration. Such notions seem to characterize a cognitive 
or philosophical concern rather than a strictly communicative one. The way I see it, if  
any message is structured in such a way so as to be demonstrably accepted by its 
recipient as plausible/believable, then that is all there is to it. It is not up for the analyst 
to question the “accuracy”/“fidelity”/“objectivity” of the message (regardless of its 
having the form of DRS or not) since it is clear that, in the situation in which it has been 
produced, its recipient showed no such concern. The following is a very practical 
illustration of what I mean, and one in which DRS has been employed.
I have been recurrently quoting what other researchers said before. If I have been 
convincing enough, you may well believe my (and their) words. From an interactional
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sociolinguistic standpoint, there is not much more to it: I wanted you to believe me, and 
you did; so the matter is settled. But if, on the other hand, you call what others and I 
have said into question, you may then be making an issue of the 
“accuracy”/“fidelity’7“objectivity” of my present claims. As a result, that would turn 
into a legitimate interactional sociolinguistic concern: for us to deal with and solve, and 
for any outside analyst to examine as well.
Whether you believe me (or my sources) or not, two interactional facts still hold. 
First of all, that I am claiming there is evidence for why I believe things are as I say, and 
want you to believe, they are (Holt, 1996; Pomerantz, 1984b). Secondly, that I am doing 
so by directly quoting the words of those who I  see as reliable authoritative sources 
(Pomerantz, 1984b). In this case, I am actually trying to mitigate my “accountability by 
presenting sources or bases for believing particular states of affairs, without accountably 
asserting” them (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609). That is to say that it is my communicative 
intent that you should accept what I am saying as plausible without you holding me 
accountable for proffering the accounting assertion(s).
This is so because people are ordinarily and constantly concerned with being 
accountable for their actions, regardless the specific activity they may be engaged in at 
any given moment. So, it applies to the sort of communicative activity we are currently 
engaged in, namely that of writing/reading a thesis. It also applies to storytelling, when 
the teller might be concerned with the plausibility of his story. Similarly, it is the story 
recipient’s business to attend to the story being told as believable, in the sense that it 
conforms to the expectations triggered off by the teller’s claim. The following 
considerations can help to clarify this point.
Sacks (1972, 1992) distinguishes between what he calls a “potentially correct 
description” from an “actually correct description” (1992, p. 254). The former means
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any description which does not violate/subvert a social norm of proper behavior,
whereas the latter has the additional component of being a description used “on some
occasion where it’s talking about something it characterizes” (p. 255). In other words,
what marks the boundary between one description and the other is the claim its
speaker/producer is making on the specific occasion when the description is employed:
The power of good lies is that they could be good descriptions, and what would 
differentiate the phenomenon ‘lies’ from ‘a story’ would be that one who tells a 
story makes no claim at all that he’s talking about some actual occurrence. A liar 
is presumably engaged in passing off his potentially correct description as actually 
correct. (Sacks, 1992, p. 255)
This serves to foreground the importance of the sort of claim being made by the 
producer of the discourse, and which its recipient is expected to be able to grasp. The 
question it raises then is how does the producer manage to communicate this claim to 
the recipient without having to overtly express it—as it appears to be the case when the 
speaker/writer employs DRS?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to bring into the current discussion 
the notions of “footing” (Goffman, 1981) and “frame” (Bateson, 1972), which are 
complementary concepts accounting for phenomena operative in interaction. These 
concepts work together in determining what Goffman refers to as the “production 
format” (p. 145) and the “participation framework” of talk-in-interaction (p. 137). In 
other words, footing and frame are organizational features of interaction which serve the 
production and the processing of all communicative events.
For Goffman (1981), footing is the alignment participants take up to themselves 
and to others in any given situation. Footing is, then, “expressed in the way 
[participants] manage the production or reception of an utterance” (p. 128). Moreover, 
changes in footing may occur at each and every moment of an on-going conversation. 
Due to this, participants are constantly monitoring each other’s moves in search of any
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signal that can indicate that even the slightest change in footing is likely so that they can 
be prepared to adjust to an eventual new footing. To put it differently, one participant 
usually signals, by means of altering the production format of his actions, that he is 
about to change his alignment and that the other party is being invited to change his 
own. Upon taking a new alignment himself, the other party may then be recognizing and 
ratifying the establishment of a new participation framework.
As for “frame,” Bateson (1972) defines it as, primarily, a psychological concept 
and, secondly, as an interactional phenomenon which establishes a metacommunicative 
message that interactants attend to during the course of the on-going interaction in order 
to make sense of it. Frame is, then, a set of elements (linguistic or not) which explicitly 
or implicitly delimit a class of meaningful actions/messages, thus, signaling how these 
actions/messages should be interpreted.
Footings and frames are interrelated in that changes in footing can be used as 
indicative that a new frame is about to be introduced in the on-going interaction. The 
change in footing thus functions as a preparatory move to the intended change in frame. 
It follows, therefore, that when current speaker uses what Holt (1996) has called 
“prefatory forms” (p. 225), he is actually signaling that he is changing his present 
alignment and that, from this point on (and during a period of time), he will be 
incorporating the utterances/actions of other(s) into his own discourse. Consequently, 
this is how the recipient should take what will be said and align accordingly. 
Furthermore, whether the process of incorporation will be a direct or indirect one is 
immaterial, at this specific interactional locus.
Nevertheless, in choosing to report what was said directly or indirectly, current 
speaker is establishing a new frame. One that adds a new dimension to the interaction 
by setting a metacommunicative message which indicates current speaker’s attitude
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toward and degree of detachment/affiliation to what will be reported and invites the 
recipient to actively evaluate it.
Thus, in shaping DRS so as to retain both original deixis and prosody, current 
speaker is simultaneously constructing an implicit metacommunicative message by 
which he claims that all information offered inside the limits of that frame should be 
regarded by the recipient as trustworthy, or, in Sacks’ (1992) terms, a “ potentially 
correct description.” In other words, the features which Holt (1996) asserts are used in 
the construction of DRS also concur to the building of a frame to provide the recipient 
with a metamessage on how to interpret what is being reported. Although Holt does not 
put it this way, she was able to perceive that DRS may actually have multiple functions: 
“Indeed it seems that DRS can be a highly economical device in that the entire 
quotation may have multiple functions” (p. 240). She identifies one of these functions as 
a means that current speaker has to signal to the recipient that what he is presently 
hearing should be taken as the reported speaker’s words rather than the current 
speaker’s (p. 238).
What I am arguing for is that this interpretive instruction is always implicit in 
DRS. Or, rather, this metacommunicative message is, in fact, a constitutive element of 
DRS. Additionally, the frame which is linguistically signaled by DRS has the power of 
activating a “knowledge schema” (Tannen, 1993) which sets up participants’ 
expectations in relation to people, objects, events, and scenes. In the specific case of the 
use of DRS in conversation, and as I believe, in written narratives, this schema informs 
current recipient that the messages now being conveyed should be regarded as 
plausible/believable. Furthermore, the way I see it, that is the very reason why DRS can 
demonstrably be employed to provide evidence, even of things and events that were not 
really expressed in utterances (e.g., thought), or did not actually take place, or even did
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not actually take place as current speaker says they did, but which could have been said 
or could have happened as current speaker claims they did.
2.1.2 A discourse analytical view on DRS in conversational narrative
In Talking voices: Repetition, dialogue and imagery in conversational discourse, 
Deborah Tannen (1989) deals with the analysis of the “animation of speech framed as 
voice other than the speaker’s” (p. 1), especially in oral narratives. Her main objective is 
to substantiate two assertions. The first is that, in incorporating another’s voice into his 
own speech, current speaker “bears full responsibility and credit” (p. 4) for the 
“creation” of a speech which Tannen designates “constructed dialogue”—thus rejecting 
the traditional term “reported speech” (p. 4), for, she argues, it may never have been 
actually produced by any speaker previously. Secondly, Tannen claims that “speakers 
use constructed dialogue to create scenes peopled by characters in relation to each other, 
scenes which hearers and readers recreate upon hearing/reading, resulting in both 
understanding and involvement” (p. 4). Moreover, it is Tannen’s underlying assumption 
that “conversational discourse provides the source for [understanding and involvement] 
strategies which are taken up by other, including literary, genres, both spoken and 
written” (p. 2). Consequently, an “understanding of the language of everyday 
conversation is needed as a basis” for language and literary scholarship (p. 1).
I align with much of what Tannen argues for, but I do not fully agree with some of 
the arguments she presents, nor do I believe the terminology she uses is the most 
appropriate. I provide the following discussion of her claims and some terminological 
items in order to emphasize the interactional aspect of the phenomenon in question.
The very first paragraph in the introduction of Tannen’s book corroborates two of 
my initial assumptions, namely that written narratives have a lot in common with their
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oral/conversational counterparts, and that DRS, or “constructed dialogue,” is employed
by storytellers as a means of promoting and sustaining audience involvement:
The central idea of this book is that ordinary conversation is made up of linguistic 
strategies that have been thought quintessentially literary. These strategies, which 
are shaped and elaborated in literary discourse, are pervasive, spontaneous, and 
functional in ordinary conversation. I call them “involvement strategies” because, 
I argue, they reflect and simultaneously create interpersonal involvement, (p. 1)
In fact, the whole book is devoted to re-stating the assertion made elsewhere
(Tannen, 1982, 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989) that the strategies which occur in literary
discourse are similar to those normally used in ordinary conversation (see section 2.1.1).
Tannen reinforces this claim by means of the detailed discussion of three “involvement
strategies,” among which “constructed dialogue” figures prominently.
To understand both Tannen’s point of view as well as my own, it is necessary to
comprehend how each of us regard those similarities. It is also important to understand
the sense in which the phrases “involvement strategies” and “constructed dialogue” are
being used by Tannen. In addition, I propose to expand Tannen’s “involvement
strategy” by incorporating two crucial interactional notions, namely “ordinariness” and
“frames.”
Saying that “ordinary conversation is made up of linguistic strategies that have 
been thought quintessentially literary” serves well to illustrate the amazing paradox 
associated to language and its use. Western history, society, and especially literary 
scholarship, have contributed to assigning written language a misleading higher 
hierarchical status over that of spoken language. Yet, not only does spoken language 
precede any written code but it is the very source of the latter. That is to say, written 
code has been created so as to “mirror” the oral use of language—at least initially. It 
follows that, a number of structural patterns, mechanisms and strategies used in
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composing a written text might have been first “borrowed” from oral practice and, later,
adapted to suit the requirements of the written medium.
Written discourse, on its turn, has been regulated by social agents such as
prescriptive grammar, stylistics, rhetoric, and ultimately canon. All of which exert a
powerful normative control over written discourse. However, none of them exert as
great a power as to override the organizational similarity between written and oral
discourse, or rather between written and oral interaction (Clark, 1996). Moreover, this is
so because oral use of language is an orderly phenomenon, one which is regulated by an
even more powerful—however unrecorded or unnoticed—force, “the technology of
conversation” (see discussion below). All this is applicable to language use in general as
well as to particular instances of language use such as storytelling.
Tannen reports on a previous study (Tannen, 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989) in
which she compared spoken and written narrative and concluded that “ordinary
conversation and literary discourse have more in common than has been commonly
thought” (p. 15), especially in regard to the strategies employed.
In fact, storytelling is “at the heart of everyday life” (Rosen, nd, cited in Tannen,
1989, p. 103). This is exactly what Sacks (1984) claims to be the essence of the job of
“doing ‘being ordinary’:”
The cast of mind of doing “being ordinary” is essentially that your business in life 
is only to see and report the usual aspects of any possible usual scene. That is to 
say, what you look for is to see how any scene you are in can be made an ordinary 
scene, (p. 416)
What Sacks is arguing for, in other words, is that whatever people experience in 
the conduct of their mundane daily lives necessarily entails the possibility that they tell 
about these experiences on a later occasion. Or, as he puts it, “people monitor the scenes 
they are in for their storyable characteristics” (Sacks, 1984, p. 417).
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Sacks goes on to assert that there is “some immensely powerful kind of 
mechanism operating in handling your perceptions and thoughts” (p. 418). Such 
sophisticated mechanism regulates both the living through those experiences and the 
telling about them. Sacks (1984) calls this mechanism “the technology of conversation” 
(p. 413), which he defines as the “techniques’7“procedures”/“methods” that “generate 
the orderly features” (p. 413) to be found in conversation.
The point Sacks is making here is that being an ordinary person in the world 
implies using language. Moreover, in so doing, the person is not merely uttering words 
but, most significantly, the person is performing actions; actions which both construct 
the social world and are, simultaneously, regulated by this very same socially 
constructed reality. Storytelling plays a significant role in making sense of this reality, 
or, in Tannen’s (1989) words, “storytelling is a means by which humans organize the 
world and feel connected to each other” (p. 103).
What allows for this feeling of connectedness is precisely what Sacks (1984) 
refers to as “an attitude of working at being usual” (p. 429). An attitude that is 
eventually determined and recognized as such by the culture of the specific group to 
which the individuals belong.
As a result, storytelling can only be regarded as “spontaneous” (Tannen, 1989, p.
1) in that it lies at the very core of human experience. Yet, in being finely attuned to 
whatever makes up for “ordinariness”/“usualness,” storytelling is handled by that 
“powerful mechanism” which operates in any conversational activity. Furthermore, 
since it is a particular sort of conversational activity, there are some specific 
mechanisms which are operative in storytelling.3
From what I have been arguing so far, I hope to have made it clear that the use of 
DRS/“constructed dialogue” is a mechanism available to the teller as a means of
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organizing and presenting the narrative. One mechanism which does allow for the 
recipient to take a more active role in the storytelling activity. Thus, a mechanism which 
can be viewed as an “involvement strategy.”
Tannen explains that the sense in which she is employing “involvement” 
encompasses both Chafe’s (1985, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 11), which emphasizes the 
psychological component of the concept, and Gumperz’s (1982), which highlights the 
essentially interactional aspect of it. Her own sense of the term can be summed up as 
“an internal, even emotional connection individuals feel which binds them to other 
people as well as to places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and words” (p. 12). 
Additionally, this psychological link, she adds, does not pre-exist the individual’s living 
through experiences, but is achieved through interaction, or, as Tannen puts it, it is “an 
achievement in conversational interaction” (p. 12).
It follows that, in order to achieve involvement, participants necessarily have to 
share enough “linguistic and socio-cultural knowledge” (Gumperz, 1982, p. 3) to be 
able to make inferences which allow them “to derive frames [emphasis added] in terms 
of which they can interpret what is going on” (p. 2). In other words, it is the very 
possibility of grasping the metamessages implied by those frames that allows parties to 
be able to act appropriately during the interaction and, thus, to experience the feeling of 
“connectedness (to other participants, to the language, to the world)” (Tannen, 1989, p. 
13).
Tannen—following Becker (1982, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 13)—claims that 
understanding and connectedness are a matter of “an aesthetic response” (p. 13), which 
she equates to the “ability to perceive coherence [in discourse]” (p. 13). Such a claim 
should be viewed with caution, for the notion of “an aesthetic response” may appear to 
foreground undesired connotations such as “ecstasy,” or “envelopment,” long associated
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to one’s experiencing “Beauty.” Therefore, the connection with one’s perception of 
coherence in discourse may seem fuzzy. Indeed, perceiving coherence is not merely a 
matter of a purely emotional experience, it also involves cognitive processes. As a 
matter of fact, what is at stake here is not just parties’ ability “to perceive” coherence, 
but their ability to jointly construct it (Clark, 1996; Jacoby & Ochs, 1995). In addition, 
it should be noted that what participants co-construct is coherence in interaction, not in 
discourse alone.
Thus, I believe that, although entailing a certain degree of emotional response, 
understanding and connectedness are primarily a matter of one being able to recognize 
and produce interactional frames, as weir as the metamessages they communicate. 
Bateson (1972) argues that abnormalities in the individual’s handling of frames are 
typical of certain forms of psychopathology such as schizophrenia: “The absence of 
metacommunicative framing (...) is characteristic of the waking communications o f the 
schizophrenic” (p. 190).4 Frames, then, in being related to cognitive processes, can 
activate background, familiar schemas which account for success in communication 
(Tannen & Wallat, [1987] 1993): However, it is hard to demonstrate participants’ sense 
of satisfaction when they manage to produce coherence during an on-going interaction.
Differently from smooth interaction, when problems of communication arise, that 
is, when participants sense that their own schemas/frames do not match (or only 
partially match) those of the other party, failure can be easily demonstrated. Frustration, 
or at least uneasiness, can result from this perception, as well as from the knowledge 
that repairing problems is interactionally costly. So, when trouble occurs, it can either 
require that participants do extra work or it can lead parties to inferring about the other’s 
unwillingness to cooperate, in which case, involvement is compromised. As a 
consequence, miscommunication, or even communication failure, is likely to occur.5
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To put it differently, if participants to talk-in-interaction are actively and
successfully sustaining interactional involvement, then everything runs smoothly.
!
Otherwise, parties will signal non-involvement, even if temporary, by means of 
demonstrably orienting to the problem(s) perceived.
To sum up, the foregoing discussion provides the necessary link between the 
interactional and the psychological components which Tannen rightly suggests to 
interplay in establishing and sustaining audience involvement in storytelling activity. 
Thus, participants’ feeling of understanding and connectedness—or simply 
involvement—presupposes their ability to recognize and handle interactional frames 
appropriately. This, in turn, depends on participants being able to co-construct 
ordinariness.
Now, as for the second element of the phrase “involvement strategy,” Tannen 
reasons that, although the term “strategy” is usually associated to her unintended 
meaning of “conscious planning” or even “plotting” (p. 15), she decided to adopt it 
because this term has been largely employed in linguistic research. In this tradition, 
“strategy” is generally used to convey the idea of a “systematic way of using language” 
(p. 15). I have also been, and will continue, using the term in this latter sense.
I shall now turn to the discussion of the phrase “constructed dialogue.” Tannèn 
(1989) proposes “constructed dialogue” as a more appropriate term than the traditional 
and “misleading” phrase “reported speech.” However, I believe that, the phrase 
“constructed dialogue” may be just as misleading as the traditional one. Most 
significantly, the way Tannen uses it seems to be fraught with a certain degree of 
inconsistency.
Tannen argues, first of all, that “reported speech” encompasses both what is 
“commonly understood to apply when another’s utterance is framed as dialogue
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[emphasis added] in other’s voice”—“direct quotation”—and what is “commonly 
understood to apply when another’s speech is paraphrased in the current speaker’s 
voice”—“indirect quotation”—(p. 98). She adds that this distinction is valid only in the 
abstract, for when it comes to “actual discourse, many equivocal cases arise” (p. 98). 
Therefore, Tannen’s “constructed dialogue” is intended to refer to any form of 
“reported speech.”
This idea is reinforced by the notion that any utterance is ultimately the 
“absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva, 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 
99), a notion originally conceived by Voloshinov ([1929] 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 
99)/Bakhtin ([1952] 1986, cited in Tannen, 1989, p. 99) and which Tannen folly 
incorporates into her own sense of “dialogue:”
For Voloshinov/Bakhtin, dialogue is crucial: not dialogue per se, that is the 
exchange of turns that is of central concern to conversation analysts, but the 
polyphonic nature of all utterance, of every word. (p. 99)
Additionally, Tannen draws attention to the fact that “the reported speech” (p. 
101) is dynamically interrelated to both the reported context—in which it was originally 
produced—and the reporting context—in which it is presently being reproduced. Due to 
this change in context, Tannen argues, “the reported speech” is “inevitably” (p. 101) 
transformed: “I am claiming that the term ‘reported speech’ is grossly misleading in 
suggesting that one can speak another’s words and have them remain primarily the 
other’s words” (p. 101). For her, then, current speaker appropriates the words by 
another when he repeats them; consequently, those words cease “to be those of the 
speaker to whom they are attributed” (p. 101). Due to this, she posits, those words 
should rather be regarded as current speaker’s creation.
Finally, Tannen claims that “much of what appears in discourse as dialogue 
[emphasis added], or ‘reported speech’, was never uttered by anyone else in any form”
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(p. 101). For this reason, she claims, “uttering dialogue [emphasis added] in 
conversation is much a creative act as is the creation of dialogue [emphasis added] in 
fiction and drama” (p. 101). In order to illustrate this, she provides a number of 
instances in which “a speaker represents an utterance as the words of another, [and] 
what results is by no means describable as ‘reported speech.’ Rather it is constructed 
dialogue” (p. 109).
The examples provided by Tannen include:
1) “dialogue” [emphasis added] representing what was not said, that is, what one 
felt like saying but which was withheld instead. In the following example, the speaker is 
telling about how she felt embarrassed when her father berated her in front of others for 
not having done what he had told her to;
(1) You can’t say, “Well Daddy I didn’t HEAR you.” (p. 111),6
2) “dialogue” [emphasis added] as instantiation, or dialogue constructed so as to 
illustrate an utterance type which is recurrent—similar, for instance, to an adage or 
saying. In this example, the man is telling about how his mother set his father up as one 
to be feared:
(3) whenever something happened,
then “Oh wait until your father comes.” (p. 112);
3) summarizing “dialogue” [emphasis added], in which the gist rather than the 
actual words of what was said is represented. Now, current speaker is talking about one 
occasion when she was at a Philippine restaurant with some other people and one of 
them criticized their being there:
(5) and this man is essentially saying
-> “We shouldn’t be here
-> because Imelda Marcos owns this restaurant.” (p. 113);
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4) choral “dialogue” [emphasis added], when one single utterance is attributed to 
more than one speaker. Here, some Americans have been waiting in line at the Athens 
airport for some hours when a Greek woman tried to break into the line. The Americans 
started to object, but in learning that she had small children with her:
(6) And then all Americans said 
-> “Oh in that case, go ahead.” (p. 113);
5) “dialogue” [emphasis added] as inner speech, that is, current speaker’s thought. 
The speaker was riding in a car of the New York subway, and a strange man entered the 
car:
(8) started mumbling about. . . perverts,
-> . . .  and I thought “Oh God,
-> if I am going to get
someone’s slightly psychotic attitude on perverts 
-> I really don’t feel like riding this train.” (p. 114)
6) “dialogue” [emphasis added] as someone else’s inner speech. Here, a woman 
tells about a girl who was riding a bicycle with a basketball stuffed under her skirt, 
giving her the appearance of being pregnant. The girl fell off the bicycle and was almost 
hit by a bus:
(11) And the bus driver was like “Oh my Go::d!” (p. 115)
There are many other examples, which include recipient’s own contribution to the 
storytelling, indirect discourse fading into direct discourse, an utterance attributed to a 
nonhuman speaker, and an utterance in which the speaker uses vague deixis. The 
examples I quoted above, though, suffice as a starting point for my own discussion of 
the terms “dialogue” and “constructed.”
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First of all, and most noticeably, although “dialogue” is initially intended to refer 
to any form of reported speech (see p. 26), all the preceding examples are actually 
instances of “direct quoting.” In fact, there is not a single example of indirect quoting 
among the twenty-one examples Tannen provides; and there are only two instances in 
which direct quoting and indirect quoting are mixed up. Therefore, “dialogue” seems to 
be standing rather for “direct quote” than for “reported speech.”
Secondly, in spite of being intended to emphasize the polyphonic nature of 
discourse (see p: 27), “dialogue” is used, by and large, in the sense of turns at talk (see, 
for instance, the highlighted occurrences of “dialogue,” pages 26 through 29); or, rather, 
a turn at talk, as in the preceding examples. In only two occasions out of the twenty- 
one examples were utterances paired up in dialogue-like form.
In short, it seems that Tannen’s focus of attention is, in fact, on instances in which 
single utterances appear in direct discourse. This does not account for the distinction 
between direct and indirect reported speech, which Holt suggests rightly to be operative 
in conversation (see discussion on section 2.1.1). Nor does it take into account the 
potential of dialogue—turns at talk—as an interactional achievement, which I perceive 
as crucial to storytelling.
As for Tannen’s argument that direct reported speech cannot be viewed as the 
objective rendering of one’s actual words due to the polyphonic nature of discourse and 
to the fact that it may often be the representation of inner speech or of what was not 
said, this is subject to questioning.
One possible objection to it was raised by Holt (1996), who demonstrated that 
DRS/“dialogue” can be used to report thoughts as well as other non-linguistic actions 
(see section 2.1.1): Additionally, the utterances supposedly being reported could well be 
used as situational equivalents of one’s gestures or actions, as in example 6 on page 29:
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dialogue as inner speech. According to Goffman ([1964] 1972), utterances produced in 
the course of a social encounter do “a further job” (p. 65) than that of being mere 
linguistic expression, and it is this job that matters most. As a result: “Many of the 
properties of talk will have to be seen as alternatives to, or functional equivalents of, 
extra-linguistic acts” (p. 65).
A second objection derives from Holt’s discussion about the alleged “accuracy”/ 
“fidelity”/“objectivity” of DRS. She cited sources who claimed that DRS may, in fact, 
sometimes be accurate and at some other times not. Now, even if we only consider
I
Tannen’s argument that reporting another’s words is not possible due to the polyphonic 
nature of all utterances, this objection stilt holds. Therefore, I would not go as far as to 
assert that every “dialogue” that appears in current speaker’s speech ought to be 
regarded as the product of his creative mind. Such a position completely eliminates the 
possibility of verbatim recalls.7 In addition, such a position seems as extreme as that 
expressed by, the traditional linguistic view, according to which DRS is repetition of 
one’s actual words. I believe there is a compromise solution, grounded in strictly 
interactional reasons; which leads me to the third possible objection to Tannen’s 
argument.
As I have argued in section 2.1.1, from a communicative perspective, what really 
matters is current speaker’s claim regarding what he is quoting, as well as the 
recipient’s reaction to it—whether it is accepted as a “potentially correct description” or 
not (see pp. 16-17). Thus, in the examples Tannen supplied, current speaker’s 
“reporting,” not one’s actual words, but his own interpretation of the (linguistic and 
non-linguistic) actions performed in the situation being depicted, should not be viewed 
as interactionally deviant or exceptional. Rather, it should be viewed as the rule.8 First 
of all, because participants are demonstrably orienting their actions to the construction
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of such a “joint pretense” (Clark, 1996, p. 360), that is, a joint activity in which parties 
coordinate their actions to produce and ratify a projected, make-believe reality (Clark, 
1996, chapter 3). Secondly, because what allows for the possibility of such a joint 
pretense is the laminative nature of the phenomenon itself (see further discussion at the 
end of this section and in the next).
Furthermore, Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides five 
definitions for the entry “to construct.” Two of which seem to fit Tannen’s idea of 
“creation” of dialogue. The first one is: “to form, make, or create by combining parts or
I
elements” as in “constructing a new freeway/a d o r m ito r y the second reads: “to 
fabricate out of heterogeneous or discordant elements” as in “constructed international
I
language” (p. 489). “Out of heterogeneous elements” is precisely the underlying 
semantic feature in the word “constructed” which renders it inadequate to describe the 
phenomenon in question.
Consider, for example, the construction of a building. One takes a number of 
diverse materials such as bricks, cement, iron, wood, glass, and so on, and puts them all 
together in such a way that what results—the building—by no means resembles, or 
could be described in terms of, its original components. Similarly, if we think of 
“dialogue” as being the result of a construction, what we may be implicitly admitting is 
that it does not resemble whatever components it is made of.
My claim, then, goes in another direction. If a speaker is now producing 
“dialogue,” he does not start from any other possible thing but “dialogue:” as a 
competent member of a particular group, current speaker draws on his own knowledge 
of what “dialogue” is and ends up with nothing else but “dialogue.” In other words, the 
speaker “looks for” what is ordinarily perceived as “dialogue” and does his best to 
produce something that can ordinarily be accepted as “dialogue.” This is clearly an
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illustration of what Sacks (1984) refers to as taking “an attitude of working at being 
usual” (p. 429) (see the discussion about “doing ‘being ordinary’ ” on pp. 22-23; see 
also the discussion on “potentially correct description” on pp. 16-17).
Having this in mind, I believe that what current speaker is actually doing when he 
animates another’s voice is to “re-present” dialogue: present dialogue again. In this 
sense—and especially in this sense—, dialogue in conversational narrative and dialogue 
in written narrative can, and should, be equated. I am suggesting that “represented 
dialogue” seems, at least provisionally, a more appropriate term for the phenomenon in 
question than does “constructed dialogue” (this issue is advanced in chapter 3).
Nevertheless, Tannen’s argument that dialogue in conversation ought to be viewed as 
a construction/creation results from her intention “to question the conventional 
American literal conception of ‘reported speech’” (p. 101), according to which “the 
literal truth of the report is not questioned” (p. 105).
As I have discussed earlier, Holt (1996) demonstrates that DRS, or rather 
“represented dialogue,” is actually used by conversationalists to provide evidence. It so 
happens, I have argued, because the introduction of represented dialogue both signals a 
change in footing and concurs to establishing a frame which instructs recipients on how 
to interpret what is going on within it. Tannen’s “constructed dialogue” does not fully 
consider the significance of both “footing” and “frame.” Nor does it take into account 
the fact that communication operates simultaneously at several “levels of abstraction” 
(Bateson, 1972, p. 177-178), of which the primary level is the literal one. The level in 
which what matters is that which is “materialized” in linguistic form. Yet the level from 
which all other possible levels derive.
In discussing the notion of footing, Goffman (1981) argues that most utterances 
are structured in such a way so as to allow for speaker’s “unrestricted displacement in
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time and place” (p. 148) and unrestricted projection of oneself as well as other’s self. 
This means that the speaker can actually project figures/characters who belong “to the
I
world that is spoken about, not the world in which speaking occurs” (p. 147). Goffman 
calls this “embedding” and asserts that “multiple embedding” (p. 150) is also possible— 
and this phenomenon he terms “lamination” (p. 154).
Lamination, then, accounts for the possibility of transplantation of “the
I
participation arrangement that is natural in one social situation into an interactional
environment in which it isn’t” (p. 153). As a result, not only does lamination allow for
the embedding of utterances but, most significantly, for the embedding of interaction
and interaction arrangements as well.
Moreover, if lamination is operative in any form of ordinary conversation, it is
even more so in storytelling—which happens to be a particular instance of
conversational activity:
Storytelling, of course, requires the teller to embed in his own utterances the 
utterances and actions of the story’s characters. And a full-scale story requires that 
the speaker remove himself for the telling’s duration from the alignment he would 
maintain in ordinary conversational give and take, and for this period of narration 
maintain another footing, that of a narrator. (Goffman, 1981, p. 152)
Therefore, the recognition of this laminative property of Storytelling constitutes the
appropriate theoretical and methodological basis for the investigation of “represented
dialogue” both in conversational and in written narrative.
2.1.3 A discourse analytical view on represented dialogue in written narrative
Unlike Tannen (1989), whose main concern is dialogue in oral narratives, Caidas- 
Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) focuses on the examination of written factual and 
fictional dialogue, or rather “exchanges” (1988, p. 89) or “interactions” (1992, p.70). 
She sets out to demonstrate that both represented and reported speech, in spite of being
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grounded on “the knowledge of the structural properties of real talk” (1988, p. 89), are 
actually “reduced and simplified versions of talk in terms of the overall organisational 
features” and “the structural properties” (1988, p. 90; 1992, p. 70; 1994, p. 297) they 
exhibit. She also argues that fictional writers and factual reporters alike—the latter even
I
more—rely on “the reader’s ability to reconstruct what is not present in the discourse” 
(1998, p. 106; 1992, p. 71) or “in the interaction” itself (1988, p. 116).9
Caldas-Coulthard recognizes that teller and recipient are actively engaged in an 
interactional/communicative activity both in oral and written storytelling. But she 
makes a distinction between them in that, in the first sort of interaction, teller and 
listener are co-present and their interaction happens in “real time” (p. 37), while writer 
and reader are separate from one another spatially and temporally. In spite of that, 
written narratives are, she argues, recipient-designed in the sense that they “are 
organised to take account of a possible reader” (p. 38).
As a consequence of her seeing written narrative—or rather, any written text—“as 
a cultural interactive product directed to a specific reader” (p. 40), the text will 
inevitably carry “social and ideological meanings” (p. 40). This notion pervades her 
analysis of “the role of speech representation in written narratives” (p. 40).
Another aspect which Caldas-Coulthard introduces in her preliminary discussion 
of speech representation is the fact that narratives “can be layered and other interactive 
relations can occur” (p. 41), especially those interactions that “happen intratextually 
between narrators and characters” (p. 41). Layering accounts for several possible levels 
of interaction, starting from the one which “happens in the real world of authors and 
readers” (p. 42), ending at “the last layer of interaction” (p. 44) where character’s 
speech is represented, and including intermediate levels such as the level at which the 
narrator takes up the position of teller? and so on.
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The notion of layering Caldas-Coulthard employs was developed by literary 
scholars whose main concern is to describe literary narrative, particularly in relation to 
issues o f diagesis (Chatman, 1978; Leech & Short, 1981, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 
1988, p.42). This concept of layering turns out to be similar to Goffman’s (1981) notion 
of “lamination.” However, lamination is more comprehensive in that it applies to 
communication/interaction in general, not just to particular types of activities such as 
literary storytelling (see discussion in section 2.1.2).
Caldas-Coulthard argues that the incorporation of the voices of others into one’s
I
own discourse is a means by which “recounters” (p. 61) detach themselves from what is 
being recounted. She adopts the term suggested by Fairclough (1988), namely 
“representation of speech,” to refer to the incorporation of speech both in factual and in 
fictional narratives, because, in either case, “there is always a decision [of the recounter] 
to interpret and represent” speech (Fairclough , 1988, p. 1, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 
1988. p. 62).
As I have discussed in the previous section, I believe that “represented” speech is 
a more appropriate term than “reported”/“constructed” speech. I also believe—and in 
this I align with Caldas-Coulthard—that tellers decide if and how they will present the 
voices of others to their recipients. However, tellers act selectively both in regard to 
how voices are presented and to “whatever is to be animated.”
Furthermore, Caldas-Coulthard claims that any author “is a social agent” (p. 62), 
who occupies “a specific place in a social structure” (p. 62). Due to that, texts will 
necessarily reflect the values of the specific social group which their authors participate 
in. Consequently, when authors represent or create characters’ conversation, they do so 
“according to their motives and ideological constraints” (p. 62). In other words, authors’
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decisions concerning what to say and how to say something cannot be viewed as 
neutral.
As a result, she claims, represented interaction “differs in significant ways from 
real interaction” (p. 62), even though writers “represent what they think 
conversationalists say when engaged in conversation” (p. 62). What Caldas-Coulthard,is 
suggesting, then, is that writers’ “assumptions about real interaction” (p. 62) do not 
correspond to what real interaction is. These assumptions can either lead to 
exaggeration or simplification of features of real interaction—or, as the findings of her 
studies indicate, just simplification/reduction.
In order to demonstrate that represented interaction is, in fact, reduced and 
simplified in comparison to real interaction, Caldas-Coulthard focuses on, on the one 
hand, aspects of overall organization in conversation and, on the other hand, on the 
structural properties of conversation. She asserts that she draws on both the works of 
“ethnomethodologists (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson)” (p. 64) to account for overall 
organization, and on “the Birmingham model of Discourse Analysis” (p. 91)— 
especially as proposed by authors such as Sinclair and Coulthard (1972, cited in Caldas- 
Coulthard, 1988, p. 91), Coulthard (1977, 1985, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 91), 
and Coulthard and Brazil (1979, cited in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 91)—to explicate 
the structural properties of conversation.
In her discussion of “overall organisation of conversation” (p. 63), Caldas- 
Coulthard takes into consideration only two of the features which ethnomethodologists 
and conversation analysts have demonstrated to be operative in terms of sequential 
organization, namely conversation openings, pre-closings and closings, and the turn- 
taking system.
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Following Schegloff and Sacks (1973), Caldas-Coulthard points out that 
openings, pre-closings and closings “are formalized, recognized and accomplished by 
participants in the interaction” (p. 65). Among possible opening sequences, she pays
special attention to the exchange of greetings; requests for information, actions and
!
services, and apologies—typically occurring between strangers—; a summons-answer 
sequence such as that which happens in telephone conversations; and phatic communion
[
exchanges like talking about the weather. She claims that:
In general (...) phatic exchanges are simplified, if not totally excluded from 
fictional dialogue.
Interestingly, like phatic communion, opening and closing sequences are rarely 
present in fictive interaction. If openings do appear, narrators tend to report them 
in the cotext in which the report is inserted, rather than in the dialogue itself as 
“quote”, (pp. 75-76)
In fact, she included only a few examples of interaction where openings—which 
play “such an important role in real talk” (p. 77)—appear. For, when they do appear, she 
claims, “their presence is super-significant because they do not simply mark beginnings 
of interactions but something else which the reader has to derive from” (p. 77).
Caldas-Coulthard quotes a passage from Anthony Burgess’ The Malayan Trilogy, 
in which two characters (Crabbe and Fenella) are at Talbot’s, waiting for him, when he 
arrives and says:
“Don’t tell me, don’t tell me”, said Talbot. “It’s Bishop. We’re back together 
again. God, it’s been a long time. Mrs Bishop, how are vou? Young and beautiful 
as ever, despite the heavy weight of the years. And the other boys, how are they, 
Bishop?” (p. 78)
In discussing this example, she concludes that:
The significance of the greeting and the reason for its appearance at all is that Mr 
Talbot does not recognize Crabble and Fenella and talks to them as if they were 
Mr and Mrs Bishop. The greeting is an economical way of showing this.
[emphasis added] (p. 78)
The foregoing example and the conclusion which follows it are revealing. It is 
stated that the use of interaction is “economical” in terms of narrative development. And
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this is so exactly because interaction can be viewed as “supermeaningful” (p. 75). But 
the sense in which I can perceive represented interaction as “supermeaningful” differs 
from that which seems to be the sense in which Caldas-Coulthard means it. From her 
standpoint, “supermeaningful” is clearly related to the author’s “intentions” and 
“ideology,” which is ultimately what makes her/him manipulate characters’ interaction.
While one cannot deny that authors choose to employ certain devices which can better
i
convey the meaning of the story—a meaning which is certainly related to the fact that 
this specific author is telling this story, and not any other one—, represented interactiqn 
turns out to be a “supermeaningful” device because readers are allowed to poke into the 
intratextual reality and, say, “see” characters’ stances and actions, and so they can draw 
their own conclusions about what is being seen (see section 2.1.1).
My present claim is that interaction as a whole, or any interactional sequence such 
as openings, is not “supermeaningful” just because it happens to appear in a piece of 
literary work fraught with its author’s ideological orientation; it is “supermeaningful” 
because communication (interaction/conversation) is multilayered (see discussion in 
section 2.1.2). This is why utterances acquire, or rather can be assigned, multiple-level 
meanings: literal and non-literal; serious and nonserious (Clark, 1996); linguistic, 
metalinguistic and metacommunicative (Bateson, 1972). Consequently, in the case of 
the example quoted,, in the primary literal level/layer, the character (Mr. Talbot) is 
“only” greeting the others. Whereas, in a non-literal level, the man is telling his visitors 
about his bad memory. Indeed, this can only be inferred from the greeting because 
Crabbe and Fenella know—as Mr. Talbot, who is supposedly acquainted with them 
should know—they are not Mr. and Mrs. Bishop.
I am bringing in once again the notion of “lamination” (Goffman, 
1981)/“layering” (Clark, 1996), which Caldas-Coulthard herself alludes to as
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characteristic of narratives. What I am claiming, then, is that, at the level of 
author/narrator-reader interaction, it is true that the author/narrator is “guiding” the 
reader into seeing things as the author himself perceives them. Represented interaction 
can help the author accomplish this in an economical way because the author need not 
“narrate” what readers can unmistakably infer—or, in Caldas-Coulthard’s words, 
“reconstruct” (p. 106):—for themselves (see section 2.1.1).
There is yet one aspect of the analysis of the intratextual reality level which is 
crucial for my own argumentation, and which deserves proper attention. In the case of 
the example quoted previously, there is no doubt that what we have is a representation 
of an opening sequence performed by the characters—or at least by Mr. Talbot, since 
only his utterance has been provided. An opening sequence which can effectively 
communicate both that Mr. Talbot is greeting his visitors and that he is having problems 
in recognizing people. These messages are conveyed to the reader by the actions of the 
character (DRS), and not by the author’s/narrator’s words (reporting discourse).
One crucial question that arises from this fact is: If one were to go through such a 
situation in real life, would he not infer that the man is having a hard time retrieving 
items from his memory? Of course the same inference could be drawn from such a 
situation. Because ordinary people in the world regard being mistaken for somebody 
else as socially inappropriate. As a result, people could either take offense, and react 
accordingly, or show tolerance/compassion for the person’s getting confused. The latter 
seems to be the alternative explored by the author in question. Therefore, instead of 
appearing “simplified,” the use of that specific opening section looks quite complex. 
Such opening appears as complex as it can be in real life. This cannot be downplayed by 
the fact that the author had such or such intention and/or ideology, that is, by the fact 
that authors act selectively as to what to include in/exclude from the narrative.
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The same can be applied to pre-closing and closing sequences, if one’s concern is 
to find out whether or not represented interaction is similar to real interaction and, 
above all, to what extent it happens. When represented interaction is focused on, the
relevant question is: “Could people ordinarily act and interpret one another’s actions in
i
the same way, by using the same interactional techniques/mechanisms?”
Furthermore, it seems that the role sequences such as openings, pre-closings and 
closings play in real interaction is being overestimated. These sequences, however 
elaborate in structure and however expected their occurrence may be, are usually 
designed to perform the tasks suggested by the literal reference of the terms. Once these 
tasks are accomplished in interaction, the function of those sequences has been fulfilled. 
Yet, as I have suggested above, opening, pre-closing and closing sequences can 
simultaneously perform other tasks (in represented interaction as) in ordinary 
conversation besides that which they normally do. Such is the case of the example 
quoted before.
Furthermore, as I have suggested before, authors are free to act selectively as to 
what they decide to include in their stories. So, they may, in fact, choose to present their 
recipients with an instance of a conversation, that is, something characterizable in 
terms of overall features of organization such as opening, pre-closing and closing 
sections and, above all, the larger section in which the topic(s) is (are) developed 
(Levinson, 1983). Alternatively, though, authors may just present a section or 
subsection (one stage) of some supposedly major conversational activity. My data 
suggest that the latter seems to be a very frequent option indeed (see section 3.2.2).
What I mean is that authors do not often represent those kinds of sequences 
because their primary function is only quite too obvious. So, having narrators describe 
them seems to be more economical. Nevertheless, authors may choose to represent
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sequences like those when they want to convey the idea that characters are doing 
something else besides greeting one another, for instance—which, I repeat, may also 
happen in real, naturally occurring interaction.
Regarding the turn-taking system, Caldas-Coulthard points out that “writers of 
fictional and factual speech reports are certainly aware of turn-taking mechanisms” (p. 
80), but they only follow “the most basic rules in any conversation” (p. 80). According 
to her, this alone indicates that turn-taking is also simplified in fiction. She puts it as 
follows:J
The author is in absolute control of turn-taking mechanisms so turn-taking is npt 
locally organised, but author organised. Therefore, turn order, turn size, length of 
conversation, what parties say, distribution of turns, how talk shifts and the ways 
transfers are coordinated, are all going to be pre-determined by the writer, and not 
locally managed as in real interaction. The simplification of the turn-taking 
system reduces conversational organisation since the struggle for the floor and 
control over turns, for example, tend not to be reported, (pp. 80-81)
In addition, she draws attention to the fact that overlaps and gaps cannot usually
be found in represented interaction. Only silence seems to be attended to by writers in
order to signal “conflict or a momentary breakdown in the communication” (p. 82).
Finally, another argument she raises to support her claim that represented
interactions “are tidied-up versions of talk” (p. 82) is that “text is linear [so] it virtually
forces tidiness on written conversation” (pp. 82-83). She is referring specifically to the
fact that turns “generally terminate at utterance points, and have the characteristic of
being organised in an orderly way. In real conversation, by contrast, a speaker can
interrupt the current speaker in the middle of a turn” (p. 82).
As for turn-taking, although I acknowledge that authors do control aspects of the
turn-taking system such as length of conversation, distribution and contents of turns,
turn order, and turn size, this argument does not seem sufficient grounds to concluding
that “represented interaction” is reduced/simplified.- From the interactional
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sociolinguistic perspective I subscribe to, it seems there are some important facts 
missing in this discussion.
First of all, the turn-taking system described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 
([1974] 1978) is not the only basic mechanism operative in sequential organization of 
face-to-face interaction. In fact, conversation analysts have demonstrated that it works 
in tandem with other mechanisms which have not been included in  Caldas-Coulthard’s 
discussion of “the properties of real talk” (1988, p. 89). The mechanisms I  am referring 
to are: adjacency pairs (Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973), the notion of 
conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1972), the notion of preference organization 
(Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, part II), and topic progression (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984, 
part III).
Secondly, the object being focussed on here is by no means face-to-face, naturally
I
occurring conversation. Rather, it is viewed as a particular instance of language use 
which derives from that “basic setting of language use” (Clark, 1996, p. 8). Moreover, it 
is an instance of language use which occurs within another, namely storytelling.
As I have discussed in section 2.1.2, lamination/layering plays a crucial role in 
structuring storytelling activity, or, in Clark’s.(1996) words, “layering is a feature of all 
types of stories” (p. 360) (see also section 3.2). It follows therefore that one cannot look 
at characters’ conversational exchanges without taking lamination/layering into account. 
This also applies, of course, to the specific issue of turn-taking. If characters appear to 
be managing the turns they take at speaking, one could not possibly expect that this is 
going on in another world but the fictional reality, or the projected layer. Indeed, the 
fact that characters’ interaction is embedded into the teller’s/narrator’s words suggests 
that there may be certain constraints imposed on its design features, one of which is the 
turn-taking system. What I am suggesting, then, is that the kind of turn-taking system
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which is operative in “represented interaction” might perhaps differ from the turn-taking
system as described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), that is “in its
simplest systematic form” (p. 8). As is the case in other non-basic forms of language use
(e. g. classroom or courtroom talk) which constitute speech exchange systems that are
modified versions of ordinary conversation, the sociological bedrock.
In describing the turn-taking system operative in the basic setting of face-to-face
conversation, Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974]) 1978) also provided for the
possibility of such a turn-taking system suffering adaptations according to the particular
sort of activity which the analyst is currently looking at:
An investigator interested in some sort of activity that is organized by a turn- 
taking will want to determine whether, how, and how much the sort of activity 
investigated is adapted to, or constrained by, the particular form of turn-taking 
operating in it. (p. 8)
In fact, previous research has already demonstrated that this “basic” turn-taking
i
system does suffer adaptation according to: 1) whether the conversation can be 
characterized as institutional talk, where turns are usually pre-allocated; 2) the type of 
activity presently at hand, such as the extended turns which occur in storytelling 
(Goodwin, 1984); and 3) the socio-cultural environment in which conversation is 
carried out (Shultz, Florio & Erickson, 1982).
Considering that there is a particular form of turn-taking system operating in 
storytelling and given that storytelling itself presupposes lamination/layering as one of 
its design features, one might reason that characters’ conversational exchanges might be 
further constrained by virtue of their “projected” status. Indeed, it seems that characters’ 
turn-taking might be especially designed in accordance with the projected nature of their 
interaction. What I am now suggesting, then, is that there might be a specific form of 
turn-taking system operating in the projected reality. Moreover, this “projected turn- 
taking system” seems to be, as Caldas-Coulthard points out, systematically author-
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organized. Yet, it also appears that the “projected turn-taking system” is organized by 
authors in such a way that it can simulate characters’ local management of their turns at 
speaking. If so, “the projected turn-taking” may still bear enough similarities with that 
“basic” turn-taking system operating in real, face-to-face conversation, as in all forms of 
language use (Clark, 1996). My own data points in this direction, as the analysis of 
characters’ interaction in chapter 4 demonstrates.
As for the occurrence of overlaps, interruptions, and gaps—lapses or attributable
silences (Sacks, ScheglofF & Jefferson, [1974] 1978)—, they may not be always!
represented, but (as I have noted in relation to openings, pre-closings and closings) they 
certainly occur whenever they are relevant to the story in question. For example, in 
Poe’s The cask o f Amontillado (see Appendix) there are two instances of interruption by 
the character Fortunato, who is demonstrably competing for the floor.
My data also show instances where silence occurs. Sometimes attributable silence- 
—when one of the participants simply does not produce something which he was 
expected to contribute as a reply to the other party’s prior turn (as in Austen’s Pride and 
prejudice, in section 4.1.5). At other times, silence is being employed as a “conflict- 
management strategy” (Tannen, 1990)—as in F. O’Connor’s A good man is hard to 
find, in section 4.1.3. Therefore, this evidence reinforces what I have claimed before 
regarding authors being free to decide what to include in/exclude from their stories.
Last, as for Caldas-Coulthard argument that “written text forces tidiness” (p. 82) 
to represented interaction, this cannot be denied. Yet, this is also true in relation to any 
written text, because the written code is highly conventionalized—even normatized. No 
oral text can be transposed to the written medium and remain what it was when 
originally spoken. Indeed, conversation analysts and interactional sociolinguists have 
reported on the difficulties which transcriptions of naturally occurring conversation
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impose on the analytical work. For, in being written versions of spoken language, 
transcriptions also need to be adapted according to certain conventions, which means
j
that there are decisions to be made (Ochs, 1979; Psathas, 1995). What I am claiming, in 
short, is that it is the differences between the two modalities—oral and written—which 
impose such limitations to the representation of interaction in general, and of fictional 
interaction, in particular. So, adaptation to the requirements o f the written modality ^ is 
not only desired/able, but it is taken for granted as part of the organization of non-basic, 
written uses of language (see discussion in section 2.1.1, pp. 11-12).
Most of my counter-argumentation in relation to what Caldas-Coulthard considers 
as “overall organization features” (p. 63) also applies to her view of “the structural 
properties” o f real talk. If she drew on conversation analytical notions to discuss some 
organizations which are operative in conversation, her notion of structural properties 0f 
conversation derives from a strictly linguistic pragmatic tradition, namely the 
Birmingham model of Discourse Analysis, with insights from Longacre’s (1983, cited 
in Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 100) model of “repartee.” She points out the similarities 
between the two models which justify her basing her discussion on, alternatively, one or 
another:
The Birmingham theory of the exchange structure and Longacre’s theory of 
repartee share striking similarities. Although the S/C [Sinclair & Coulthard] model 
is concerned with the interactive structures which characterize formal teaching 
in oral and authentic contexts [emphasis added], and Longacre’s is concerned 
with written dialogues [emphasis added], both theories interpret utterances 
according to structural expectations. Longacre’s notional structure corresponds to 
moves and acts, and his surface structure corresponds to the exchange structure, (p. 
100)
Neither model, though, can be said to account for the structural organization of 
ordinary conversation, since the objects of their individual concerns are not 
conversation. Moreover, both modds seem to link the utterances which are produced to
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speech act/interactional move types (for a detailed discussion about some of the 
misconceptions of such theorization, see Levinson, 1983, Chapter 6).
The Birmingham school model, for instance, asserts that the categories which 
make up classroom discourse are, from the lowest to the highest: “acts, moves, 
exchanges, transactions and lessons/interactions” (Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, p. 93). 
According to this model, each higher category is made up by a number of the next lower 
category items. For example, transactions—which are regarded as “the largest unit of 
discourse (p. 93)—are made up of exchanges. These include “boundary exchanges” (p. 
93), which are preliminary and terminal exchanges; “bound by frames and focus”, 
“medial exchanges” (p. 93) and “free exchanges,” which are those that are not “bound 
by frames or focus” (p. 93). Frame moves being elements “marked” by items such as 
‘right’, ‘well’, ‘ok’, or ‘now’ and focus moves corresponding to metastatements about 
the discourse—it seems that what they call “focus moves” might perhaps correspond to 
Bateson’s (1972) notion of “frame” (see section 2.1.1).
In this model, exchanges are the minimal units of interaction. In addition, in being 
obligatory units, medial and free exchanges are the ones which are described in terms of 
three classes of moves: Initiation, Response, and Follow up, of which only Initiation is 
obligatory. These three moves can be realized by certain speech acts. Initiation, for 
example, includes acts such as directive, informative, starter and elicit. Responses can 
be realized as reply, react, or comment; and Follow up includes acceptance, evaluation 
or comment (Caldas-Coulthard, 1988, pp. 93-94).
Caldas-Coulthard claims that, in spite o f being devised to account for exchange 
structure in classroom interaction, this model can also be applied to naturally occurring 
interactions, which may have the Initiation-Response-Foliow-up structure (p. 95).
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As for Longacre’s model, Caldas-Coulthard points out that his “description of
composed dialogues is in many ways similar to the one devised for spoken dialogue” (p.
!
101). This, she claims, is enough to show that “writers definitely base their composition 
on real interaction” (p. 101) but “they seem to reduce the structural properties of the oral 
interaction” (p. 101).
To state it briefly, Caldas-Coulthard-'s main point is that “fictional interaction, at
i
exchange level, is characterized by chains of two moves (initiations and responses) and 
three part exchanges are rarely found” (1994, p. 297).
First, I do not see why fictional interaction seems reduced if, according to the 
models mentioned earlier, only initiation is obligatory. Second, it may be true that in 
real classroom interaction, which is an instance of institutional talk, a three-move 
sequence can be frequently found. But in naturally occurring ordinary conversation, 
such structure is not frequently observable—although it can occur on occasions when 
conversationalists are taking up a teacher-student alignment, that is, when one is 
claiming superior knowledge status, leaving the other in the position of a learner, or less 
knowledgeable person.
Thirdly, the works of ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts have already 
demonstrated that “conversation has in fact an elaborate and detailed architecture” 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 295). This architecture corresponds to Sacks’ (1984) “technology of 
conversation” (p. 413), that is, the set of techniques and mechanisms that emerge during 
the course of conversational activity and that parties employ to produce and make sense 
of that activity. These techniques/mechanisms include a number o f complex 
conversational organizations which structure and manage the interaction: “the 
systematic properties of the sequential organization of talk, and the ways in which 
utterances are designed to manage such sequences” (Levinson, 1983, p. 287).
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To conclude, while discussing Tannen’s view of the phenomenon in question, I 
argued that, although she uses interactional sociolinguistic concepts, her methodological 
standpoint allows her to draw much from a more traditional, language-centered 
discourse analytical perspective. As a result, it seems that she adopts the position of a.n 
outside analyst, which happens to be a position similar to the one adopted by Caldas- 
Coulthard. I believe, however, that the phenomenon currently at hand can be better 
described if approached from an emic perspective—the perspective o f participants 
themselves (Pomerantz, 1990)—, which I shall discuss in the next chapter. But, before 
turning to this discussion, I provide one last observation about the phenomenon itself 
As I have argued before (pp. 32-33), “represented dialogue” seemed at that 
moment a better characterization of the phenomenon than “DRS” or even “constructed 
dialogue.” Nevertheless, during this last section, I have gradually incorporated Caldas- 
Coulthard’s “represented interaction” into my own discourse. I have done so because, as 
I stated all through this chapter, the phenomenon we are dealing with is, in essence, 
interactional. Here is where the boundary between “dialogue” and “interaction” lies. In 
order to cross this boundary, a crucial element should be taken into account: context. 
Therefore, I start chapter 3 by discussing the role played by context in the 
characterization of the object o f this study: “represented interaction.”
CHAPTER 3
AN INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC APPROACH TO REPRESENTED
CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES
3.1 From dialogue to interaction
Following the line of discussion in chapter 2 ,1 am now in a position to summarize 
my own perspective on the phenomenon under study. This will, then, allow me to 
foreground the reasons why I claim that an interactional sociolinguistic approach is the 
appropriate methodological standpoint to the investigation of such a phenomenon.
As I have suggested in section 2.1 .2 ,1 align with Tannen (1989) when she points
i
out that the traditional label “reported speech” is misleading, because it does not take 
into account the polyphonic nature of language—a view which seems to be subscribed 
to by Caldas-Coulthard as well. I also align with Tannen in relation to the fact that the 
animation of the voices of others operates in written narrative similarly to the way it 
does in spoken storytelling. The differences between one and the other seem to be 
mainly related to the possibilities and constraints of each modality. In addition, and 
most significantly, following Tannen, I believe that the representation of fictional 
characters’ voices seem to have a lot in common with ordinary face-to-face interaction.
My reason to believe this lies in the assumption that storytellers design the 
animation of characters’ voices according to their notion of “ordinariness.” A notion 
which is based on the teller’s own social experience, or in Sacks’ (1984) words, on their 
ability to “do ‘being ordinary’” themselves. In Gumperz’s (1982) terms, “doing ‘being 
ordinary’” may be said to correspond to participants sharing “the linguistic and socio­
cultural knowledge” (p. 3) necessary if communication between them is to succeed.
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Thus, in designing characters’ speech in such a way that it can be perceived as ordinary, 
the teller is neither merely “reporting” speech, nor “constructing” it, but he is actually 
representing speech (see section 2.1.2).
I have also argued that “dialogue” seemed, at least provisionally, a more adequate 
term to the animation of characters’ voices than “speech.” But my notion of “dialogue”
differs from that which is implicit in Tannen’s use of the term. First of all, in the sense
i
in which she employs it, “dialogue” should encompass both direct and indirect 
quotation (and any other possible form within this continuum}.
Unlike Tannen, I do believe that the traditional distinction between direct and 
indirect quote is actually operative in storytelling. In this, I align with Holt (1996), who 
suggests that the interactional task which one form accomplishes in narrative is different 
from that task performed by the other form. The choice between one and the other
I
signals that the teller is proposing to take up different footings (see section 2.1.1). 
Nevertheless, “dialogue” can better express the idea of turns at talk, whereas “speech” 
or “quote” may only refer to a single turn or utterance.
Caldas-Coulthard (1988, 1992, 1994), however, suggests an alternative possibility 
to dialogue: “interaction.” For her, interaction seems to replace the notion of DRS. Yet, 
the sense in which she employs “interaction” is close to the notion of “dialogue” as 
referring to turns, or a turn, at talk (see discussion in section 2.1.2).
There is one aspect of the animation of characters’ voices, though, which has not 
been given proper attention by these researchers, namely context. I consider this aspect 
as crucial to the understanding of “represented interaction” both from the narrative 
recipient’s standpoint and, above all, from an analytical perspective that privileges 
interactional participants’ sense-making perspectives (Pomerantz, 1990)
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Among the sources examined, Holt (1996) is the only one who admits that DRS 
allows current speaker to introduce contextual elements such as the reporting of a 
sequence of events and thoughts into his narrative. She also points out that current 
speaker tends to keep both deictic references and prosodic features as they appeared in 
the original (reported) context. Actually, she regards retention of deixis and prosody as 
the design features which characterize the production of DRS and distinguish it from, 
for example, indirect reported speech. Nevertheless, she does not systematically 
incorporate the notion of context into her discussion or analysis.
Although Tannen acknowledges that there is a dynamic interrelationship between 
what is being “reported” and the reported context as well as the reporting context, she 
deals with this interrelationship in terms of the general assumption of teller’s presumed 
neutrality, as opposed to the dialogic nature of language use. In the examples provided 
by her, however, it is clear that context has to be attended to if one is to make sense of 
the utterances being presented.
For instance, the single utterance “Oh in that case, go ahead” (see example 4 on p. 
29), attributed by the teller of the anecdote to some American people, can only be 
interpreted as ordinary if one knows that: (1) those Americans were in a Greek 
airport and (2) a Greek woman tried to break into the line in which (3) those 
Americans have been waiting for some hours, a quite annoying fact for anybody. So, 
it might well be the case that the Americans (4) started to object because they might 
have thought the woman was being given special attention due to the fact that she was 
Greek. For, as soon as (5) they were told the woman had children with her, they all 
could realize that the sort of treatment dispensed to the woman was the usual procedure 
in this circumstance and not, as the Americans seem to have thought, an exceptional 
one.
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Without knowing facts 1 to 5 above, one cannot understand how such an utterance 
could possibly have been produced by more than one person and, ultimately, one cannot 
make sense of the utterance at all. Facts 1 to 5 are, thus, crucial both to the teller’s 
representing an utterance which could have been simultaneously produced by each and 
every American in the scene and to the recipient’s interpreting the utterance in the 
intended way. Actually, facts 1 to 5 turn out to be features of the context in which the 
teller claims the utterance has been produced.
In her discussion of overall organization and exchange structure, Caldas- 
Coulthard makes several references to the fact that what is not straightforwardly 
available in the characters’ utterances tends to be indirectly reported, or otherwise 
glossed, by the teller/narrator. She claims, in fact, that author’s reports of openings and 
closings as well as of parts of exchanges that can be non-verbally realized in real 
conversation can serve as evidence that “represented interaction” is, indeed, 
reduced/simplified in narrative.
My own view of the role played by such elements of the reporting discourse is 
that they are not marginal aspects of “represented interaction.” Rather, they are as much 
a part of it as are the utterances themselves. In other words, if one is to regard 
characters’ utterances as actions performed in the fictional reality, one should consider 
the context in which characters are said to have produced and interpreted those 
utterances. The reporting discourse may, then, function as the means by which the story 
recipient can have access to the context surrounding those actions.
This established, I can now say that the phrase “represented dialogue” I have 
provisionally incorporated in the present discussion acquires a new dimension; a 
dimension in which both dialogue (turns at talk) and its surrounding narrative discourse 
operate together in organizing characters’ performance. Having this in mind, I now
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propose to call the phenomenon with which this study is concerned “represented 
conversational exchanges” or simply “represented interaction ” Such a characterization 
is, then, a sine qua non condition to approaching the phenomenon both from a 
theoretical and a methodological interactional sociolinguistic stance.
If we aim at examining the extent to which represented interaction can be 
regarded as similar to the way people in the real world use language, all relevant aspects 
of context must be taken into account. Thus, context should be understood as referring 
to diverse, yet interrelated, sorts o f environment: the sequential position of utterances in 
relation to one another, how those utterances have been produced and interpreted, the 
socio-situational setting where utterances have been produced, and, finally, the position 
of the utterances in the main narrative discourse, that is, within the story itself.
My reasons for claiming this is grounded in the findings of ethnomethodologists, 
conversation analysts, and interactional sociolinguists concerning how face-to-face 
interaction is achieved, as well as in their discussion of the import of context both in 
ordinary conversation and particularly in storytelling. I shall now turn to the discussion 
of the various senses in which context is relevant for the investigation of talk-iii- 
interaction.
Schegloff (1995), in arguing for the crucial significance of social action over the 
informative content of utterances, cogently argues that sequential context cannot be left 
out of the analysis of talk-in-interaction:
Especially (but not exclusively) in conversation, talk is constructed and is 
attended by its recipients for the action or actions it may be doing. (...) There is 
virtually always an issue (for the participants and, accordingly, for professional 
analysts) of what is getting done by [the] production [of an utterance] in some 
particular here-and-now. (p. 187)
where “here-and-now” refers to and emphasizes the sequential position of the turn at
talk, or the discourse environment in which the utterance is placed. So, in this sense, to
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talk about context is to invoke “the systematic properties of the sequential organization 
of talk” (Levinson, 1983, p. 287).
As I have mentioned earlier (section 2.1.3), the basic mechanisms operative in 
sequential organization of talk-in-interaction are the turn-taking system, adjacency 
pairs, the notions of conditional relevance and preference, and topic progression. These 
mechanisms work in tandem with one another in structuring the organization of talk in a 
local basis in the sense that “an action done by a speaker--taken as an action—has 
decisive consequences in shaping the trajectory of the talk’s development” (Schegloff, 
1995, p. 192).
This means that such mechanisms determine conversationalists’ local (moment- 
by-moment) choices among a range of possible alternatives for tum-construction, or 
choices among alternative actions. In other words, what one party says is interpreted by 
the recipient both in terms of the job its production fulfills (the intended action) and in 
terms of the limited range of possible appropriate actions the recipient is expected to 
produce next, and so on and so forth. Thus, conversationalists gradually build up a 
series, or sequence, of interdependent actions which can only be interpreted within this 
specific sequence, or context, in which they occur.
To this sense of context as sequential organization, another should be added, 
namely the human and physical settings in which talk-in-interaction takes place, that is, 
the social situation (Goffman, [1964] 1972). According to Goffman, “talk is socially 
organized, not merely in terms of who speaks to whom in what language, but as a little 
system of mutually ratified and ritually governed face-to-face action, a social 
encounter” (p. 65). What he is referring to is the fact that there are certain constraints 
imposed on conversationalists’ behavior by virtue of their finding themselves in a social 
encounter, which is established as such the moment at least two people in a given
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situation “jointly ratify one another as authorized co-sustainers of a single, albeit 
moving, focus of visual and cognitive attention” (p. 64)
Such constraints ultimately influence both the “production format” (Goffman, 
1981, p. 145) of utterances and the “participation framework”, or the relationships “of 
all persons in the gathering” (p. 137). Thus, whoever is present in the physical setting 
where interaction occurs, how they relate to one another in terms of how accessible their 
actions are to the other(s), who is ratified as an authorized participant as opposed to 
mere bystanders, who is being addressed, and so on, play a decisive role in how actions 
are both shaped and interpreted.
There is also a third sense in which context plays a crucial role in the organization 
of talk-in-interaction. A sense in which the notion of context includes social phenomena 
and, most significantly, is extended to encompass a range of culturally established 
conventions. Such conventions allow parties to make inferences about one another’s 
actions so that they can make sense of the communicative activity they are engaged in.
For Gumperz (1982), meaning is determined not just by participants knowing the 
sort of activity they are currently engaged in. Yet, the activity type restricts the range of 
possible interpretations “by channeling inferences so as to foreground or make relevant 
certain aspects of background knowledge and to underplay others” (p. 131). That is to 
say, besides having the activity type defined, there are a number of features which are 
systematically attended to by participants to produce and make sense of their actions. As 
Gumperz (1982) puts it:
This channeling of interpretation is effected by conversational implicatures 
based on conventionalized co-occurrence expectations between content and 
surface stylé. That is, constellations of surface features of message form are the 
means by which speakers signal and listeners interpret what the activity is, how 
semantic content is to be understood and how each sentence relates to what 
precedes or follows. These features are referred to as contextualization cues. 
(p.131)
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Later Gumperz extends the concept of contextualization cues so as to comprehend 
paralinguistic and nonlinguistic features as well.
Among the linguistic features which may function as contextualization cues are 
aspects such as lexical and syntactic options, semantic content and topical progression, 
and code, style and topic switching. As for paralinguistic features, they include prosodic 
elements such as voice tone, pitch and loudness, and intonation, among others. Finally, 
nonlinguistic features refer especially to interpersonal distance, posture, gestural signs, 
facial expression and gaze direction (Erickson & Schultz, 1981, 1982; Gumperz, 1982}.
The foregoing discussion suffices to highlight the importance of context in the 
structuring of real, naturally occurring interaction. It also provides me with a touchstone 
against which fictional characters’ actions can be judged in terms of the similarities and 
differences they bear with their naturally occurring counterparts.
However, there is still one more sense of context which is of utmost significance 
to this study: how characters’ utterances are contextualized within the story itself. This 
contextualization establishes a dynamic interrelationship between the narrative 
discourse which surrounds utterances and the elements which function as 
contextualization cues within the fictional universe. Such an interrelationship constitutes 
the means by which the story recipients can have access to the intratextual reality and, 
thus, be able to perceive ordinariness in represented interaction.
Buttny (1998) claims that prior talk is evoked in a current storytelling activity 
because it “seems to be reserv ed for capturing the most crucial or interesting parts of the 
narrative”(p. 49). He also draws attention to the fact that the actions being reported can 
only be interpreted in connection with their context: “The reported speech conveys the 
‘what was said’, but some context for the reported speech is necessary to indicate ‘what 
actions were done’ along.with their social significance” (p. 49). He also emphasizes that
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“context is continually oriented to by participants” (p. 49), therefore, it “works for 
recipient design and contextual framing purposes” (p. 49) Moreover, this contextual 
framing is accomplished linguistically, by means of discourse itself: “context involves 
utterances [or discourse] designed to tell recipients how to hear the reported speech” (p. 
49).
Most significantly, discourse so designed does a further job in storytelling than 
merely to provide factual information to the recipient, as Sacks (1992) argues.
Stories may be designed for their listener, now not simply in the sense of 
what their listener knows and doesn’t know in general but what their listener 
might or might not have in mind at the moment (...) It’s not just that sometimes a 
fact might be asserted which the other party doesn’t know, but that whether the 
other party knows it or not, the issue is would they use it now. So what we have is 
a sense of context being employed by the teller, which involves fitting to the 
story, in carefully located places, information that will permit the appreciation of 
what was transpiring, (p. 274)
Here, “carefully located places” means that this sort of contextual framing is signaled by
discourse placed either “directly before or after” (p. 274) the event being focused on by
the teller.
It follows that, if this sort of contextual framing plays such a crucial role in 
conversational storytelling, it is reasonable to expect it to play an even more important 
role in written storytelling, for, in this case, teller and recipient are spatially and 
temporally removed from one another. As a result, tellers are expected to allow the 
readers to see things as they have happened in the projected reality. This, I believe, 
supports my own claim that the surrounding reporting discourse can, and actually 
should, be regarded, not as peripheral to the phenomenon, but as an indication that the 
integrity of represented interaction is being attended to both by the writer and by the 
analyst interested in describing it.
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3.2 An emic perspective to the investigation of represented conversational 
exchanges
As I have pointed out in the previous section and in chapter 2, conversational 
analytic and interactional sociolinguistic research provides concepts which allow for the 
characterization of the object of inquiry of this study, namely represented conversational 
exchanges, as an interactional phenomenon rather than a merely linguistic one. Such a 
characterization justifies the use of an interactional sociolinguistic approach to the 
analysis of represented interaction.
I am aware, however, that full-fledged conversation analytic or interactional 
sociolinguistic methodology cannot be incorporated into the present study due to the 
fact that the sort of represented interaction I am looking at occurs in written fictional 
narrative discourse, thus, out of the usual empirical scope of either of those 
perspectives.
Ethnomethodologists, ethnographers o f communication, conversation analysts, 
and interactional sociolinguists may disagree on aspects such as: 1) corpus constitution 
and transcription systems, which may depend on whether the focus of analysis falls on 
how utterances fit into a small number of sequences or on why a particular feature 
occurs in multiple sequences; and 2) whether or not paralinguistic and, especially 
nonlinguistic contextual information is systematically attended to (Schiffrin, 1988).
Yet, their methodological positions converge in two fundamental aspects: the 
nature of the object of analysis and the rigorous constraint imposed on analytical work 
by the strictly emic perspective employed Regarding the first aspect, emphasis is placed 
on using naturally occurring conversation as data. As for the adoption of an emic 
perspective, Schiffrin (1988) observes that:
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It is speakers and hearers whose conversational procedures are the focus of 
inquiry and the analyst’s perspective should aim to replicate the language user’s 
perspective, (p. 254)
Indeed, she points out that ethnomethodologists argue that users, or rather, 
conversationalists, are themselves analysts in the sense that they are constantly 
monitoring the other party’s actions in order to make inferences about how these actions 
should be understood and to project their own possible next actions (Schiffrin, 1988).
Therefore, this research departs from an orthodox interactional sociolinguistic 
standpoint in aiming at the sort of interaction represented in written narrative. 
Nevertheless, the perspective which I adopt in the analysis of such data is that of 
interactional sociolinguistics: an emic view. This means that the categories of analysis 
are not determined a priori, but are recognized and explicated as they emerge in the 
course of the on-going represented interaction. Thus, what are regarded as emergent 
categories are those which participants, or characters, themselves can be demonstrably 
orienting to. This stance allows me to compare the mechanisms and techniques 
employed in fictional interaction to those that have been found to be operative in the 
organization of real, ordinary conversation, and to point out the similarities and 
differences between them.
My foundation for claiming that applying an emic perspective to the analysis of 
represented interaction is the most appropriate approach is grounded in Clark’s (1996) 
notion of “layering,” which he claims to derive from Bateson’s (1972) notion of frame 
(see section 2.1.1), Goffman’s (1981) lamination (see section 2.1.3), Walton’s (1973, 
1976, 1978, 1983, 1990, cited in Clark, 1996, p. 355) claim that make-believe lies at the 
very foundation of fiction, and Bruce’s (1981, cited in Clark, 1996, p. 355) analysis of 
levels in written fiction.
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For Clark (1996), layering is a pervasive phenomenon which characterizes all 
instances of nonserious use of language, that is, when one appears to say one thing 
while he is actually doing another. Also, Clark asserts that “all nonserious actions are 
created in the course of serious actions” (p. 354). Thus, nonserious actions are, in fact, 
dependent on the occurrence of serious actions, but the former take place in a “domain 
of action” (layer 2) other than that where the latter happen (layer 1) (p. 355).
Clark provides an enlightening example of such a relationship between the two 
domains and the actions that take place within each domain:
It is San Francisco in 1952, and two ten-year-olds named Alan and Beth are 
playing a game of make-believe in Alan’s back yard. From a book they have read, 
they decide to be Wild Bill and Calamity Jane, living in Deadwood, Dakota 
Territory, during the gold rush of 1876. They designate a pile of dirt in the comer 
of the yard as placer diggings and an old kitchen plate as a gold pan, and they pan 
for gold. Soon they find a few nuggets (small stones), go off to Saloon Number 
Ten (the patio), sit down at a poker table (a picnic table), and play a few hands 
with an invisible deck of cards. After a while Beth is called home, and their game 
ends. (p. 354)
According to Clark’s analysis of this example, real kids (Alan and Beth) are 
playing make-believe in a particular place (Alan’s back yard in San Francisco) at a 
particular moment in time (1952) and all this is taking place in layer 1, the real world 
domain. However, it is also true that Alan and Beth are engaged in a “joint pretense” (p. 
360) which allows them to become Wild Bill and Calamity Jane, respectively. It 
follows, therefore, that Alan and Beth’s actions also take place in layer 2, the projected 
reality domain, in the sense that it is what they actually do that is construed as the 
actions in layer 2. On the other hand, whatever the actions performed by Wild Bill and 
Calamity Jane and the experiences they go through take place exclusively in layer 2.
Clark observes that: “Each domain is characterized by its participants, their roles, 
the place, the time, the relevant features of the situation, the possible actions, and other 
(...) things” (p. 355). Thus, each domain constitutes a complete world in itself.
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Nevertheless, only domain 1 is autonomous: all other possible domains {such as domain
2) inevitably depend on domain 1. As a result, “access to domains 1 and 2 is 
asymmetrical” (p. 357) in that “the participants in 1 have access to elements of 2, but 
the participants in 2 have no access” (p. 357) to domain 1 at all.
Goffman’s (1981) model of participation framework is particularly useful to 
clarify this point. Taking the first layer of communication, or domain, as a point of 
reference^ teller and recipients) act as official, ratified participants in the storytelling 
activity. Story characters play no role at all in this interactional layer. They cannot even 
be regarded as nonparticipants, for they simply do not exist in domain 1. If, on the other 
hand, we move the focus to the second layer/domain, characters assume the official 
status as ratified participants. Yet, their interaction is accessible to both participants in 
domain 1. Due to this, teller and story recipient(s) assume the status of nonratified 
participants, or bystanders, in relation to domain 2. Now, since they are purposely 
poking into domain 2 in order to “see” and/or “hear” what is going on there, teller and 
story recipients) are actually working in collusion with one another as eavesdroppers 
(GofFman, 1981, pp. 132-134). This is why participants in domain 1 may know a lot 
more about characters’ feelings and circumstances than the characters themselves do.
Both Clark’s and Goffman’s considerations on layering/lamination apply to 
language use in general. Yet, layering is an essential “feature of all types of stories” 
(Clark, 1996, p. 360). Additionally, storytelling is, in fact, a joint activity in which one 
participant invites the other participant to join her/him in the creation and/or 
maintenance of a “joint pretense” (p. 360). Joint pretenses are, thus, ultimately achieved 
by means of layered actions.
This is true for any storytelling activity, including written narrative. In this case, 
layered actions may take place in several layers, or domains. However, discussing
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complex issues which underlie possible author-narrator-reader relationships is beyond 
the scope of the present study. Therefore, I do not venture into tackling those layers of 
action peopled by such beings as the implied author, projected narrator(s), or the like. 
For the purpose of the analytical perspective adopted here, namely an emic approach, it 
suffices to focus on only two layers, or domains. I, then, consider the primary 
communicative layer that in which the author and reader interact with each other. The 
second communicative layer is the one in which characters interact with one another.
Since the latter happens to be the main concern in this study, I zoom straight into 
the intratextual reality to examine the actions being performed there. Occasionally, 
though, the primary layer is invoked, especially due to the fact that the reporting 
discourse employed in this layer serves as the representation of paralinguistic, non- 
linguistic and situational features which are relevant for the actions characters perform 
on the course o f their interaction (see section 3.1).
Before I can proceed with the analysis, there are some methodological issues that 
deserve some consideration, for they originate in the severe constraint imposed on this 
work, as in any analytical work having an emic perspective at its basis. These issues 
concern the procedures I followed and the difficulties I found in the process of data 
collection, corpus constitution and corpus segmentation.
3.2.1 Data collection
When I set off the search for appropriate material which could be used as data for 
this study, I had to face some problems posed by the nature of the phenomenon which is 
being focused upon, as well as by the emic perspective adopted here. In aiming at the 
investigation of an interactional phenomenon which lies within a literary fabric, the first
difficulty I had to face was that of establishing clear criteria to guide the selection of the 
material for analysis.
Since my main concern in this study was, from the outset, fictional characters’ 
interaction, I decided that the adequate criterion for selection of fictional works to 
compose my corpus was that the animation of characters’ voices should figure 
prominently among the strategies employed by the authors to develop their narratives. 
Since occasional, isolated utterances do not characterize conversational activity, by no 
means would they serve the purpose of the present investigation. Therefore, I 
concentrated on those narratives in which writers resorted to the animation of 
characters’ utterances in such a way as to characterize a conversation, or at least one 
stage in a conversation (see section 3.2:3). Preferably, characters’ voices should be 
connected to some situational, or contextual, information in the form of reporting 
discourse in their vicinity.
Moreover, the selected pieces should conform to the perspective which supports 
the present analytical work. Consequently, in selecting the stories, I was cautious 
enough so as to avoid any kind of choice that could possibly be misrelated to specific 
literary issues such a: esthetic taste, values and judgements; literary genres; literary 
schools and movements; or any other sort of strictly literary concern. Drama, thus, was 
intentionally excluded simply because of its straightforward, obvious basis on 
interactional phenomena—although, of course, that can only be fully achieved on stage. 
Apart from this, I made no attempt to distinguish between shorter and longer pieces of 
narrative.
Another preoccupation which motivated the selection of material regards the 
choice of authors. I chose to work with a variety of authors so as to prevent the results
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of the analysis from being attributed to one (or two) particular author’s style or esthetic 
and ideological orientations.
Therefore, the narratives collected include 3 short stories and 3 novels, both 
canonical and non-canonical literary works, from which represented conversation 
exchanges were excerpted for analysis.
3.2.2 Constitution of the corpus
Since stories are usually recipient-designed, in the sense that tellers aim at 
structuring their narratives in such a way as to promote and sustain their audience’s 
involvement, it is not infrequent that storytellers resort to different and varied strategies 
(e. g. narration, description, as well as both direct and indirect speech) in the course of 
one single story. Authors of written fictional works are no exception to this rule.
Deriving from this and from the results of preliminary analysis carried out on the 
short stories and novels selected, a problem arose of where to draw the line that would 
allow me to segment stretches of represented interaction from the main flow of 
narrative. Additionally, there was the issue concerning the surrounding reporting 
discourse which, when used by authors, functions as a means of providing the reader 
with relevant contextual material for the understanding of characters’ actions, as I have 
discussed it in section 3.1. These difficulties had to be overcome before I attempted to 
carry out further analysis.
As the interaction between writer and readers of the story is not a synchronic 
event, authors’ control of the flow of narrative is constrained by the fact that stories are 
recipient-designed: One means by which authors can control the unfolding of the events 
in the story is by alternatively assigning voice either to the narrator alone or to two or
more characters, one of which may be the narrator. When voices are assigned to two or 
more characters, represented interaction occurs.
As Buttny (1998) suggests, characters tend to be assigned voices at the most 
crucial or interesting parts of the story, that is to say, at those parts where the author 
invites the readers to take up a more active role in interpreting and/or assessing the 
events being highlighted. Readers’ involvement, then, is intimately connected to the fact 
that a secondary communicative layer is being invoked through represented interaction.
However, before characters can actually start taking turns at speaking, the narrator 
must yield the floor. On the other hand, as interpersonal involvement is at stake, this 
cannot happen randomly or hastily. So, one should really expect that the narrative 
displays some indication that the narrator is about to be silenced, and another layer will
be introduced. In other words, the writer must somehow signal to the recipients that ai
change in his footing will soon occur so that readers can align accordingly.
Preliminary analysis of the stories I had selected suggested that authors appear to 
signal to the reader that the narrator’s voice will be replaced by the voices of others by 
means of introducing subtle changes in the narrative discourse. Such changes seem to 
function, then, as transitions between the primary and the secondary communicative 
layers in the story. Also, I could perceive that similar transitions seem to occur, even 
more recurrently, when the author is about to go back to layer 1 to resume the prose 
narrative.
In fact, it was more difficult for me to locate the exact place where the 
conversational exchanges started than where they ended, or could be viewed as 
complete. This was due to the fact that the authors of the pieces selected have employed 
a greater variety of devices to signal the transition from layer 1 to 2 (henceforth in­
transition) than they did from layer 2 to 1 (out-transition).
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In the stories selected, authors used a number of in-transition devices which 
establish a gradual, stepwise progression into represented interaction, as well as a few 
others which accomplish the in-transition in a more abrupt manner. The first type of in­
transition devices is explicated in examples 1-3 below. Examples 4-6 illustrate the 
second type of in-transition devices. Among the in-transition devices in which we have 
a gradual shift into layer 2, the use of a short descriptive/narrative paragraph was the 
author’s most frequent choice10, as we can see in the examples that follow.
1) In The cask o f Amontillado, the author employed a paragraph in which features 
of the situation and the opening of the encounter (which coincides with the narrative 
itself) are described: the paragraph reproduced below follows the three first paragraphs 
at the beginning of the story, in which the author describes the narrator’s attitude and 
feelings in relation to Fortunato and how these led the former into plotting against the 
latter. Note also the use of a prefatory form of the sort described in section 2.1.1 to 
signal the aimed shift into layer 2, namely “I said to him:”
It was about dusk, one evening during the supreme madness of the 
carnival season, that I encountered my friend. He accosted me with excessive 
warmth, for he had been drinking much. The man wore motley. He had on a
tight-fitting parti-striped dress, and his head was surmounted by the conical cap 
and bells. I was so pleased to see him, that I thought I should never have done 
wringing his hand.
I  sa id  to  h im :  [utterances are introduced here] (The cask o f Amontillado, p. 
191)11
2) In the same narrative, the author also employed a paragraph briefly describing a 
transition between two stages in a major on-going conversational activity: this example 
shows that, after having talked for a while, characters are, at this point, maintaining an 
open state of talk (Goffman, 1981), that is, they are attending to the walking further into 
the vaults without speaking, but still having the chance to address each other. This is 
what happens eventually, when the narrator makes the first move to seize Fortunato by 
an arm, thus making him stop and focus attention on what the narrator is going to say:
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The wine sparkled in his eyes and the bells jingled. My own fancy grew 
warm with the Medoc. We had passed through walls of pilled bones with casks 
and puncheons intermingling into the inmost recesses of the catacombs. I paused 
again, and this time I made bold to seize Fortunato by an arm above the 
elbow, [utterances are introduced in the next paragraph] {The cask o f Amontillado, 
p. 194)
3) In the novel Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight, author Carolyn 
Keene employed a brief description marking a change from one encounter into the next 
one, that is, at least one character exits a previous encounter and joins other character(s) 
in a new encounter. In the illustration below, Montana has just left Kara and Nikki to go 
backstage in search of Ray. Here, we have the second of a set of two paragraphs 
describing Montana’s behavior and thoughts while she is walking to meet Ray:12
Ray was heading into the hallway that led to club offices and pay phones. 
As Montana followed him, she felt her nerve slipping. Maybe I’ll just make a 
phone call, she told herself, but before she could alter her course, someone beat 
her to the phone. She had no choice, [utterances are introduced in the next 
paragraph] (Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight, p. 65-66)
This device may also indicate that participants are managing an unstable state of
talk which later acquires what Goffman (1981) refers to as “a more sustained
regrouping” (p. 136), or a more stable configuration.13
While the above examples show gradual in-transitions, the following are
illustrations of devices in which in-transition is not accomplished in so smooth a
manner. In example 4, transition is not completely brisk, whereas in examples 5 and 6 it
occurs abruptly. In these two examples, however, the author employs what I perceive as
a signaling device within the interaction proper (“said . . . one day”), which may
perhaps function as a later compensation for such an abrupt shift in layer. This signaling
is introduced early on in the interaction: as soon as one character performs a summons
(uttering the term of address), whose aim is to engage the other character in
conversational activity. Therefore, it may well be the case that both summons and
reporting discourse could work in tandem to signal the shift in layer. In addition, the
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link between the series of short preceding paragraphs and the conversational exchange 
itself can only be established much later in the interaction, when characters allude to 
(example 5) or start to talk about the topic (example 6) which was introduced in those 
paragraphs. Note also that examples 4 and 6 are, respectively, the very beginning of the 
short story and of the novel.
4) In A good man is hard to find, the author employed a paragraph in which 
situation and characters’ description is interspersed with the interaction proper; later on, 
the description is gradually dropped, and interaction proceeds then:
The grandmother didn’t want to go to Florida. She wanted to visit some of 
her connections in east Tennessee and she was seizing at every chance to change 
Bailey’s mind. Bailey was the son she lived with, her only boy. He was sitting on 
the edge of his chair at the table, bent over the orange sports section of the 
Jo u rn a l. “Now look here, Bailey,” she said, “see here, read this,” and she 
stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the newspaper at 
his bald head. “Here this fellow that calls himself The Misfit is aloose from 
the Federal Pen and headed toward Florida and you read here what it says 
he did to these people. Just you read it. I wouldn’t take my children in any 
direction with a criminal like that aloose in it. I couldn’t answer to my 
conscience if I did.” (A good man is hard to find, p. 137)
5) In The rocking-horse winner, the paragraphs preceding the conversational 
exchange contain no description of the situation or of the characters; no indication that 
characters’ voices will soon be introduced is provided either. The only indirect link 
these paragraphs bear with the interaction that follows is the “unspoken topic: There 
must be more money!” Yet, after the first utterance is said, the author inserts an internal, 
and very economical, way of in-transition signaling, namely “said . . . one day.” In this 
specific case, this device turns out to be highly economical because it also introduces 
the boy’s name, which has not been mentioned before. Additionally, the term of address 
informs us about the party who the boy is trying to engage in interaction (in italics). The 
paragraph reproduced below is the last in a series of three such short paragraphs:
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Yet nobody ever said it aloud. The whisper was everywhere, and therefore 
no one spoke it. Just as no one says: “We are breathing!” in spite of the fact that 
breath is coming and going all the time.
“M o th er ,” sa id  th e  boy P a u l o n e  day, “why don’t we keep a car of our 
own? Why do we always use uncle’s, or else a taxi?” (The rocking-horse 
winner, p. 306)
6) In Pride and prejudice, there are two short paragraphs introducing the general 
topic which will be later developed by the characters on the course of their interaction 
(lasting for almost the entire chapter in the novel). Note the use o f  “said . . . one day,” 
after the character used the term of address which serves to introduce both the 
characters themselves and their relationship with each other—Mr. and Mrs. Bennet (in 
italics):
It is a truth universally acknowledged that a single man in possession of a 
good fortune must be in want of a wife.
However little known the feelings or views of such a man may be on his 
first entering a neighbourhood, this truth is so well fixed in the minds of the 
surrounding families, that he is considered as the rightful property of some one or 
other of their daughters.
‘M y  dear M r  B e n n e t ,’ sa id  h is  lady to  h im  one day, ‘have you heard that 
Netherfield Park is let at last?’ {Pride and prejudice, p. 1)
In addition to the use of the in-transition devices explicated above, authors also 
employed out-transition devices. These devices differ from the preceding ones in that 
out-transition devices encompass a smaller number of phenomena. In all selected 
pieces, out-transitions systematically coincide with the closing of: a stage in a major on­
going conversational activity (example 7); a section or chapter in the narrative 
(examples 8a and 8b); or an encounter (example 9). Sometimes indirectly telling of an 
utterance appears at the very end of the interaction, maybe to signal that the narrator is 
about to seize the floor once again (example 8a). At other times, the sort of closing in 
question may be followed by a transition paragraph in which some sort of 
assessment/recapitulation is provided and which, in its turn, leads to the closing of a 
section/chapter in the narrative (example 10).
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7) In The cask o f Amontillado, we have an instance of the first type of out- 
transition device mentioned above. Here, there is coincidence between the end o f the 
conversation exchange and the end of a stage in the major on-going interaction. Note 
the gradual change between situational features of the interaction which is being closed 
into the main description of the events in the story itself:
“Be it so,” I said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak, and again 
offering him my arm. He leaned upon it heavily. We continued our route in 
search of the Amontillado. We passed through a range of low arches, descended, 
passed on, and descending again, arrived at a deep crypt, in which the foulness of 
the air caused our flambeaux rather to glow than flame. {The cask o f Amontillado, 
p. 194)
8a) In A good man is hard to find,, the author represents the girl’s final reply to 
her grandmother indirectly, which, as suggested above, may be indicative that a shift to 
layer 1 is about to take place. Immediately after the girl’s reply there is a new paragraph 
which advances the main narrative. Note that this paragraph starts by explicitly 
mentioning a change in time, thus, a change in the scene, or rather, a change in section 
of the narrative:
“All right, Miss,” the grandmother said. “Just remember that the next 
time you want me to curl your hair.”
J u n e  S ta r  sa id  h e r  ha ir  was na tura lly  curly.
The next morning the grandmother was the first one in the car, ready to go. 
She had her big black valise ( ...)(A good man is hard to find, p. 138)
8b) In Wild Hearts: On the edge, we can find the sort of out-transition which
signals the closing of a chapter in the novel. Here, there is a one-line paragraph which
describes the subsequent actions that follow the girl’s last utterance. These actions
clearly mark the close of the encounter as well as the end of the chapter:
“I love you, too,” I finally said, “but I don’t want either one of you to 
take care of me, Darryl. I want to take care of myself.”
Then I started my Jeep, and I drove away. (Wild Hearts: On the edge, p.
59)
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9) In Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight, the interaction closes down 
when participants change their configuration and move away in a clear sign that the 
encounter has come to its end. In the following illustration, as Montana turns and starts 
to leave, Cory tries to engage her in another encounter but fails:
“Look, I’d better go. I just wanted to say you guys were great. I’d stick 
around, but I’ve got a ton of homework to do. Good luck with your second 
set.” Montana turned around and started walking. She felt she might die of 
embarrassment unless she got outside immediately. Ray wasn’t interested in her— 
at all! She heard the door to Jason’s office open and close behind her as Ray 
stepped inside.
Go upstairs, Montana coached herself. Get your coat—
“Montana?” Cory stepped away from the pay phone mounted on the 
wall, “Hey, I—”
Montana didn’t hear another word. Cory’d been in the hall all the time, 
she realized, (...) {Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight, p. 67)
10) In Pride and prejudice, the out-transition device employed encompasses the 
closing of the interaction and of the encounter. It also happens to preface the end of the 
chapter itself, which takes just another narrative paragraph to end:
‘Depend upon it, my dear, that when there are twenty, I will visit them
all.’
Mr Bennet was so odd a mixture of quick parts, sarcastic humour, reserve, 
and caprice, that the experience of three and twenty years had been insufficient to 
make his wife understand his character. Her mind was less difficult to develope.14 
She was a woman of mean understanding, little information, and uncertain 
temper. When she was discontented, she fancied herself nervous. The business of 
her life was to get her daughters married; its solace was visiting and news. (Pride 
and prejudice, pp. 2-3)
In short, it seems that these transition devices function as a means by which 
authors accomplish changes in footing, which eventually determine a re-framing of the 
main interaction. In fact, these devices appear to function in a similar way as the 
coordinated changes in the contextualization cues that Erickson and Shultz (1981, 1982) 
have demonstrated to be deployed during junctures, or transitions from one stage in an 
interactional event to the next. In addition, as I have suggested before, through the re­
framing of current interaction, authors mark off the boundaries which distinguish one
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communicative, or discursive, layer from the other. As a result, the layer in which 
characters’ performance takes place (and where the narrator’s turn is temporarily 
suspended) can be isolated and an interactional sociolinguistic analysis of what 
participants are doing in this layer becomes feasible. For this reason, I used these 
transitions to help me segment the conversational exchanges from the main narrative 
discourse.
Yet, it is also clear from the foregoing illustrations that such transition devices 
may also contain contextual material which is relevant to the understanding of the 
conversational exchanges whose boundaries they mark off. This posed another 
difficulty concerning what exactly could be considered as part of the interaction, or 
rather, how to distinguish those glossing materials which make up surrounding 
reporting discourse relevant to the understanding of the exchange from those other, 
irrelevant materials which constitute general descriptive or narrative discourse.
Considering what has been discussed in section 3.1, and having the emic 
perspective of analysis in mind, I decided to include all contextualization material which 
participants (characters) could be demonstrated to be orienting to and, consequently, 
omit any other kind of material perceived as belonging exclusively to the main 
discursive layer. By “relevant to participants,” I mean any item, action or situational 
feature, which influence the production and interpretation of characters’ actions, thus 
determining the course of their interaction. In examples 1, 2, 4, 7, 8a, 8b, and 9 above, I 
have used bold type to highlight the items which are regarded as relevant to, thus as part 
of, the interaction in question.
Finally, there were times in which the exchanges in the story were too long to be 
used entirely. Therefore, I had to stop their progression at certain places. When this was 
necessary, I made an effort to segment them further in those places where I perceived
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that a certain event or speech activity had come to an end and, another one would start. I 
tried, thus, to follow a similar procedure to the, one I perceived that authors themselves 
used in separating events in a major interaction.
3.2.3 Preparation of represented conversational exchanges for analysis
In preparing the selected pieces for analysis, I had to face a problem that many 
researchers working in the fields of conversation analysis and interactional 
sociolinguistics have already described: the issue of how to transcribe and present data 
(Ochs, 1979; Psathas, 1995).
Differently from analysts in those fields, I had to deal with particular difficulties 
concerning the nature of the material used in this study, in which, for example, glossing 
material may appear either interspersed with the turns at talk or within the transition 
devices described in the previous section. Due to this, I had to consider, first, the import 
of the glossing for the actions being performed. When the relevance of such glossing 
was apparent, I had to decide whether the glossing would accompany the utterance 
which it preceded or followed, and whether it was being perceived by interactants as an 
action on its own—and thus, as an individual turn. What I needed, then, was a 
compromise solution which could enhance the process of analysis while allowing the 
data to be recognized as represented interaction. In order to attain this, I have devised a 
set of conventions which are used throughout the analysis of the excerpted pieces.
These conventions are summed up as follows (see Appendix):
1) Each piece of represented conversational exchange is numbered, arid 
indication of the source from which it has been excerpted is provided;
2) All lines in the transcribed excerpt are progressively numbered;
3) Characters’ actions are indicated sequentially in tum-by-tum manner:
3.1) turns at talk are indicated by characters’ initials;
3 .2) quotation marks have been eliminated from utterances;
4) Relevant situational or contextual features of the surrounding reporting 
discourse appear in italics, in double square brackets—e.g. [[he said]]:
4.1) at the same place in which they appeared in the narrative, in cases when 
they supply additional information to the action being performed in a 
particular turn; or
4 .2) in isolation, in a line of their own, when they represent an action which
is intrinsic neither to the previous, nor to the following turn;
5) Items of the main narrative discourse constituting elements of characters’ 
prior knowledge made relevant to the on-going interaction appear in italics, 
in double braces—e.g. {{Oh, God}};
6) Irrelevant iteims of the surrounding reporting discourse appearing on the 
course of the interaction are suppressed, and this is indicated by three dots in 
parentheses—{:..).
All these changes in the excerpts of the narratives have been devised in order to 
make referencing to the stretches under analysis clear and easy to follow. Apart from 
that, the conversational exchanges suffered no further changes.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPLOYING INTERACTIONAL SOCIOLINGUISTIC CONCEPTS AND AN 
EMIC PERSPECTIVE TO THE ANALYSIS OF REPRESENTED 
CONVERSATIONAL EXCHANGES
4.1 Analysis of fictional characters’ conversational exchanges
In this chapter, I employ interactional sociolinguistic concepts and an emic 
perspective to the analysis of excerpts from three short stories and three novels. The 
excerpted segments were taken from the following works: Edgar A. Poe’s The cask o f  
Amontillado, Flannery O’Connor’s A good man is hard to find, D. H. Lawrence’s The 
rocking-horse winner, Jane Austen’s Pride and prejudice, Cherie Bennett’s Wild 
Hearts: On the edge, and Carolyn Keene’s Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the 
spotlight.
Analysis of the pieces selected is carried out in several stages. First, the excerpted 
pieces are analyzed in terms of the mechanisms and techniques that the author projected 
into and are displayed in characters’ interaction. In other words, in this first stage of the 
analysis, I explicate what participants are doing through what they utter, how this is 
done, and their nonlinguistic behavior as well. Characters’ emergent interactional 
mechanisms/actions are, then, compared to those which previous conversation 
analytical and interactional sociolinguistic research has demonstrated to be operative in 
real, naturally occurring face-to-face interaction. Similarities or differences which arise 
from this comparison are emphasized as analysis of the excerpts proceeds. In aiming at 
attempting to describe the extent to which the two sorts of interaction can be regarded as
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similar, I focus on the discussion of those emergent mechanisms/actions which seem to 
work in a similar way as in real interaction.
I start up the report of the analysis by presenting a detailed—tum-by-tum— 
analysis of the first two excerpts. This is done because, as I have suggested in section 
2.1.3, an issue was raised as to whether or not there may be a specific kind of turn- 
taking system which is employed in represented interaction. If so, then it is profitable to 
see if this “projected turn-taking system” (as I have provisionally termed it) still bears 
enough similarities with its naturally occurring counterpart—the “basic” turn-taking 
system as described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978).
Yet, since this does not constitute the primary focus of this study, in the remaining 
excerpts, I concentrate on the analysis of specific mechanisms/actions, thus also 
avoiding unnecessary repetition, for, whatever the features of the “projected turn-taking 
system,” they are assumed to be systematically employed in all the excerpted pieces. Of 
course, if there are any deviations from it or if other features appear in the remaining 
excerpts, they will be eventually attended to. Otherwise, the conventionalized 
transcription can suffice to indicate how characters’ actions are sequentially organized 
in the excerpted exchanges.
The remaining excerpts, thus, are further segmented, and only the segments being 
focused on are transcribed in this chapter. Full-scale excerpts are provided in the 
Appendix at the end of this thesis.
4.1.1 Conversational exchange 1: E. A. Poe's T h e  cask o f  A m on tillado
This short story is a piece of writing in which the feature of lamination/layering 
has been fairly explored. It is mainly developed through the two characters—the 
narrator (Montresor) and Fortunato—interacting with each other. Narration and
78
description of events are actually very brief. Additionally, layering has been managed so 
as to foreground participants’ asymmetric access to the two layers, or domains. On the 
one hand, at the beginning of the story, readers are told about the narrator’s intention of 
satisfying his strong desire of revenge due to Fortunato’s having allegedly insulted him. 
On the other hand, Fortunato, who only has access to the events that happen in layer 2, 
is utterly unaware of Montresor’s feelings and what he has plotted against him, because 
“neither by word nor deed had [Montresor] given Fortunato cause to doubt [his] good­
will” (p. 191).
Thus, in spite of Montresor’s hidden agenda, when he and Fortunato meet, he 
behaves in his usual manner—from his own and Fortunato’s point of view. Fortunato, 
who, as any real person in the world, cannot possibly know what is going on in his 
party’s mind—unless, of course, the other lets it show—, has no reason to suspect the 
other’s intentions. As a result, he also displays his usual conduct. For readers, who also 
have access to characters’ interaction in layer 2, the fact that this interaction can be 
perceived as normal is in sharp contrast with what readers are told in layer 1.
Therefore, from readers’ perspective, the contrast between the two layers is what 
causes the effect of horror towards the narrator’s pathologic attitude and behavior in 
general. This is also significant from an analytical stance. An analyst whose concern is 
the actions performed by characters should be careful enough to look at characters’ 
interaction from their own perspective, and avoid judgement based on the discursive 
elements to which readers (but not the characters) can have access. This is the stance I 
take in the present analysis.
There is yet an element which has an important role in both layers and which, for 
this reason, should receive analytical attention: the situational setting. The fact that 
characters meet each other during carnival season and that Fortunato, who had been
drinking, is already drunk. Together these two features of the situation set up (in 
readers’ and in characters’ minds alike) the expectation that some degree of unusualness 
or strangeness is likely. This turns out to be relevant for characters’ interaction in the 
sense that it can justify parties—especially Fortunato—letting pass a few “odd” 
elements in the other’s behavior which otherwise could turn into an issue for 
participants—in the story universe as out in the real world too. I also integrate this 
element to the emic perspective of the analysis that follows.
The point of the present analysis, though, goes beyond merely reiterating the 
ordinariness of characters’ interaction from their standpoint and the specific situation 
where the interaction takes place. It aims at demonstrating what degree of ordinariness 
is displayed in the mechanisms and techniques employed by interactants as the 
interaction unfolds. I shall now turn to this.
As suggested in section 3.2.2, the short story in question consists of one single 
encounter, or interaction, which unfolds on a stage-by-stage basis. The following 
excerpt depicts the moment when Montresor (the narrator) and Fortunato first meet and 
start interacting. The opening of this encounter is partly narrated in the paragraph which 
immediately precedes the introduction of the characters’ utterances (see example 1 on p. 
67) and is partly accomplished in the narrator’s first turn at speaking:
01 M: [[I said to him:]] My dear Fortunato, you are luckily met. How
02 remarkably well you are looking to-day! But I have received a pipe
03 o f what passes for Amontillado, and I have my doubts.
Here, the narrator’s first utterances in turn 1 (/. 1-3) function as a transition 
between the exchange of initial greetings (the end of the opening section) and the 
discussion of the topic which is presently Montresor’s worry—the issue of whether or 
not what he had purchased is genuine Amontillado. Since Fortunato claims to be a wine
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connoisseur, Montresor has reasons to be glad to have the opportunity of sharing his 
problem and hopefully having the issue settled. This explains why Fortunato is “luckily 
met” (/. 1). This rushed introduction of the topic does not seem inappropriate for 
Fortunato, who shows no such concern in his next turn (/. 4-5)—just as it would not in 
the real world. For, as we can see later (/. 6-7), the topic involves financial affairs (“I 
was silly enough to pay the full Amontillado price”), and all this is going on “in the 
middle of the carnival” (/. 4-5), which makes the issue both relevant and urgent.
The last utterance in this first turn is designed both to inform Fortunato about the 
deliverance of the wine (“I have received a pipe of what passes for Amontillado”) and, 
most significantly, to highlight Montresor’s suspicion that the sherry might not be 
authentic: “what passes for Amontillado” and “I have my doubts.” This latter sentence 
in particular also does a further job, that of prefacing a request (Levinson, 1983).
Levinson, following Schegloff (1979), observes that in real, naturally occurring 
talk-in-interaction “prompting an offer is an action preferable to performing a request” 
(1983, p. 343). Thus, “a turn designed to prefigure a request,” a pre-request, “provides 
the possibility of recipient performing an offer instead” (p. 343). Moreover, this sort of 
pre-sequence only accomplishes the task it was designed to fulfill contingently, that is, 
when the recipient displays “uptake and assessment of a speaker’s in process talk” 
(Schegloff, 1995, p. 192).
Now, what we have in this specific interaction is evidence that Fortunato does not 
orient to the pre-request in Montresor’s prior turn. Rather, Fortunato prioritizes the 
informational content of “I have received a pipe of what passes for Amontillado” (/. 2-
3) over the implied doubt and consequent need for his help in Montresor’s utterances: 
“you are luckily met,” “what passes for” and “I have my doubts.” We can confidently 
say so, based on what Fortunato produces in his next turn (/. 4-5), which ratifies the
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relevance of the topic for Fortunato and also indicates that the narrator’s doubts may be 
well-founded for the unexpectedness o f the situation. Another reason why we can say so 
is the insistent repetition of “I have my doubts” in the narrator’s subsequent turns. First, 
in line 6, when Montresor adds an account of why, despite the doubt, he had paid for the 
wine (/. 6-8): “You were not to be found, and I was fearful of losing a bargain,” an 
account which is also designed to emphasize his need for Fortunato’s help in the matter 
(“without consulting you in the matter. You were not to be found...”); Secondly, in a 
turn of its own (/. 10), which makes the doubt most evidently the focus of attention; and, 
finally, in line 12, when Montresor explicitly says that he must satisfy his doubts:
04 F: How? \\said />£.}] Amontillado? A pipe? Impossible! And in the
05 middle o f the carnival!
06 M: I have my doubts, [[I replied^ and I was silly enough to pay the full
07 Amontillado price without consulting you in the matter. You were
08 not to be found, and I was fearful o f losing a bargain.
09 F: Amontillado!
10 M: I  have my doubts.
11 F: Amontillado!
12 M: And I must satisfy them.
13 F: Amontillado!
As we can see, in all these occasions, Fortunato fails to recognize Montresor’s 
pre-request and, thus, to produce the offer made relevant when “I have my doubts” was 
first uttered. Instead, he keeps marveling about the unexpectedness of the event: 
“Amontillado!” (/. 9, 11, 13). Now, not only does the repetition of this echo-sentence 
indicate that Fortunato did not hear the pre-request as such, but, in fact, it suggests that 
he did not hear it at all. For it is designed in such a way that it appears to be a response 
to Montresor’s first turn (/. 1-3) rather than to his insistent attempts to prompt the offer.
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“Amontillado!” does not connect with any of Montresor’s actions in lines 6-8, 10, or 12. 
Yet it seems to connect back to his utterances in lines 1-3:
As a result, a sort of vicious circle originates, preventing the interaction to unfold 
smoothly. Neither does Fortunato’s utterance constitute the offer made relevant before, 
nor does it give Montresor the opportunity to go on and formulate a request for help. 
Therefore, Montresor’s next turn (/. 14-15) is intended to break this circle and allow for 
either action to be accomplished:
14 M: As you are engaged, I am on my way to Luchesi. I f  any one has a
15 critical turn, it is he. He will tell me—
16 F: Luchesi cannot tell Amontillado from Sherry.
The turn in lines 14-15 is evidence that Montresor—as any ordinary person— 
assumes that Fortunato’s not orienting to the pre-request signals his unwillingness to 
help. What Montresor produces in this turn, then, is shaped to challenge Fortunato’s 
expertise in the matter, maybe in the hope that the offer will eventually come. This is 
done by the suggestion that somebody else (Luchesi) may be more willing to cooperate, 
besides being knowledgeable enough on the subject.
As we Can see (/. 16), Fortunato’s reaction is quick this time. He produces his turn 
in partial overlap with the narrator’s utterance, interrupting it mid-course. But still what 
Fortunato produces is not the desired offer. Rather, he responds to the possibility that 
Luchesi’s expertise can be regarded as superior to his own.
In other words, the narrator’s challenge (/. 14-15) opens the possibility for 
Fortunato—as any ordinary person in the real world—performing one (or both) of the 
following actions: either responding to the literal challenge or displaying his disposition 
to solve the issue himself. Fortunato takes up only the first option (/. 16).
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Seeing that he has finally managed to attract Fortunato’s attention to the issue, 
Montresor presses him. By challenging him further, Montresor manages to prompt the 
“offer” in the end:
17 M: And yet some fools will have it that his taste is a match for your
18 own.
19 F: Come, let us go.
Yet, the “offer” does not come out as such at all. Instead, it takes a command format (/.
19); This evidences that Fortunato is not really being sympathetic to Montresor’s plight. 
If so, he would have produced the offer made relevant much earlier on in the 
interaction. Fortunato’s command comes out because, as his vanity has been provoked, 
he now wants to prove his superiority over Luchesi.
Moreover, the fact that Montresor has repeatedly refrained from explicitly 
requesting Fortunato’s help, together with Fortunato’s authoritarian action—when he 
could have taken a more egalitarian stance—, suggests an uneven power relation 
between them, both in terms of social status and knowledge. This is confirmed later in 
the interaction by Montresor’s next turns (/. 21-22, and 24-26) as well as by Fortunato’s 
repetition of the command “come” (/. 23). Therefore, Fortunato is portrayed as a 
member of a social and intellectual élite, to which Montresor seems not to belong. This 
sort of uneven power relation that pours into their interaction can also appear in real 
talk-in-interaction. Uneven power relations can ordinarily be projected into real 
people’s interaction by means of the identities parties assume through, for instance, their 
footings (Aronsson, 1998).
Also, Fortunato’s command (/. 19) comes out so unexpectedly, at a moment when 
going to Luchesi’s has turned into the current topic, that it makes Montresor—as it 
could make anyone in the real world— confused:
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20 M: Whither?
21 F: To your vaults.
Montresor’s question, then, makes it relevant for Fortunato to produce an answer and 
clarify the ambiguity perceived in his previous turn (1. 19), which he does in line 21. 
This turn also functions as the closing of the extended sequence which was initially 
designed as a pre-sequence but which took longer than usual to be fully realized. In real 
interaction, pre-sequences are generally accomplished in fewer turns and require less 
effort on interactants’ part (Levinson, 1983). However, Schegloff (1995) demonstrates 
that, when a party fails to recognize the action being performed by the other—such as a 
pre-request—, those sequences can be considerably extended, as in this interaction.
The next turn (/. 22-23) launches another interactional sequence in which 
Montresor tries to convince Fortunato that the need to have the issue about the 
authenticity of the wine settled seconds Fortunato’s welfare:
22 M: My friend, no; I  will not impose upon your good nature. Iperceive
23 you have an engagement. Luchesi—
24 F: I have no engagement;—come.
25 M: My friend, no. It is not the engagement, but the severe cold with
26 which I perceive you are afflicted. The vaults are insufferably
27 damp. They are encrusted with nitre.
28 F: Let us go, nevertheless. The cold is merely nothing. Amontillado!
28 You have been imposed upon. And as for Luchesi, he cannot
29 distinguish Sherry from Amontillado.
30 [[Thus speaking, Fortunato possessed himself of my arm. Cutting on a mask
31 of black silk. and draadm a roauelaire closeh about my tenon. I  suffered him
32 to hum me to mv pala^o. 111S
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First, Montresor attempts to dissuade Fortunato from going to the vaults by showing 
deference to the other. Montresor seems to realize that he might probably have been too 
pushy, for he acknowledges Fortunato’s superior position and backdowns from 
imposing himself on Fortunato (/. 22-23). But, as soon as Montresor begins to suggest 
that he can content himself with the opinion of a second best, Fortunato interrupts him 
once more (/. 24). Now Fortunato quickly dismisses the possibility of being engaged (“I 
have no engagement”) and assures Montresor that he is actually determined to check 
things over: “come.”
Montresor, then, foregrounds his worry in relation to Fortunato’s health condition 
as a means to dissuade the other, which is another sign of deference (/. 25-27). 
Fortunato, however, quickly dismisses Montresor’s worries as unimportant compared to 
his urgency of solving the issue (/. 28-30). Thus, Fortunato takes Montresor by the arm 
and prompts him to move (/. 30-32). This action is demonstrably perceived by 
Montresor as a proposal to close the discussion because he prefers not to argue and 
follows the other.
In short, as I have emphasized throughout the above analysis, this interaction 
displays some mechanisms and techniques which previous research has demonstrated to 
be operative in the sequential organization of ordinary talk-in-interaction. I have 
highlighted how the interpretation of each turn determines the shape of the forthcoming 
turn and how turns connect to topic, conditional relevance and preference to determine 
the course of the interaction. I have concentrated on showing how a sequence can be 
extended when one party fails to recognize and orient to the action performed by the 
other in a prior turn. Also, I have showed evidence that social identities can be realized 
in represented interaction as in the ordinary world.
86
I shall now proceed to the analysis of the second excerpt taken from the same 
short story. After this analysis, I will be able to resume the issue concerning what I  am 
referring to as “the projected turn-taking system.”
4.1.2 Conversational exchange 2: E. A. Poe's T h e  cask  o f  A m ontillado
The core of the analysis of this exchange concerns the sequence which is launched 
by Fortunato’s first turn (/. 5-6) and which extends itself until line 23 . This sequence 
evidences how characters’ interaction representation can be attuned to issues of local 
management of talk-in-interaction.
In the following excerpt, the two characters are in the vaults in the narrator’s 
pal a770 and are going farther into them. Due to the nitre all around them, the narrator 
had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Fortunato to go back twice. Fortunato, however, 
insisted that his cough is not serious enough to prevent them from checking the 
authenticity o f the Amontillado. Mbntresor, then, made him drink some wine in order to 
keep him warm.
At this point, Mbntresor has just made Fortunato stop and listen to him (see 
example 2 on p. 68). Montresor is once again urging Fortunato to give up their 
enterprise for his health’s sake:
01 M: The nitre! [[I said \^\ see, it increases. It hangs like moss upon the
02 vaults. We are below the river’s bed. The drops o f moisture trickle
03 among the bones. Come, we will go back ere it is too late. Your
04 cough—
05 F: It is nothing, \\be said;\\ let; us go on. But first, another draught o f
06 the Medoc.
As we can see from Fortunato’s reply (/. 5), produced once more in partial overlap 
with and interrupting Montresor’s prior turn (/. 4), he will not give it up: “It is nothing,
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let us go on.” This can once again be viewed as a sign of Fortunato’s higher power 
status over Montresor’s (see section 4.1.1, p. 83). In producing his utterance like that, 
Fortunato is actually issuing a strong disagreement with what Montresor said in his 
prior turn.
Such a disagreement, according to Põmerantz (1984a), constitutes a dispreferred 
action in real face-to-face conversation inasmuch as it happens after a turn where an 
agreement is ordinarily relevant and preferred as a next action. Due to this, when
j
disagreements occur instead, they are usually mitigated by being shaped as partial 
disagreements often prefaced by delay devices such as silence, repair initiators, requests 
for clarification, and so on (Pomerantz, 1984a).
Now, as we have seen, Fortunato’s turn does not include any such devices. On the 
contrary, his utterance as well as the fact that it characterizes an interruption forestall 
Montresor’s probable argumentation. Besides that, Fortunato immediately introduces 
another utterance in the same turn, which briskly closes down the topic concerning his 
health and introduces another topic.
The second utterance in this turn (“But first, another draught of the Médoc.”) 
triggers off the sequence mentioned above. A sequence which is realized both verbally 
and non-verbally, just as sequences can be thus realized in ordinary, face-to-façe 
interaction.
Goffman (1981) argues that, in some occasions, conversation itself may “be 
subordinated to an instrumental task at hand,” thus allowing for “stretches of silence” 
which are neither “interludes between different encounters [nor] pauses within an 
encounter” (Goffman, 1981, p. 134) 16. According to GofFman (1981), such conditions 
favor the development of what he terms an “open state of talk” (p. 134), where parties 
have “the right but not the obligation to initiate” talk (p. 135).
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In this conversational exchange, the task that the characters are presently engaged 
in, and which assumes a dominant status over that of talk, is realized in the turns in lines 
7 to 11:
07 M: [[I broke and reached him a flagon of De Grave.]]
08 F: [[He emptied it at a breath. His eyes flashed with afierce light. He laughed
09 and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I  did not understand?^
10 M: [[I looked at him in surprise.]]
11 F: [[He repeated the movement— a grotesque one]] You do not comprehend?
04 [he said?\\
13 M: N o t I, [[/ replied?^
Here, it is characters’ behavior, rather than utterances, which conveys communicative 
meaning. The significance of the non-verbal actions in these turns, especially gestures 
and eye gaze, evidences the crucial role played by the reporting discourse in the 
narrative. It renders such non-verbal actions, which in ordinary, face-to-face interaction 
(as in layer 2 reality) are readily available to parties’ visual sense, accessible to the eyes 
of readers. Otherwise, it would be hard, if not impossible, for readers to make sense of 
the verbal sequence that follows it (from line 11 on), or even to make sense of the 
interaction as it were.
It is clear that “He laughed and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I did 
not understand.” (/. 8-9) determines Montresor’s behavior in line 10. Also, the action he 
produces in this turn, and which is accomplished solely by his eye gaze and expression 
(“I looked at him in surprise.”), has further interactional consequences. It prompts 
Fortunato’s repetition of his previous gesture (/. 11) which, then, functions as an answer 
to Montresor’s unspoken question (/. 10). The fact that Fortunato formulates a verbal 
action, besides repeating the gesture, makes it quite clear that he perceives Montresor’s 
look as a question—a question designed so as to ask for an explanation for the
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production of such a “grotesque” gesture, perhaps because it was unexpected. Yet, 
instead of supplying the explanation made relevant by Montresor’s prior turn, Fortunato 
formulates another question (“You do not comprehend?”—I. 11) to ask for confirmation 
whether the inference he has drawn from Montresor’s gesture is right; Montresor’s 
answer (“Not I”—I. 13), then, supplies such confirmation.
The above segment demonstrates that characters appear to do just as parties in 
ordinary conversation, who co-construct their interaction by making inferences about 
each other’s local (tum-by-tum) actions and by, then, producing their own actions based 
on those inferences. Moreover, this can be accomplished by means of turn 
constructional units which function (as I have shown throughout the analysis of the 
segment in question) in a rather similar way as in real interaction.
By looking once again at Fortunato’s question in line 11, for instance, we can see 
that it starts another sequence which constitutes an example of a quite elaborate 
interactional mechanism operative in ordinary conversation: an embedded sequence of 
adjacency pairs (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1972; Schegloff and Sacks, 1973).
Here, “You do not comprehend?” evidences how the production of a second pair 
part made relevant after the first part has been produced (an answer—second part—to 
Montresor’s question—first part) can be suspended because a first pair part of yet 
another adjacency pair has been produced instead (again a question-answer type of 
pair). Its production, thus, prompting the other party (Montresor) to supply the now 
much more conditionally relevant second part of the second pair (“Not I”). After this 
has been produced, parties can then resume the suspended pair.
In the case of the present interaction, this means that, upon having his question 
answered, Fortunato can provide the explanation Montresor is still expecting to get. The 
explanation does come eventually, however, it is provided in an indirect way.
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Fortunato’s previous question (/. 11) also functions as an introduction to the relevant 
explanation. Montresor’s answer (/. 13) to this question allows Fortunato to get where 
he intends to, that is, to conclude that Montresor cannot recognize and understand his 
gesture because he does not belong to “the brotherhood.” This can be seen in his next 
turn:
14 F: Then you are not o f the brotherhood.
15 M: How?
16 F: You are not o f  the masons.
Yet, Montresor cannot make sense of Fortunato’s explanation in line 14. Hence his 
initiation of repair in line 15. Fortunato, then, edits his previous utterance, this time 
making his point explicit: “You are not of the masons” (/. 16).
Taken together, these three turns constitute an instance of a sequence designed to 
perform a specific interactional task: “repair.” For Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 
(1977), “repair” encompasses a wide range of phenomena concerning how parties deal 
with local problems of communication, including self-editing—which is precisely the 
phenomenon in question here.
Furthermore, repair can be accomplished in several ways, ranging from self­
initiated self-repair to other-initiated other-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). 
In the above sequence, the sort of repair being performed by the characters can be 
characterized as “other-initiated self-repair,” ordinarily accomplished in three 
subsequent turns: a turn in which the trouble-source is first produced; a second turn, 
where another party prompts the producer of the trouble to repair it; and a third turn in 
which the producer has the chance to provide a repaired version of his previous turn 
(Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1997; Levinson, 1983). This is precisely the structure of 
the sequence above (/. 14-16), including the production of the repair initiator in line 15.
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Montresor’s next turn (/. 17) demonstrates that he could finally understand 
Fortunato’s point. However, this turn, shaped as a series o f emphatically repeated 
“yes’s,” carries some ambiguity. In ordinary conversation, a yes-initiated turn following 
a turn where information is provided signals that its producer is claiming prior 
knowledge regarding the information in question (Heritage, 1984). Not only does 
Fortunato’s next turn (/. 18) demonstrate that he understood"Montresor’s “yes’s” this 
way, it also shows that he understood Montresor to be claiming more, that is, to be 
claiming to be a member of the masons himself. Hence Fortunato’s bafflement in line 
18:
17 M: Yes, yes, [[I said;\] yes, yes.
18 F: You? Impossible! A mason?
19 M: A mason, [[I replied,;]]
Montresor’s answer in line 19 suggests that he is taking advantage of Fortunato’s 
misunderstanding of what he has said previously. By asserting his membership, he 
ratifies Fortunato’s inference. Yet, Fortunato perceives it as a contradiction in relation to 
Montresor’s not recognizing his gesture before, which constitutes grounds enough for 
him to ask for further, and convincing, evidence for such an assertion:
20 F: A sign, \\he said.'W
21" M: It is this, [|7 answered, producing a trowelfrom beneath the folds of my
22 rvauelaire.]]
Here, it is worth highlighting the fact that, routinely, when people “make 
declarative assertions, they are proposing to represent actual states of affairs and are 
accountable for” that (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 609). Therefore, Fortunato’s challenge (/.
20) sounds quite ordinary in the context in which it is produced. In his next turn (/. 21- 
22), then, Montresor provides the relevant evidence; which is done both verbally and, 
most significantly, non-verbally.
92
At this point, it is clear that the interactants have been talking at cross-purposes 
without perhaps even noticing it. The narrator has understood Fortunato’s utterances 
“You are not of the masons.” and “A mason.” not as a “freemason,” which was the 
meaning intended by Fortunato, but as a “stonemason” or “bricklayer.” So, it makes 
perfect sense for him to show Fortunato the trowel he has been carrying. But, of course, 
the trowel makes no sense at all for Fortunato, at least initially.
Now, one thing that I have argued for all through this thesis is that characters’ 
interaction can be represented in such a way so as to suggest the impression that they 
are, in fact, co-constructing it. Jacoby and Ochs (1995) define co-construction as “the 
joint creation of a form, interpretation, stance, action, (...) or other culturally meaningful 
reality” (p. 171). Furthermore, they emphasize that, in being a joint project, co­
construction of coherence in discourse presupposes “collaboration, cooperation, and 
coordination” (p. 171) between interactants.
Fortunato’s first actions in the next turn are additional and definite evidence of the 
fact that, in represented exchanges, characters appear to be co-constructing their 
interaction:
23 F: You jest, \\he exclaimed, recoiling afew paces But let us proceed to the
24 Amontillado.
25 M: Be it so, [[I said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak, and again offering him
26 my arm.]]
In line 23, Fortunato’s effort in collaborating and cooperating with his party in making 
sense of their interaction is clear. “You jest” turns out to be the most plausible 
interpretation for the production of such an oddly concrete sign of membership; a sign 
which apparently has nothing to do with “the brotherhood.” Therefore, in spite of his 
moving backwards and the astonishment coloring his utterance (“he exclaimed recoiling
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a few  paces”), Fortunate» seems to reason that it is carnival season, after all, so it may 
well be the case that Montresor is acting appropriately in the end: Thus, Fortunato lets it 
pass what could otherwise be made an issue.
This is also evidenced in his next utterance in the same turn “But let us proceed to 
the Amontillado.” With this, Fortunato proposes to close the matter regarding the trowel 
and Montresor’s possible membership as a Mason by bringing them back to their initial 
concern. The narrator quickly takes up Fortunato’s proposal (/. 25), and they once again 
turn their attention to walking farther into the vaults. (/. 25-26). This means that this 
stage in the interaction is also closed down.
This last segment not only is crucial for the characters’ interaction but also for the 
narrative as a whole. The moment when Montresor removes the trowel from underneath 
his costume is actually a potential turning point in the course of both interaction and 
story. Here, Fortunato’s suspicion as for Montresor’s intentions could have been raised 
to the point of his demanding an explanation for the absurdity o f the “membership 
sign.” The narrator’s plan of revenge could, then, have been put at risk, if not totally 
spoilt. As a result, the outcome of both the interaction and the story could have been 
altered.
To reiterate, what the foregoing analysis serves to evidence is that the essentially 
collaborative nature of real talk-in-interaction can be preserved in represented 
conversational exchanges, since we can see that character’s actions are projected in such 
a way that they appear to be monitoring and analyzing each other’s moves in order to 
plan their own next moves.
I have also showed that this is accomplished in a local (turn-by-tum) basis and by 
means of complex and elaborate mechanisms and techniques which previous 
conversation analytic research has demonstrated to be operative in real, face-to-face
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interaction. Such mechanisms include: embedded sequences of adjacency pairs, 
agreement/disagreement sequences, and repair sequences; all o f which having the 
possibility of being realized linguistically, non-Iinguistically, or both.
I have also showed that, just as in real interaction, the occurrence of overlap, 
interruption, repetition, and requests for evidence play a significant role in determining 
the course of events.
Finally, I have demonstrated that just as real social actors’ identities can be 
projected in their on-going interaction, so can characters’ identities, especially their 
statuses, be projected into their conversational exchanges.
As I have said before, in the analysis of the exchanges that follow, I shall 
concentrate on examining sequences where specific mechanisms are employed by 
authors to represent specific actions accomplished by characters.
4.1.3 Conversational exchange 3: Flannery O'Connor's A  g o o d  m a n  is h a rd  to  f i n d
In this excerpt, there are two interactional moments. The first concerns the old 
lady’s unsuccessful attempts to engage in conversation, alternatively, her son (Bailey) 
and her daughter-in-law (/. 1-15). Following this, there is the activity which her 
grandchildren (John Wesley and June Star) jointly engage in: the “picking-on-the-old- 
lady job” (/. 16-28).
However, the focus of the analysis of this excerpt does not fall on explicating how 
those moments are accomplished. Rather, I focus on specific features that emerge on the 
course of the activities in question. I start by looking into how silence and body posture 
concur to defining the first interactional moment—just as in real, face-to-face 
interaction. Then I concentrate on the issue of parties’ speaking rights and how this
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transpires in the interaction. I also focus on the use of innuendo (and the related 
participation framework operative in it) needed for “picking-on-the-old-lady.”
The interaction in this excerpt starts in the middle of the very first paragraph of 
the short story (see example 5 on p. 71), where readers are told that the old lady does 
not want to go to Florida. Presumably it has already been decided that they are all going 
to Florida. Instead, she would rather go to east Tennessee, and “she was seizing at every 
chance to change Bailey’s mind” (p. 137).
In the segment below, although the family members are presently engaged in 
different activities, the fact that they are all gathered up in the living area makes them 
accessible to one another, which means that talk can be initiated by any of them at any 
moment.
The old lady and her son Bailey are sitting at the table reading the newspaper 
when she breaks the silence to address her son:
01 OL: Now look here, Bailey, [['she said,]] see here, read this,
- > 02 [[and she stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the
-► 03 newspaper at his bald head.]] Here this fellow that calls himself The
04 Misfit is aloose from the Federal Pen and headed toward Florida
05 and you read here what it says he did to these people. Just you read
06 it. I wouldn’t take my children in any direction with a criminal like
07 that aloose in it. I couldn’t answer to my conscience if I did.
- >  08 B: [[Bailey didn’t look up from his reading,]]
-► 09 OL: [(/<? she wheeled around then andfaced the children’s mother, (...) She was
10 sitting on the sofa, feeding the baby his apricots out of ajar.]] The children
11
12
have been to Florida before, \]the old lady said.]] You all ought to 
take them somewhere else for a change so they would see different
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13 parts of the world and be broad. They never have been to east
14 Tennessee.
^  15 B’s W: [[The children’s. mother didn’t seem to hear her]]
The short arrows in the above segment indicate the lines in which the old lady’s 
body posture and movement as well as her gestures are being described. These 
descriptions evidence the role played by such postures, movements and gestures in the 
framing of the interactional situation. They allow parties to establish and “maintain 
differentiated access to one another and [facilitate] the maintenance of a common focus 
of attention” (Kendon, 1990, p. 209) In other words, such non-verbal behavior concur 
both to the establishment of participants’ footings and of the participation framework 
(Goffman, 1981).
That the old lady is trying to engage Bailey in conversation is quite clear in her 
utterances in line 1. The use of the vocative indicates that, among those who are 
candidate participants in a likely conversation, Bailey is selected as her addressed 
recipient, the others being left in the position of mere bystanders (Goffman, 1981). The 
fact that the old lady, who was sitting at the table, now stands and gets closer to Bailey 
(“and she stood...”) ratifies the establishment of such a participation framework.
The second short arrow in the segment in question (I. 9) points to yet another 
evidence that body posture and movement are attended to by authors in representing 
how a situation can be defined. Here, in seeing Bailey ostensibly not engaging in 
conversation with her, the old lady goes on to select another member of the gathering as 
her addressed recipient: This can clearly be seen in the way she re-arranges her body 
and especially her face so as to bodily address Bailey’s wife. According to Kendon 
(1990), in an on-going encounter, “a new beginning in an interactive system is
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associated with the establishment of a new orientation often of the trunk (...) or of the 
head” (p, 220).
Moreover, in discussing contextualization cues in talk-in-interaction, Gumperz 
(1992) claims that both body postures and facial movements serve to reflect and signal a 
transition from one stage of an encounter to another. He also argues that these non­
verbal signs are coordinated with verbal signs (see also Erickson & Shultz, 1981, 1982). 
In the segment in question, this coordination of verbal and non-verbal signs becomes 
clear in the utterances that follow the old lady’s new configuration. First of all, there is a 
marked change in the general tone of her discourse in relation to the utterances directed 
to Bailey (/. 1 and 3-7). Secondly, there is also a slight shift in topic in relation to her 
first turn. Now she is resorting to another sort of argument against their destination, an 
argument which has more to do with the business of the children’s mother (the 
children’s education) than the previous one (the family safety)—the business of a father- 
—, in the story as out in the real social world.
Still in the same segment, the longer arrows indicate the two turns (/. 8 and 15) 
where narrative discourse represents a stretch of no talk which can be characterized as 
silence. In this case, attributable silence; for in both occasions it would be appropriate 
for the party being addressed (Bailey and his wife, respectively) to seize the floor after 
the old lady has completed her turn at speaking (Sacks, ScheglofF, & Jefferson, [1974] 
1978).
However, these silences happen at moments when the old lady is trying to engage 
Bailey and, later, his wife in the discussion of the topic concerning their trip to Florida. 
It seems that this is a matter which has already been settled. Still the old lady is insisting 
on attempting to impose her own will on everybody. In such circumstances, it is not 
surprising that both Bailey and his wife refuse to engage in a discussion which could
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perhaps lead them into a direct confrontation with the old lady. Therefore, their silence 
is being used as a strategy to avoid such a confrontation.
Tannen (1990) has also showed evidence of the use of silence as a conflict 
management strategy in drama and fiction. Her analysis of such use was supported by 
the works of interactional sociolinguists who demonstrated that in real face-to-face 
interaction silence is a functional equivalent of noisy speech in “the management of 
strong but problematic emotions” (Saunders, 1985, p. 165, cited in Tannen, 1990, p. 
260). That is to say that people may resort to silence in order to avoid potential conflict 
or confrontation, both in real and represented interaction. This is precisely how Bailey’s 
and his wife’s silence functions in the segment above.
I shall now turn to the analysis o f the second interactional moment in this excerpt. 
As I said before, John Wesley and June Star have been assigned the position of 
bystanders, or, rather, overhearers, in relation to the dominant encounter (Goffman, 
1981). This position limits their speaking rights: although they are entitled to (over)hear 
what is being said, they are not supposed to talk. Therefore, if the children are to be 
incorporated in the current established interactional system as official participants, they 
need to find a means to warrant them this status.
Sacks (1972) argues that, due to socio-cultural constraints, children’s right to talk, 
especially to adults, is restricted. Thus, children need “to have a good start if [they are] 
going to get further than that” (Sacks, 1972, p. 343). Sacks also points out that questions 
are good starts in that whoever asks a question “has ‘a reserved right to talk again,’ after 
the one to whom he has addressed the question” answers it (p. 343).
The shorter arrows in the segment below indicate the moment when one of the 
kids, John Wesley, produces his first turn in the on-going interaction. John Wesley’s 
turn is evidence of the sort of job children should do to warrant their right to talk,
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particularly when they have the status of mere bystanders (in represented as in real 
interaction). First of all, the turn in question (/. 16-17) is produced after the old lady’s 
unsuccessful attempts to engage the two adults in discussing the trip to Florida. In fact, 
John Wesley’s turn is subsequent to his mother’s silence (/. 15). Here, the addressed 
recipient (the mother), in having been selected as next speaker, declines to take the 
floor. This provides for a candidate next speaker to self-select (Sacks, Schegloff & 
Jefferson, [1974] 1978), which justifies John Wesley’s venture into speaking at this 
precise moment. Besides that, the boy’s turn is shaped in a question format. As stated 
previously, this format consists of “a good start,” which warrants him the right to go on 
speaking in a forthcoming turn.
16JW: [[but the eight-year-old boy, John Wesley, (...) said[] I f  you don’t want to
17 go to Florida, why dontcha stay at home? [[He and the little girl, June
18 Star, were reading the funny papers on the floor.]]
-> 19JS: She wouldn’t stay at home to be queen for a day, [[June Star said
20 without raising heryelbw head.]]
21 OL: Yes and what would you do if this fellow, The Misfit, caught you?
22 [[the grandmother asked]}
23 JW: I’d smack his face, [[John Wesley said.]]
-► 24 JS: She wouldn’t  stay at home for a million bucks, [[June Star said.\]
-> 25 Afraid she’d miss something. She has to go everywhere we go.
26 OL: All right, Miss, [[the grandmother saidi\\ Just remember that the next
27 time you want me to cur! your hair.
Finally, the first longer arrow in the above segment points to June Star’s first turn
at speaking (/. 19). June Star’s producing her utterance at this specific point is evidence 
that, once one kid has breached the previously existing interactional framework and
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secured a warrant to his right to speak, the other can feel confident enough to adhere to 
the new framework now under way. Also, since John Wesley has started the “picking- 
on-the-old-lady” job by shooting a provocative question at their grandmother (/. 16-17), 
the girl can now join him in this activity.
Goffman (1981) refers to the sort of communication in which at least two parties 
deal with each other, excluding a third party, “collusive byplay” (p. 134). The arrowed 
utterance in line 19 evidences that June Star is doing such a collusive work with her 
brother. Moreover, she accomplishes this by means of making the old lady the target of 
innuendo17 (Goffman, 1981, p. 134)—just as any ordinary person in the real world 
could.
Finally, we can confidently say that the girl’s use of innuendo is intended as a 
provocative action; an action designed to invite a confrontation with the old lady. Initial 
evidence to this lies in the offensive utterance the girl produces (/. 19). The girl’s 
employing innuendo once more in lines 24-25, this time rephrasing and expanding her 
utterance, is further evidence to this. Last, the fact that the old lady promptly takes up 
the girl’s challenge and engages in direct confrontation with her (/. 26-27) reinforces 
this claim.
To sum up, the analysis of the foregoing excerpt demonstrates that the author has 
employed a number of complex interactional mechanisms and strategies (body posture 
and movement, facial expression and eye gaze, silence, parties’ asymmetric speaking 
rights and participation framework, collusion, and innuendo) to represent how 
characters—as ordinary people in the real world—establish interactional situations and 
accomplish certain interactional tasks. In the next conversational exchange, I go on 
analyzing how other tasks are realized in represented interaction.
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4.1.4 Conversational exchange 4: D. H. Lawrence’s T he  rocking -horse  w in n er
In this segment, I focus on the examination of a repair sequence (see section 4.12, 
p. 90) embedded in the major on-going interaction and which is demonstrably 
characterized as a correction event. I also concentrate on the examination of the role 
played by the particle “Oh” in the segment in question.
In the major conversational activity in this exchange, young Paul has become 
aware of and is trying to understand the relationship between his family lifestyle and 
their financial conditions. So he starts asking his mother questions which could shed 
some light on the matter.
The segment in question happens after Paul has been told that their lifestyle 
differs from that of his uncle because they are “the poor members of the family” (/. 3 in 
the Appendix). Since Paul still cannot figure out why this is so, his mother goes on to 
explain to him that “it’s because [his] father has no luck” (/. 6 in the Appendix).
At this point, the use of the lexical item “luck” causes a slight shift in the topic of 
the conversation. This shift, then, leads the characters into a discussion concerning the 
term “luck” which lasts until line 24 (see Appendix). The segment below happens at the 
beginning of this discussion, just after the term has been introduced:
07 P: [[7 'he boy was silent for some time \^\
08 Is luck money, mother? \\he asked rather timidly.]]
09 M: N o Paul. N o t quite. It’s what causes you to have money.
^ ^  10 P: Oh! \\said Paul vaguely.]] I thought when Uncle Oscar said filthy
--------^  11 tucker, it meant money.
^  12 M: Filthy lucre does mean money, \\said the mother,:]] But it’s lucre, not
► 13 luck.
—► 14 P: Oh! \\said the boy]]. Then what is luck, mother?
15 M: It’s what causes you to have money. If  you’re lucky you have
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16 money. That’s why it’s better to be bom  lucky than rich. I f  you’re
17 rich, you may lose your money. But if you’re lucky, you will always
18 get more money.
Here, the longer arrows indicate the turns in which the repair sequence occurs and the 
shorter arrows locate the occurrence of “Oh.”
As I have demonstrated elsewhere (p. 90), repair sequences operative in real, face- 
to-face interaction can also be represented in characters’ exchanges. The above segment 
constitutes one more evidence to this. The sort of repair in this sequence can be 
characterized as an instance of “other-initiated other-repair” (Schegloff, Jefferson, & 
Sacks, 1977), which is ordinarily accomplished in the subsequent turn to that in which 
the trouble-source has been produced.
If we look at lines 10-14 again, we can see that “filthy lucker” (the trouble-source 
item) comes out in the boy’s utterance in lines 10-11. Immediately after that, Paul’s 
mother provides the repaired version of the item (“Filthy lucre,” /. 12), followed by an 
utterance designed to reiterate and highlight the trouble-item which is being repaired: 
“But it’s lucre, not luck” (/. 12-13).
Apart from the location and format of this sequence, another evidence that it is 
intended to be taken as a repair event lies in the fact that both “filthy lucker” and “Filthy 
lucre” have been italicized by the author himself. The use of italics in “Filthy lucre” can 
easily be attributed to the representation of the woman’s shift in prosody (see section 
2.1.1). Yet in “filthy lucker” prosody does not justify the use of italics, for there is no 
apparent interactional reason (in layer 2) for a shift in the boy’s prosody. Therefore, the 
italics here may well be taken (by readers, in layer 1) as an index that there is an 
additional meaning associated with the production of this item.
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Now, other-repair issued from other-initiation is ranked as the least preferred 
alternative in talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977). This means that 
conversationalists tend to avoid performing such an action because, in doing so, the 
producer of the repair is claiming knowledge to himself. The producer of the trouble- 
source is, then, put in the position of not-so-knowledgeable a member. In other words, 
the footings involved in such a repair mechanism provide for its characterization as a 
correction event. Therefore, there must be a strong interactional reason for one party to 
do correction, otherwise he may be held accountable.
As I have suggested above, Paul’s mother is demonstrably doing correction, 
which is ratified by the alignment Paul takes up to himself in this sequence. The reasons 
why we can say so are as follows. First of all, it is a socially and culturally established 
fact that children’s education is part of the business of any mother—here, as in the real, 
ordinary world. Correction is certainly likely to occur when teaching/learning are at 
stake, and it is ordinarily performed by the most knowledgeable party, the one who is 
“doing teaching.” Secondly, the whole interaction in this excerpt concerns Paul’s 
resorting to his mother as an authoritative source of information: out of Paul’s 9 turns at 
speaking, 8 contain either an information question (/. 1-2, 4, 14, and 22) or a yes/no 
question designed to ask for clarification/confirmation of previous information (/. 8, 19, 
and 25). Finally, there is the particle “Oh” initiating the subsequent turn to that in which 
correction is performed (/. 12-13), to the discussion of which I now turn.
According to Heritage (1984), “the work accomplished by the particle ‘oh’ in 
natural conversation (...) is (...) to propose that its producer has undergone some kind of 
change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation or 
awareness” (p. 299). Heritage also puts it that “oh” ordinarily occurs in a turn following 
a turn/turns in which “informing” is done (p. 301). That is exactly the job “oh” performs
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in Paul’s turns in lines 10 and 14 above (as well as in line 19 in the Appendix). In line 
10, “Oh!” is a response to his mother’s informing him that luck is “what causes you to 
have money” (/. 9). Thus, “Oh!” is a sign that Paul, who had thought luck to be the same 
thing as money (/. 8), now knows them to be different, that is, after being thus informed. 
In line 14, again “Oh!” functions as a change of information status token: after having 
been informed that “lucre” and “luck” (or “lucker”) are not the same thing, the boy’s 
proffering “Oh!” informs us that now he knows something that he did not before.
The foregoing considerations serve as evidence that, just as in ordinary 
interaction, such phenomena as correction and change of state of knowledge can also 
occur in represented interaction. In addition, the representation of these phenomena tend
j
to display very similar features to those found in naturally occurring face-to-face 
conversational activity.
The phenomena referred to above have been located within a specific sort pf 
interactional sequence, namely a repair sequence. In the next section I analyze yet 
another kind of mechanism operative in both represented and in actual interaction: a 
pre-announcement sequence.
4.1.5 Conversational exchange 5: Jane Austen’s P ride a n d  p re ju d ice
The excerpt below is, in fact, a segment of a major interaction which takes almost 
the entire chapter in the novel to be accomplished. I have selected this segment to focus 
on because it evidences the representation of another specific type of sequence, a pre­
announcement. Besides functioning as a pre-sequence to another interactional activity, 
the sequence in question is designed in such a way so as to demonstrably perform an 
additional work, that of providing the opportunity for the characters to “do annoying 
each other.”
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The excerpt below is a segment of the sort of interaction which I have discussed in 
section 3.2.2, where the author provides no initial information about the situation, nor 
does she previously introduce the characters (see example 7 on p. 72). Thus, the excerpt 
starts at the very opening of the interaction (see section 2.1.3):
01 Mrs B:
02
03 Mr B:
04 Mrs B:
05
06 Mr B:
07 Mrs B:
08
09 Mr B:
10
Here, after performing the summons (“My dear Mr Bennet,” /. 1) designed to engage 
her husband in conversation, but without waiting for him to give an indication that he is 
attending to her talk, Mrs Bennet goes on to produce an utterance which functions as the 
opener of a sequence that takes all this segment to be completed. Such a sequence is 
demonstrably a pre-announcement sequence, a sequence designed to preface an 
announcement.
In discussing pre-announcements in real talk-in-interaction, Levinson (1983), 
following Terasaki (1976, cited in Levinson, 1983, p. 349), states that they function as a 
preface to the telling of news, stories, and so on. Such telling being constrained by the 
recipient’s current state of knowledge regarding the news or story, pre-announcement 
sequeiltes allow for “a prospective teller” to check whether or not the recipient already 
knows the news/story (Schegloff, 1995). Therefore, such sequences are usually realized
My dear Mr Bennet, \\said his lady to him one day,]] have you heard 
tHat Netherfield Park is let at last?
[[Mr Bennet replied that he had not.]]
But it is, [[returned she; ]] for Mrs Long has just been here, and she 
told me all about it.
[[Mr Bennet made no answer.:]]
Do not you want to know who has taken it? [| cned his wife
You want to tell me, and I have no objection to hearing it. 
[[T'his was invitation enough.]]
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in two adjacent turns. The first of which contains the opener of the sequence, or the 
offer to tell the news/story, and the second, a response to this offer (Levinson, 1983; 
Schegloff, 1995). The offer typically includes items such as “Guess what” or “Have you 
heard...” (Levinson, 1983): As for the possible responses, they can either include a “go- 
ahead” which forwards the sequence to the telling (e. g., “What,” or “No. What,” or the 
like) or a blocking, that is, an action designed to forestall the telling. Such an action can 
be realized as, for instance, “I heard” or any other item which signals a claim of 
knowledge (Levinson, 1983; Schegloff, 1995).
Looking back at lines 1-2 in the segment above, we can see that the format of the 
utterance “have you heard that Netherfield Park is let at last?” matches the description 
of a proper pre-announcement opener. Also, it does actually elicit a response from Mr 
Bennet: “No.” His response (/. 3), however, is not understood by his wife as a go-ahead, 
nor as a blocking to the telling. Due to this, the pre-announcement sequence ends up 
being extended.
According to Schegloff (1995), in naturally occurring face-to-face interaction, it is 
possible for such sequences to be extended when the recipient fails to perceive the 
additional intended meaning in its opener and, thus, attends only to its informative 
propositional meaning. In part, Mrs Bennet’s next utterance, “But it is” (/. 4), is 
evidence that she took Mr Bennet’s negation token as just a response to the information 
she has initially provided, that Netherfield Park is let at last.
I say in part because this is not all there is to the turn in question here. Mrs 
Bennet’s adding “for Mrs Long has been here, and she told me all about it” (/. 4-5) 
signals that she also (and most significantly) took Mr Bennet’s “no” as a challenge to 
her claim of knowledge. Her resorting to describing an authoritative source as evidence
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to support her claim—just as people may ordinarily do during a dispute (Pomerantz, 
1984b)—demonstrates that.
Nevertheless, Mrs Bennet still withholds the information: she refers to the news
i
I
by means of the generic “it” (/. 5), which does not say much about the news. This 
evidences that her initial offer to tell this piece of news still holds, that is, she is still 
waiting for her husband’s request to hear it.
Mr Bennet’s silence (/. 6) again does not constitute the relevant response: the gp- 
ahead his wife has been waiting for him to produce. And his not producing it raises his 
wife’s temper and causes her to hold him accountable for that. Both the utterance she 
produces next and the tone of her voice (/. 7-8) are evidence to this.
Mr Bennet’s next turn, then, indicates that he, too, perceives her to be holding him 
accountable for his non-compliance with her insistent leads. In this turn (/. 9), he finally 
obliges to what he perceives as her imposition of telling him things he did not request to 
hear (“I have no objection to hearing it,” /. 9). But not without turning the table against 
her: now it is his turn to hold her accountable for imposing on him by insisting on the 
telling. The stressed “You" in “You want to tell me” (/. 9) demonstrates that. Now, 
whether he is willing to hear the news or not, Mr Bennet does produce the so expected 
go-ahead in the end, which finally closes the pre-sequence.
I have said before that Mr Bennet’s only orienting to the informational content Of 
the pre-announcement opener could partly account for the sequence being thus 
extended: A second reason why this happens lies in the other, and most important, job 
the characters are jointly engaged in, namely that of annoying each other. We can 
confidently say that this is so based on the following.
Let us consider Mr Bennet’s last utterance, “You want to tell me, and I have no 
objection to hearing it” (/." 9) once again. First of all, “I have no objection to hearing it”
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explains why he did not perform a blocking to her telling when he had occasion to do so 
(/. 3 and 6 ) Secondly, in uttering ‘T om want to tell me,” he acknowledges that he has 
been aware of both Mrs Bennet’s intention to tell him the news and of her expectation 
for his requesting her to tell it from the start. Therefore, his not performing the request is 
done on purpose, to upset his wife, not because he failed to understand the interactional 
meaning of her actions. This is how he manages to “do picking on his wife.” As for Mrs 
Bennet, the above analysis demonstrates that she “does annoying her husband” by 
imposing on him. What annoys him most is that his wife wants to tell him things
I
without, however, being accountable for that. That is why she insists in making his the 
urge to listen to what she has to say.
To recap, in this excerpt I have demonstrated that pre-announcement sequences 
operative in real, face-to-face interaction can be represented in narrative. Such a 
representation can also display complex techniques real conversationalists employ and 
which account for the sequence taking longer than just two turns to be completed. Last, 
I have showed evidence of how the accomplishment of such sequence can be affected 
by the additional job it does, that is, participants’ teasing each other. I shall now turn to 
the examination of an instance of how overt confrontation is represented in characters’ 
interaction.
4.1.6 Conversational exchange 6: Cherie Bennett’s W ild H earts: O n th e  edge
In the following segment, I concentrate on examining how accusations are 
performed and dealt with by characters at the moment which precedes their direct 
confrontation. I also demonstrate the relationship between the representation of 
interruption and the conflict situation in which characters find themselves. Before doing
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this, however, I provide some contextual information that helps us better understand the 
segment under analysis.
This novel consists of many stories which intermingle all through. The main story 
among these involves the female character featured below, Sandra, who is both the 
protagonist and the narrator in the story. Sandra is a teenager who lives with her mother 
and stepfather. Her birthfather, who had walked out on her when she was a young girl 
and never even saw her again, is now back and has been trying to re-establish contact 
with Sandra after so many years have elapsed.
In the segment below, Sandra has just told her boyfriend Darryl that she has 
decided—against everybody’s will or expectations—to accept her father’s invitation to 
dine out, which leads them into a progressively overt confrontation:
01 D: You’re ivhafi [\he asked in sbock?\\
02 S: Having dinner with my birth father, [[I repeated. I  gave him a short
03 version of the story to date, then I  took his hand and waitedfor his reaction.]]
04 D: So you’re telling me he just showed up here? [[Darryl asked.\\
—► 05 S: [[I nodded.]]
-► 06 D: And you’re going to have dinner with him?
—► 07 S: [[I nodded again.]]
-► 08 D: Excuse me, Sandra, but have you lost your mind?
—► 09 S: [[I dropped his hand.]] I don’t think so, [[I said evenly'.]]
10 D: Why would you want to let this loser into your life? [[Darryl asked
11 me incredulously.]]
>► 12 S: H e’s my father— [[I began]\
13 D: O h bull, [[Darryl exploded.]] Lawrence is your father, that’s what you
14 always say.
>► 15 S O f course, but—
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16 D: But nothing, \\Danyl said.]\ I’ll tell you what you should do. You
► ►► 17 should'tell this fool to go back to wherever the hell he came from —
18 S: Why? Because you say so? [[I asked heatedly.]\
We can see from the outset that Darryl’s reaction to Sandra’S announcement is that of 
protest (/. 1). After learning the “version of the story to date” (/. 2-3), Darryl becomes 
really annoyed; His annoyance transpires in the accusations he shoots at Sandra in the 
lines indicated by the short arrows (/. 4, 6, and 8).
In discussing how attributions of responsibility are accomplished in ordinary talk- 
in-interaction, Pomerantz (1978) says that they are accomplished in two-turn sequences. 
The first turn in such a sequence contains “an announcement or report of an ‘unhappy 
incident”’ (p. 115), which occasions a subsequent turn where the attribution of 
responsibility (bliamings, excuses, denials, accusations, and so forth) for the “unhappy 
incident” is done. The utterance(s) in this turn is characterized as “on-topic” (p. 115), 
because it refeirs “to some same referents referred to in prior turns” (p. 115). The 
standard format such utterances take when preceded by announcements/reports is that of 
“a construction in which the candidate blamed party is referenced in subject position 
(actor-agent) with an active predicate” (p. 116).
If we look back at the previous segment, we can see that its initial structure (/. 2- 
4) matches every feature of the above description. Sandra’s turn in lines 2-3 contains 
both an announcement (“[I’m] having dinner with my birth father”) and a story (“I gave 
him a short version of the story to date”). Darryl’s subsequent turn being where he 
performs the first two in a series of four accusations: “So you’re telling me he just 
showed up here?” (/. 4). By uttering this, Darryl is attributing responsibility both to 
Sandra (“you’re telling me”) and to her birthfather (“he just showed up here”), the same 
“referents referred to” in Sandra’s prior turn. Moreover, both accusations are structured
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as an “actor-agent + active predicate” construction. The same applies to Darryl’s next 
turns (/. 6 and 8). Therefore, we can confidently say that Darryl is, in fact, “doing 
accusing.”
Another job Darryl’s accusations do is “doing assessment” inasmuch as, by 
uttering them, Darryl is also giving his opinion regarding what he has been told before. 
Just as in real, face-to-face interaction, such assessments have further interactional 
consequences, namely that of providing a slot for Sandra to do second assessments.
Pomerantz (1984a) characterizes assessments as sequentially constrained actions, 
that is, actions which occur in certain loci. One of these loci can be “in next turn to 
initial assessments” (p. 59). Assessments occurring in such location are referred to as 
“second assessments” (p. 59). Pomerantz also states that the production of an “initial 
assessment provides the relevance of the recipient’s second assessment” (p. 61). 
Furthermore, second assessments are ranked according to their preference statuses in 
relation to the initial assessment. For instance, when a participant proffers an initial 
assessment that invites an agreement as a preferred next action, recipient’s disagreement 
is seen as dispreferred. In proffering a disagreement, its producer may be held 
accountable. Thus, the turn containing a disagreement tends to be marked by delay 
devices such as ‘“ no talk,’ requests for clarification, partial repeats, repair initiators,” (p. 
70) among others.
Looking back at the actions Darryl performs in lines 4, 6 and 8, we can see they 
are taken up by Sandra as assessments which makes it relevant for her to produce 
subsequent assessments. Moreover, the series o f assessments both characters perform in 
the sequence from lines 4 to 9 can be characterized as a sequence which starts just as “a 
reasonable discussion,” but which gradually mounts up to an overt confrontation, an 
argument.
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The first evidence to this is found in line 5, Sandra’s response to Darryl’s 
disapproving her birthfather’s behavior: after so many years and not even a word, the 
guy simply shows up again. Sandra’s nodding signals that she is reluctantly agreeing—a 
weak form chracterizable as a partial agreement-partial disagreement (Pomerantz, 
1984a)—with Darryl, or better, she is withholding an overt disagreement by delaying its 
production. A nod also means “no talk” or silence. Since Darryl goes on showing his 
disapproval by blaming Sandra for her decision to see her birthfather in spite o f “the 
story to date” (/. 6), Sandra’s second assessment/agreement is a repetition of the actions 
in her previous turn: “/  nodded again” (/. 7). Now, Darryl’s next accusation is an 
explicit and upgraded negative assessment which formulates criticism: “have you lost 
your mind?” (/. 8). This time, then, Sandra gives up her defensive position and proffers 
the disagreement she has been withholding.
Another evidence lies in the role played by silence and gestures in this sequence. 
As I have said in section 4.1.3, silence may be employed as a conflict management 
strategy both in real and in represented interaction. Sandra’s nod/silence in lines 5 and 7 
does function as such a strategy. Her resorting to verbally proffering a disagreement in 
line 9, thus, characterizes her willingness to “do confrontation.” This is reinforced by 
the gestures in lines 3 and 9. When Sandra tells Darryl about her decision to meet her 
birthfather, she “took his hand’ (/. 3). Such gesture indicates that she is “with” Darryl. 
Now, in line 9, when overt confrontation starts, Sandra’s dropping Darryl’s hand is a 
clear indication of the new footing she is assuming. She is not “with” Darryl anymore, 
but “against” him, or at least “without” him.
From this point on, characters jointly “do arguing.” One of the evidences we have 
to this claim is provided by the occurrence of a series of interruptions. According to 
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), in the management of the basic turn-
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taking system operative in real, face-to-face interaction, interruptions are avoided 
inasmuch as they constitute disprefeired, thus accountable, actions. It is so because 
interruptions may indicate that a party is usurping the other’s right to hold the floor.
In the segment I have reproduced earlier, the three-pointed arrows indicate three 
occasions on which interruption is done by, alternatively, one character and the other (/. 
12, 15, and 17)—and there are two more instances o f such interruptions in lines 25 and 
29 in the Appendix. Therefore, characters’ repeated competition for the floor clearly 
signals that confrontation is being accomplished in this interaction.
In short, the preceding considerations demonstrate that confrontation/argument 
can be accomplished in represented interaction by means of the use of mechanisms 
which are operative in the real construction of such a joint action. These mechanisms 
include parties’ proffering assessments and accusations as well as parties’ silence and 
competition for the floor, that is, interruptions. In the next section, I focus on the 
examination of the job performed by delay devices such as silence, pauses, gestures, 
false starts, repair initiators and reformulation in an exchange involving a sensitive 
matter.
4.1.7 Conversational exchange 7: Carolyn Keene’s N a n c y  D rew  o n  cam pus  # 24:
In  th e  spo tligh t
In the following excerpt, I characterize the conversational activity characters are 
engaged in as an uncomfortable occasion where parties are managing a “touchy or 
sensitive matter” (Pomerantz, 1984b, p. 617): This claim is based on the occurrence of a 
number of features which index participants’ orientation to displaying caution 
(Pomerantz, 1984b). Such features include delay devices such as silence, pauses, 
gestures, false starts, repair initiators and reformulation as well as misplaced,
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incomplete sequences. In short, a set of actions for which parties could be held 
accountable if  it were not for the sensitive vein o f the interaction in which characters are 
presently involved.
This conversation happens in a place called Club Z, where the band “Radical 
Moves” is doing a performance. Ray is the lead singer in the band and Montana is a 
friend of his who has come to see their performance. In fact, Montana has “a crush on 
Ray” and has made up her mind that she would tell him all about her feelings this night. 
The first set of the performance is finished, and the band members have gone offstage. 
Montana has left her group in the audience and has gone backstage in search of Ray. 
She finds him on his way to the owner of the club’s office. In the segment below, they 
have met and done some small talk about the band’s performance:
09 [[Asmall, awkward silence descended between them, which Montana took as
10 her cue.]]
IT M: Ray, there’s something I’ve been wanting to ask you for a really
p  12 long time. \[She took a deep breath.]] Would you go out with me?
13 Like, on a date? Because I’m crazy about you, [[Montana confessed,:]]
--------► 14 R: You are? [[Ray bit his lip]] I don’t  think . . .  I mean, I hadn’t
► ► 15 thought a b o u t. . .
16 M :18 [[Montana’s heart broke. ((Don’t say anything more,)) she wanted to 
^  fr, 17 say, but Ray keptgoing]\
*
18 R: Montana, you’re beautiful. And I’m really flattered that you like
—► ►► 19 me. [[He took her hand and squeezed itfirmly^ I like you, too. But as a
20 friend, no t more.
21 M: Oh. S-ure, [[Montana stammered/]] I understand.
We can see that the segment under analysis already starts with an “awkward silence.” 
This is so because Montana has finished congratulating Ray on their performance and
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he has accordingly thanked her (see Appendix), which indicates that the activity which 
supposedly motivated their meeting is over. But, since it was Montana who came to 
meet Ray, the silence that follows (/. 9-10) is the appropriate slot for her to propose the 
closing of the encounter (Schegloff & S acks, [1973] 1974) .
Montana’s next action (/. 11-12), though, does not constitute the opener of a 
recognizable closing sequence. Rather, it proposes the insertion of another topic into the 
on-going conversation. In fact, this topic happens to be the actual reason why Montana 
approached Ray during the break. Thus, the insertion of such topic does not occur at the 
appropriate interactional moment.
Moreover, “there’s something I’ve been wanting to ask you for a really long time” 
opens a pre-announcement sequence. Such an opener provides for the recipient (Ray) 
performing either a go-ahead or a blocking to the candidate announcement (see section 
4.1.5). However, as we can see from line 12 (indicated by the short arrow), Montana’s 
in-breath signals that she is not yielding the floor. Ray has no opportunity to produce 
either action, because, actually, Montana goes on talking. This may constitute a strategy 
to delay the production of the question.
Montana’s action immediately following the in-breath is somewhat awkwardly 
placed. Instead of making the announcement made relevant by her previous pre­
announcement, she prefaces it with an unexpected invitation: “Would you go out with 
me? Like, on a date?” (/. 12-13). Such an invitation is unexpected inasmuch as it is not 
preceded by a pre-invitation sequence—in real, face-to-face interaction, a sequence 
designed to preface an invitation and forestall its production in the case of a likely 
rejection by its recipient (Levinson, 1983): Therefore, when the announcement is finally 
made (“I’m crazy about you,” /. 13), we can say that it has been considerably delayed.
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As I have mentioned before (section 4.1.6), delays are associated with the 
production of delicate actions. A girl telling a fellow that she is crazy about him is one 
such action—in this excerpt, as in the' real world—in that it is socially constrained. Due 
to this, we can say that Montana’s withholding the crucial announcement for so long is 
evidence that she is managing a touchy or sensitive matter.
Ray’s next turn ratifies this. This turn also contains a number of delay devices 
whose occurrence is justified by the even more sensitive task he has in his hands: that of 
turning Montana down. In line 14 (indicated by the longer arrow), there is a series of 
such delays starting with a partial repeat, “You are?” Following this, there is Ray’s 
biting his lips, a gesture which also indicates a deliberate spell of self-imposed no-talk. 
Next, there comes a false start and its accompanying slight pause (“I don’t think . . .”), 
now followed by a self-repair initiator and yet another shorter pause (“I mean,”), and the 
reformulation of the previously unfinished utterance: “I hadn’t thought about” (/. 14- 
15). This utterance is also interrupted mid-course and a longer spell of no-talk, a silence, 
occurs (indicated by the two-pointed arrows in lines 15, 16, and 17).
Finally, Ray proffers a positive assessment about Montana and her feelings 
towards him (“You’re beautiful. And I ’m really flattered that you like me,” /. 18-19), 
reinforced by his friendly gesture (“He took her hand and squeezed it firm ly” I. 19). 
Ray, then, adds a positive assessment of his own feelings towards Montana: “I like you 
too,” I  19. All these three actions being themselves delay devices to his final and crucial 
announcement: “But as friend, not more” (/. 19-20).
To put it another way, in saying “I’m crazy about you” (/. 13), Montana is actually 
proffering an initial assessment concerning Ray himself, her feelings towards him, and 
possibly his feelings towards her. As I have said earlier (section 4.1.6), this sort of 
assessment provides for the recipient performing a second assessment. I have also
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pointed out that an agreement with an initial positive assessment constitutes the 
preferred next action (see section 4.1.6). Ray’s second assessment, though, is crucially 
in disagreement with Montana’s possible notion/expectation that he could feel the same 
for her. Proffering such a disagreement is, nonetheless, a sensitive job. That is why Ray 
is so cautious as to preface his disagreement with partial agreements. Such preface also 
contains the typical agreement token “too” (Pomerantz, 1984a, p. 66), “conjoined with 
the disagreement component with a contrast conjunction (...) ‘but’” (Pomerantz, 1984a, 
p. 72), as indicated by the three-pointed arrow.
To reiterate, the foregoing considerations demonstrate that, in represented, as in 
ordinary, talk-in-interaction, when characters are managing sensitive matters/actions, 
they demonstrably orient to displaying caution by employing a number of delay devices. 
In the segment above, such devices include: misplaced, incomplete/suspended 
sequences, a partial repeat, a false start, pauses and silence, a repair initiator, 
reformulation and a disagreement turn structured so that the crucial disagreement 
component is carefully prefaced by a weak form of agreement .
This finding, considered together with the results of the analyses of all other 
excerpts in the current chapter, point to an overwhelming similarity between represented 
and real, face-to-face interaction in terms of the mechanisms and techniques employed 
to their construction.
In thp next chapter, I resume the discussion of such similarity. I also add some 
considerations about the sort of turn-taking system which seems to be operative in 
fictional characters’ conversational exchanges. Finally, I address the implications 
suggested by the findings in the present study.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: FINAL REMARKS AND IMPLICATIONS
The question I set out to answer in the present study was the extent to which 
represented interaction can be regarded as “ordinary” in terms of the mechanisms and 
techniques employed by parties in the production and sense-making of their interaction.
My point of departure was the assumption that storytellers manage to promote 
and sustain audience involvement by means of employing certain strategies to develop 
their narratives. One of such strategies being the animation of characters’ voices. A 
strategy used to cause an impression of familiarity, a sense of usualness/ordinariness, on 
the story recipient. Also, a strategy which allows recipients to take up a more active 
participation role (that of eavesdroppers) in the co-construction of the story they are 
being told.
The two other fundamental assumptions which guided this study derive from the 
above. The first is the assumption that oral and written storytelling activities have a lot 
in common with each other, especially in regard to the animation of characters’ voices. 
Of course, the different possibilities and constraints posed by each medium account for 
the peculiar features each of them displays.
The second assumption is that, due to the involvement between author and reader 
being established and maintained by thé author’s making the animation of the story 
characters’ voices perceivable as “ordinary” by his recipient, then what stands for both 
author’s and reader’s sense of “ordinariness” is their membership in a given language 
community. Therefore, it is expected that the animation of voices in stories displays 
features or mechanisms which are also displayed by “ordinary” animation of voices, 
that is when speakers animate their own voices. In other words, it was assumed that
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characters’ exchange of utterances should share a number of organizational mechanisms 
and techniques with its naturally occurring, ordinary, counterpart.
I have surveyed previous studies which dealt, from different theoretical and 
methodological traditions, with the animation of voices other than the teller’s. This 
provided me with the opportunity to discuss some of the basic interactional 
sociolinguistic concepts which constitute the necessary theoretical support for this work. 
Such concepts include Bateson’s (1972) “frame,” Goffman’s (1981) “footing” and 
“lamination,” Gumperz (1982) “contextualization cues,” and Clark’s (1996) “layering.”
The above mentioned survey also helped me to gradually and better characterize 
the phenomenon “animation of voices other than the teller’s” as an essentially 
interactional one. So, starting from the notion of “direct reported speech/DRS,” I 
upgraded this notion by incorporating some design features and concepts which 
emerged during the discussion. Thus, “DRS” was initially replaced by the notion of 
“constructed dialogue,” which, on its turn, was later better characterized as “represented 
dialogue.” Finally, a crucial notion was also incorporated, namely “context.” This 
notion was understood broadly as encompassing phenomena such as sequential location 
of utterances in relation to one another, social and situational features relevant to the 
interaction, contextualization cues which account both for the production format and the 
interpretation of the utterances, and, the location of the interaction within the story 
itself. Incorporating such notions, then, provided me with the means to characterize the 
phenomenon in question as an interactional one. Thus, the idea of “represented 
dialogue” was eventually reshaped as “represented interaction,” which involves 
characters utterances in turns at talking as well as the context in which they occur.
Characterizing represented interaction as such was the necessary first step to 
employing interactional sociolinguistic concepts to the analysis o f the selected data.
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Furthermore, the concept of “lamination”/”layering” provided me with the grounds that 
allowed me to use a strictly emic perspective to the analysis of such data.
Having thus established both a theoretical and a methodological foundation for the 
discussion of the mechanisms operative in the representation of characters’ interaction 
in my corpus, I set out to describe such mechanisms and the similarities they displayed 
in relation to those previous research has found to be operative in real, ordinary face-to- 
face interaction.
The research and its findings demonstrated that the mechanisms employed in the 
organization of character’s on-going interaction in the excerpted pieces which constitute 
the corpus of this study display an overwhelming similarity with those mechanisms 
operative in ordinary talk-in-interaction. It also showed that the mechanisms operating 
in characters’ conversational exchanges may include a number of subtle interactional 
and structural details which can ordinarily occur in actual interaction. The theoretical 
framework built up mainly on the works of Bateson (1972), Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 
1988, 1992, 1994), Clark (1996), Goffman (1981), Gumperz (1982), Holt (1996), Sacks 
(1972, 1984, 1992), and Tannen (1989, 1990) as well as the works of interactional 
sociolinguists on the organization of talk-in-interaction such as Pomerantz (1978, 
1984a, 1984b), Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), Schegloff, Jefferson, and 
Sacks (1977), among others, proved to be extremely appropriate to the description of 
the data and to its analysis.
Before concluding this work, I would like to make some considerations on aspects 
that affect the interpretation of my findings. Initially, I will discuss two issues that have 
a bear on the extent of the claim I am making, namely the issue concerning the neatness 
of the representation of characters’ exchanges and the sort of turn-taking system that 
seems to be operative in represented interaction. At a second stage, I will discuss the
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limitations of the present study as well as the possible suggestions for further research 
arising from its results. Finally, I  will discuss the implications that can be derived from 
the findings reported here both for those concerned with the study of language use and 
for those concerned with the study of “language-use-in-literature.”
5.1 The scope of the findings in this study
As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the results of the analysis of 
characters’ interaction showed that the mechanisms employed in its representation are 
amazingly similar to those operative in real, face-to-face, naturally occurring 
conversation. One possible, or even “natural,” interpretation that can be derived from it 
is that what I  am claiming is that represented interaction can operate in the same way as 
its naturally occurring counterpart. In order to avoid the pitfall this interpretation 
represents, the following discussion can help clarify the scope assigned both to the 
findings in this study and to the claim I make based on these findings.
In the works of researchers who have worked on the relationship between 
represented interaction (or “constructed dialogue,” or “composed dialogue”) and its 
naturally occurring counterpart, I have found a recurrent argument against their 
similarity, namely that represented interaction is neatly arranged, whereas transcripts 
of real talk-in-interaction reveal that face-to-face conversation is generally not so neat 
(Caldas-Coulthard, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994; Tannen, 1990). Caldas-Coulthard (1984) 
draws special attention to the noticeable absence of features such as “hedges, initiators, 
reformulations, backtracks, fillers, repetition, hesitations, interruptions, pauses, and 
false starts” (p. 89). Tannen (1990), on her turn, observes that represented interaction 
contains “occasional rather than pervasive repetition, hesitations, slips, false starts, and
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so on” (p. 261). She adds that “accurate transcripts of actual conversation often strike 
unaccustomed readers (...) as repetitive, obscure, inarticulate, and generally unrealistic,” 
because they display “the chaff of [conversation:] hesitations, fillers, hedges, and 
repetitions” (p. 261).
My own data do contain an example (out of seven) of an interaction where many 
of the above mentioned features occur (see section 4.1.7). Moreover, as I have also 
demonstrated, their occurrence plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the activity 
characters are engaged in as a “sensitive event.” This is one first observation.
A second observation concerns transcripts of naturally occurring interaction. In 
discussing the issue of represented interactions being tidied-up versions of talk (see 
section 2.1.3, p. 45-46), I have sketched that, on this respect, represented interaction in 
written narrative and transcripts of actual interactions are similar in that both presuppose 
and reflect their producer’s decision while adapting a typically oral event to the already 
highly conventionalized written medium.
These two observations lead me to the following questions. Is it the case that all 
those features simultaneously occur in each and every conversational activity? And is it 
the case that in all transcripts used by analysts all those features are always 
represented? (Note that I say “represented,” for, inasmuch as transcripts are 
conventionalized, they are not actual interaction, but they can only stand for it.) Or 
could it be the case that sometimes those features may not be relevant to the purposes of 
the analytical work to be endeavored and then such features are not so often 
represented?
In asking such questions, I am drawing attention to why, how, by whom and to 
what purpose these features of actual interaction should be expected to occur during an
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on-going conversation, in transcripts and, above all, in written fictional narrative as 
well.
First of all, given the number of items included in the lists I reproduced 
previously, I don’t believe all of them should necessarily occur in one single naturally 
occurring interaction or even in one single stage of such an interaction. In fact, I cannot 
recall one single instance of an interactional sociolinguistic corpus where one could find 
all such features either occurring simultaneously or being focused on at the same time, 
or both.
In addition, for general analyticalpurposes, other major features or mechanisms of 
actual interaction play a much more relevant role and should, then, be represented in 
transcripts. For storytelling purposes, which happens to be the reason why represented 
interaction is ever used in literature, why should such details be so relevant? Of course, 
they are not really. In represented (as in actual interaction) there are other means 
available, other sorts of contextualization cues, to the depiction of characters’ stances 
and actions. Such means can be effectively employed (as I  have demonstrated they are) 
without obliging the author to represent every possible interactional feature or detail. 
Something which is, indeed, impossible due to the fact that written discourse, especially 
literary texts, is constrained by the conventions which regulate its production.
In this respect—and especially in this respect— my findings do not allow me to 
say that represented interaction is just like actual interaction. Actually, this is not at all 
the claim I am making, or ever intended to make. On the contrary, I acknowledge that it 
is a contingent aspect of represented interaction that it is constrained by the same 
conventions which regulate the written medium in general and by those which regulate 
the production of literary- texts in particular.
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Therefore, my claim is that, as far as those conventions provide for it and 
according to how the author perceives the features in question to be relevant for his 
story/stories as a whole, as well as for the particular situation characters are in, such 
features as repetition, hesitation, pauses, silence, false starts, and so on and so forth may 
also be represented (but not reproduced) in characters’ exchanges. And, as I hope to 
have made it clear from the detailed analysis of my data, when they are employed in 
represented interaction, they do display a great similarity with their employment in 
actual interaction regarding the interactional job(s) they perform.
I shall now turn to the discussion of the turn-taking system employed in 
represented interaction and its relationship with the basic turn-taking system as 
described by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978), an issue that was raised by 
Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) in her discussion of the 
reduction/simplification of the properties o f real talk in represented interaction.
5.2 Basis for a “projected turn-taking system”
The issue raised by Caldas-Coulthard (1984, 1988, 1992, 1994) regarding the 
relationship between the turn-taking system in represented interaction and the basic 
turn-taking system operative in actual interaction has already been addressed (section 
2.1.3). In that occasion, I argued against the fact that author’s control of some of the 
features of the turn-taking system could provide grounds enough for one to consider it 
as either reduced or simplified (see section 2.1.3, pp. 42-45).
Attention was also drawn to two important facts regarding the “simplest 
systematic form” used by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson ([1974] 1978) in describing 
this basic mechanism operative in real, face-to-face interaction. The first important fact 
was that such a description is meant to apply only to “the basic setting of language use”
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(Clark, 1996, p. 8). The second fact mentioned was that Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 
([1974] 1978) themselves provided for the possibility of such “basic” form of turn- 
taking system being adapted to the interactional phenomenon parties are involved in and 
which the analyst is concerned with describing.
It was then suggested that the turn-taking system employed in the representation 
of characters’ exchanges might well be subject to further constraints by virtue of its 
“projected” status. I proposed to call this turn-taking system which seems to be 
operative in represented interaction the “projected turn-taking system.” Finally, it was 
observed that such system seemed to be author-organized in such a way as to allow 
authors to simulate characters’ local management of their turns at speaking.
At this point I would like to add two relevant considerations which reinforce my 
initial claim for a “projected turn-taking system.” First of all, as I  have recurrently said 
all through chapter 4, the analysis of my data demonstrated that not only does 
characters’ interaction appear to be locally co-constructed by them but also that their 
turns at talking are managed in tandem with other basic structures also operative in 
actual interaction such as adjacency pairs, preference and conditional relevance 
organizations, and topic progression techniques. All this constitutes evidence of the 
great similarity with parties’ local management of actual interaction in forms of the co­
construction of both individual turns and of sequences of turns.
Another important element to be considered is the locus where represented 
interaction occurs and its relationship with the form the turn-taking system managing 
such interaction takes. From the outset of this thesis and all through it, I have repeated 
over and over again that represented interaction (or “constructed dialogue,” or “DRS”) 
is not an autonomous sort of discourse. It only and always happens in a discursive layer 
which is embedded in, and thus dependent upon, another layer, the primary
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communicative layer which, in the case of written storytelling, is the layer where the 
interaction between author and reader(s) takes place.
This means that inside the projected layer, and only there, characters manage 
their words during their turns at talking. In the primary layer, however, what one can 
see is the author pulling the strings of his dummies to make them animate the 
words/actions he is projecting onto them.
Therefore, the sort of turn-taking system designed to account for these facts seems 
to be inherently and inevitably dependent on the major interactional activity between 
writer and reader(s). If so, the turn-taking system operative in represented interaction 
seems to be designed in such a way that it breaks through the barrier of the projected 
layer and extends itself out into the primary discursive layer. In fact, one evidence this 
study provides for a “projected turn-taking system” is the fact that sometimes elements 
of the reporting discourse, to which readers, but not characters, have access, can 
demonstrably function as turn constructional units, and can thus be integrated into the 
on-going interaction mainly as the realization of a turn in its own (see ^section 3.2.3). 
This points into the direction that one possible feature o f this sort of turn-taking system 
might be that, while organizing the activity going on in the projected layer, such system 
simultaneously handles aspects of the major activity on which represented interaction is 
dependent.
I believe the foregoing considerations are reasonable enough so as to suggest the 
existence of one such thing as a “projected turn-taking system,” conceived of as a 
possible adaptation to the sort of interactional activity which storytelling is, be it written 
or oral. Therefore, describing the features that might be employed in the design of such 
a mechanism can perhaps be the endeavor of future research.
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A second avenue of studies which could perhaps be undertaken by future research 
concerns the systematic description of the phenomenon alluded to in section 3 .2:2: For 
the purposes of this study, such phenomenon has been termed “transition devices.” It 
was suggested that these transition devices seem to be systematically employed by 
authors as a means of signaling to the reader a forthcoming change in footing and in 
frame in the on-going storytelling activity. In addition, these devices can signal shifts 
from one communicative layer to another. Two major types of transition devices have 
been identified: those which signal a shift from layer I to layer 2 (thus prefacing the 
beginning of characters’ interaction) and those signaling a return to layer 1, that is, 
marking the local end of characters’ conversational exchange. The former were termed 
“in-transition devices” and the latter, “out-transition devices.” Perhaps a systematic 
description of such devices could provide a characterization of the phenomenon in 
general as well as of the features which distinguish the in-transition devices from those 
which perform out-transition.
Another possible path for further research could be that of investigating the role 
played by specific phenomena such as repair sequences, agreement/disagreement 
sequences, and a number of other sequences across a greater and perhaps more 
significant number and variety of texts. This proved not to be feasible in the present 
study due to the limitations of the data which comprise its corpus.
In addition, I have suggested that both my findings and current claim ought to be 
viewed as limited by the conventions which regulate the production and reception of 
literary written narrative. However, I did not endeavor to look into such matter in a 
systematic way. This, too, constitutes yet another limitation of the present study. Maybe 
in the future, researchers could take advantage of the methodological contribution of the 
present work to investigate and clarify the extent to which such forces as literary canon,
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stylistics, and other normative “big C” Cultural agents affect the representation of 
fictional characters’ exchanges:
5.3 Implications of this research
However limited the findings of this research, its greatest contribution to students 
of language use derives from the fact that, in spite of the powerful forces which regulate 
the production and reception of written, especially literary, texts, the power of “the 
technology of conversation” (Sacks, 1984, p. 413) is such that allows for represented 
interaction to display a great number of the organizational mechanisms which are 
operative in actual interaction. In other words, the “big C” Cultural forces which control 
such social artifacts as artistic production and scholarship are not powerful enough as to 
override the pervasive human impulse to accomplish the basic job of “doing ‘being 
ordinary’” (Sacks, 1984, p. 416) even in a represented, or projected, layer of reality.
I shall conclude this work by re-stating that the extraordinary similarity found 
between represented interaction and its actual counterpart in that one can find in the 
former a number of mechanisms which operate in its production and interpretation as a 
conjoint ordinary achievement of the characters in the story as well as of the writer and 
reader(s) in the actual world, opens up new possible paths to the understanding of 
language use in general and to “language-use-in-literature” in particular.
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NOTES
1. It is not my intention to examine Holt’s sources in depth for I believe they would 
not be particularly enlightening to the interactional sociolinguistic standpoint 
adopted in this thesis. Nevertheless, I will be addressing some sources quoted by 
Holt later in this section when I discuss issues such as “accuracy,” “objectivity,” 
“authenticity,” and “reliability.”
2. Holt’s (1996) “prosody” seems to subsume all aspects of intonation as well as voice 
loudness, pitch, and tone. I will be using “prosody” in the same sense as Holt’s.
3. Since storytelling per se is not my present concern, discussing the specific 
mechanisms which are operative in this activity is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
As a starting point, details on conversation analytic descriptions of these 
mechanisms can be found in the works of Goodwin (1984), Jefferson (1978), Ryave 
(1978), and Sacks (1972, 1992).
4. While Bateson’s assertion is made within a strictly psychological standpoint, 
Ribeiro (1994) has demonstrated the validity of such an assertion within an 
interactional sociolinguistic perspective.
5. Erickson and Shultz (1982) have studied cases of cross-cultural communication in 
gatekeeping interviews and have found out that “inferential incongruity and lack pf 
behavioral mutuality” could be perceived when arhythmia occurred (p. 143). They 
argue that rhythmic regularity “may be prima facie evidence of shared interpretive 
frameworks among those engaged in interaction” (p. 143). Similarly, the absence of 
rhythmic regularity (arhythmia) points to the fact that there may inadequate sharing 
of interpretive grounds. This is what can ultimately lead participants to inferring 
“not ‘withness’ at an overall, global level of interpretation and impression 
formation” (p. 143).
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6. This example is particularly interesting because it is an instance of prosody being 
graphically represented, especially in an utterance that has never actually been 
spoken before. This suggests that, whoever wrote down what was said by current 
speaker was finely attuned to the fact that, from current speaker’s standpoint, 
whether the “reported” words are one’s actual words or not makes little difference to 
its representation.
7. Neal Norrick (1998) has examined retellings of stories, or rather separate tellings o f 
a single story, and has demonstrated that in a later telling "the basic form of the 
story remains very similar to the initial telling” (p. 80), and that the sort of 
differences which were identified between the separate versions “simply would not 
lead recipients to hear them as discrete stories in the conversational context” (p. 80). 
This serves as evidence that recounting may actually be accurate, or faithful as it 
were.
8. Unfortunately, Tannen did not provide the reaction (next turn) of any of the 
recipients in the situations depicted. It would be interesting, however, to be able to 
have access to their interpretations of the utterances provided. Nevertheless, I 
believe Holt’s (1996) findings and my own previous discussion suffice to illustrate 
my point.
9. Since Caldas-Coulthard’s arguments and conclusions concerning fictional 
representation of interaction are restated in her previous (1984) and later (1992 and 
1994) works, all references made from this point on in this section—unless 
otherwise stated—will be to her 1988 Ph.D. dissertation, in which she deals with the 
phenomenon in question in a more comprehensive fashion.
10. Such in-transition was also found to be accomplished by means of graphical 
representation of the beginning of a section or chapter in the narrative. The
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beginning of a new section was usually signaled by means of larger spacing between 
the last line in the previous section and the first line in the new on, the 
conversational exchange proper. The beginning of a new chapter was indicated by 
the chapter number.
11. In this and in all other examples in this section, emphasis has been added. I will 
refer to the highlighted elements later in this section.
12. In fact, these two paragraphs, taken together, function simultaneously as an out- 
transition from previous interaction and an in-transition to the next.
13 . The following extract from the novel is a clear instance of an unstable state of talk. 
Here, the characters are in the college cafeteria for brunch, and they are 
simultaneously trying to attend to talk (the main topic they have been discussing as 
well as instrumental talk concerning the activity) and other requirements of the 
situation such as moving forward along the line while choosing food and filling their 
trays, and so on. They can only focus their conversation solidly on a particular topic 
after they sit at the table and thus reach a more stable configuration.
“Two steps forward, if you please,” Bess said, nudging Marisa’s tray along. 
“You’re doing great. Just keep telling yourself that, because it’s true.” They 
followed George and Nancy to a large, round table near the window, [utterances 
within the more stable configuration are introduced at this point] (Nancy Drew on 
campus # 24: In the spotlight, p. 140)
14. This term is explained by the editor of the novel in the section Notes on the text. The 
explanation reads: “‘Her mind was less difficult to develope’. Develope is not the 
modern sense of causing her mind to unfold or grow (impossible in Mrs Bennet’s 
case) but in the sense of unfolding and disclosing it in a description or depiction. We 
perhaps preserve something of this sense when we develop a photograph” (p. 292).
15. The underlined words appeared originally in italics in the text. I assume italics to 
have been employed to indicate that the items are foreign words. Since I am using
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italics in the excerpted segments for a distinct purpose, I decided to use underlining 
in order to maintain that indication.
16.1 will be dealing with pauses later in this chapter. In the forthcoming excerpts there 
are some occurrences of stretches of silence which are analyzable as pauses, lapses 
or attributable silences.
17. Goffman (1981) defines “innuendo” as a sort of communication “whereby ,a 
speaker, ostensibly directing words to an addressed recipient, overlays his remark 
with a patent but deniable meaning, a meaning that has a target more so than a 
recipient, is typically disparaging of it, and is meant to be caught by the target, 
whether this be the addressed recipient or an unaddressed recipient, or even a 
bystander” (p. 134).
18 . 1 chose double parentheses to indicate the representation of thought occurring within 
the exchange. I did not include this in section 3.2.3, however, because it only occurs 
once in the whole corpus. In addition, I decided to represent this line as Montana’s 
turn because it can be demonstrably interpreted as silence.
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APPENDIX
Conversational exchange 1: E. A. Poe's The cask o f Amontillado
M :  M o n t r e s o r  ( t h e  n a r r a t o r )  a n d  F :  F o r t u n a t o
0 1  M :  [ [ /  said to him§ M y  d e a r  F o r t u n a t o ,  y o u  a r e  l u c k i l y  m e t .  H o w
0 2  r e m a r k a b l y  w e l l  y o u  a r e  l o o k i n g  t o - d a y !  B u t  I  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  a  p i p e
0 3  o f  w h a t  p a s s e s  f o r  A m o n t i l l a d o ,  a n d  I  h a v e  m y  d o u b t s .
0 4  F :  H o w ?  \[said he.\] A m o n t i l l a d o ?  A  p i p e ?  I m p o s s i b l e !  A n d  i n  t h e
0 5  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  c a r n i v a l !
0 6  M :  I  h a v e  m y  d o u b t s ,  [ [7  replied^ a n d  I  w a s  s i l l y  e n o u g h  t o  p a y  t h e  f u l l
0 7  A m o n t i l l a d o  p r i c e  w i t h o u t  c o n s u l t i n g  y o u  i n  t h e  m a t t e r .  Y o u  w e r e
0 8  n o t  t o  b e  f o u n d ,  a n d  I  w a s  f e a r f u l  o f  l o s i n g  a  b a r g a i n .
0 9  F :  A m o n t i l l a d o !
1 0  M :  I  h a v e  m y  d o u b t s .
1 1  F :  A m o n t i l l a d o !
1 2  M :  A n d  I  m u s t  s a t i s f y  t h e m .
1 3  F :  A m o n t i l l a d o !
1 4  M :  A s  y o u  a r e  e n g a g e d ,  I  a m  o n  m y  w a y  t o  L u c h e s i .  I f  a n y  o n e  h a s  a
1 5  c r i t i c a l  t u r n ,  i t  i s  h e .  H e  w i l l  t e l l  m e —
1 6  F :  L u c h e s i  c a n n o t  t e l l  A m o n t i l l a d o  f r o m  S h e r r y .
1 7  M :  A n d  y e t  s o m e  f o o l s  w i l l  h a v e  i t  t h a t  h i s  t a s t e  i s  a  m a t c h  f o r  y o u r
1 8  o w n .
1 9  F :  C o m e ,  l e t  u s  ^ o .
2 0  M :  W h i t h e r ?i
2 1  F :  T o  y o u r  v a u l t s .
2 2  M :  M y  f r i e n d ,  n o ;  I  w i l l  n o t  i m p o s e  u p o n  y o u r  g o o d  n a t u r e .  I  p e r c e i v e
2 3  y o u  h a v e  a n  e n g a g e m e n t .  L u c h e s i —
2 4  F :  I  h a v e  n o  e n g a g e m e n t ; — c o m e .
2 5  M :  M y  f r i e n d ,  n o .  I t  i s  n o t  t h e  e n g a g e m e n t ,  b u t  t h e  s e v e r e  c o l d  w i t h
2 6  w h i c h  I  p e r c e i v e  y o u  a r e  a f f l i c t e d .  T h e  v a u l t s  a r e  i n s u f f e r a b l y
2 7  d a m p .  T h e y  a r e  e n c r u s t e d  w i t h  n i t r e .
2 8  F :  L e t  u s  g o ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s .  T h e  c o l d  i s  m e r e l y  n o t h i n g .  A m o n t i l l a d o !
2 9  Y o u  h a v e  b e e n  i m p o s e d  u p o n .  A n d  a s  f o r  L u c h e s i ,  h e  c a n n o t
3 0  d i s t i n g u i s h  S h e r r y  f r o m  A m o n t i l l a d o .
3 1  [[Thus speaking, Fortunato possessed himself of my arm. Cutting on a mask
3 2  of black silk, and drawing a roauelaire closely about my person, J suffered.him.
3 3  . to hurry me to mypala^^o.]]
Conversational exchange 2: E. A. Poe's The cask of Amontillado
0 1  M :  T h e  n i t r e !  [ { J  said,]] s e e .  I t  i n c r e a s e s .  I  h a n g s  l i k e  m o s s  u p o n ’ t h e
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0 2  v a u l t s .  W e  a r e  b e l o w  t h e  r i v e r ’ s  b e d .  T h e  d r o p s  o f  m o i s t u r e  t r i c k l e
0 3  a m o n g  t h e  b o n e s .  C o m e ,  w e  w i l l  g o  b a c k  e r e  i t  i s  t o o  l a t e .
0 4  Y o u r  c o u g h —
0 5  F :  I t  i s  n o t h i n g ,  [[he sdd^  l e t  u s  g o  o n .  B u t  f i r s t ,  a n o t h e r  d r a u g h t  o f
0 6  t h e  M e d o c .
0 7  M :  [ [ I  broke and reached him a flagon of De Grape.]]
0 8  F :  \[He emptied it at a breath. His eyesflashed with a fierce light. He laughed
0 9  and threw the bottle upward with gesticulation I  did not understand.]]
1 0  M :  [ [ 7  looked at him in surprise.]]
1 1  F :  [ [ H i  repeated the movement-— a grotesque one]] Y o u  d o  n o t  c o m p r e h e n d ?
1 2  [\he said.]]
1 3  M :  N o t  I', [ [ /  replied.]]
1 4  F :  T h e n  y o u  a r e  n o t  o f  t h e  b r o t h e r h o o d .
1 5  M :  H o w ?
1 6  F :  Y o u  a r e  n o t  o f  t h e m a s o n s .
1 7  M :  Y e s ,  y e s ,  [ [7  said,]] y e s ,  y e s .
1 8  F :  Y o u ?  I m p o s s i b l e !  A  m a s o n ?
1 9  M :  A  m a s o n ,  [ [ /  replied.]]
2 0  F :  A  s i g n ,  \^ he said.]]
2 1  M :  I t  i s  t h i s ,  [ [7  answered, producing a trowelfrom beneath the folds of my
2 2  roquelairej ]
2 3  F :  Y o u  j e s t ,  [[he exclaimed, recoiling afewpacesQB u t  l e t  u s  p r o c e e d  t o  t h e
2 4  . A m o n t i l l a d o .
2 5  M :  B e  i t  s o ,  [ [ 7  said, replacing the tool beneath the cloak; and again offering him
2 6  my arm]]
Conversational exchange 3: Flannery O'Connor's A good man is hard to find
O L :  t h e  o l d  l a d y ;  B :  B a i l e y ;  B ’ s W :  B a i l e y ’ s  w i f e ;  J W :  J o h n  W e s l e y ;  a n d  J S :  J u n e  S t a r
0 1  O L :  N o w  l o o k  h e r e ,  B a i l e y ,  [[she said^\ s e e  h e r e ,  r e a d  t h i s ,
0 2  [[and she stood with one hand on her thin hip and the other rattling the
0 3  newspaper at his bald head.]] H e r e  t h i s  f e l l o w  t h a t  c a l l s  h i m s e l f  T h e
0 4  M i s f i t  i s  a l o o s e  f r o m  t h e  F e d e r a l  P e n .  a n d  h e a d e d  t o w a r d .  F l o r i d a
0 5  a n d  y o u  r e a d  h e r e  w h a t  i t  s a y s  h e  d i d  t o  t h e s e  p e o p l e .  J u s t  y o u  r e a d
0 6  i t .  I  w o u l d n ’ t  t a k e  m y  c h i l d r e n  i n  a n y  d i r e c t i o n  w i t h  a  c r i m i n a l  l i k e
0 7  t h a t  a l o o s e  i n  i t .  I  c o u l d n ’ t  a n s w e r  t o  m y  c o n s c i e n c e  i f  I  d i d .
0 8  B :  [[Bailey didn’t  look up from his reading,]]
0 9  O L :  [ [ jo  she wheeled around then andfaced the children’s mother, (...) She n/as
1 0  sitting on the sofa, feeding the baby his apricots out of ajar.]] T h e  c h i l d r e n
1 1  h a v e  b e e n  t o  F l o r i d a  b e f o r e ,  \]the old lady said^\ Y o u  a l l  o u g h t  t o
1 2  t a k e  t h e m  s o m e w h e r e  e l s e  f o r  a  c h a n g e  s o  t h e y  w o u l d  s e e  d i f f e r e n t
1 3  p a r t s  o f  t h e  w o r l d  a n d  b e  b r o a d .  T h e y  n e v e r  h a v e  b e e n  t o  e a s t
1 4  T e n n e s s e e .
1 5  B ’ s  W :  [[The children’s mother didn’t  seem to hearher]\
1 6  J W :  [ [ t e  the eight-year-old boy, John Wesley, (...) said$ I f  y o u  d o n ’ t  w a n t  t o
1 7  g o  t o  H o n d a ,  w h y  d o n t c h a  s t a y  a t  h o m e ?  [[He and the little grl, June
1 8  Star, were reading the funnypctyers on the floor^
1 9  J S :  S h e  w o u l d n ’ t  s t a y  a t  h o m e  t o  b e  q u e e n  f o r  a  d a y ,  [[June Star said
2 0  without raising her yellow head.]]
2 1  O T :  Y e s  a n d  w h a t  w o u l d  y o u  d o  i f  t h i s  f e l l o w ,  T h e  M i s f i t ,  c a u g h t  y o u ?
2 2  [[the grandmother asked.]]
2 3  J W :  I ’ d  s m a c k  h i s  f a c e ,  [[John Wesley said.]]
2 4  J S :  S h e  w o u l d n ’ t  s t a y  a t  h o m e  f o r  a  m i l l i o n  b u c k s ,  [[June Star said.]]
2 5  A f r a i d  s h e ’ d  m i s s  s o m e t h i n g .  S h e  h a s  t o  g o  e v e r y w h e r e  w e  g o .
2 6  O L :  A l l  r i g h t ,  M i s s ,  [[/hegrandmother said.]] J u s t  r e m e m b e r  t h a t  t h e  n e x t
2 7  t i m e  y o u  w a n t  m e  t o  c u d  y o u r  h a i r .
2 8  J  S :  [[June Star said her hair was naturally curly.]]
Conversational exchange 4: D. H. Lawrence’s The rocking-horse winner
P :  P a u l ;  a n d  M :  P a u l ’ s m o t h e r
0 1  P :  M o t h e r ,  [[said the boy Paul one day]], w h y  d o n ’ t  w e  k e e p  a  c a r  o f  o u r
0 2  o w n ?  W h y  d o  w e  a lw a y s  u s e  u n c l e ’ s ,  o r  e l s e  a  t a x i ?
0 3  M :  B e c a u s e  w e ’ r e  t h e  p o o r  m e m b e r s  o f  t h e  f a m i l y ,  [[said the mother.]]
0 4  P :  B u t  w h y  are w e ,  m o t h e r ?
0 5  M :  W e l l — I  s u p p o s e ,  [[she said slowly and bitterly^ i t ’ s  b e c a u s e  y o u r
0 6  f a t h e r  h a s  n o  l u c k .
0 7  P :  [[The boy was silentfor some time J ]
0 8  I s  l u c k  m o n e y ,  m o t h e r ?  [\he asked rather timidly.]]
0 9  M :  N o  P a u l .  N o t  q u i t e .  I t ’ s  w h a t  c a u s e s  y o u  t o  h a v e  m o n e y .
1 0  P :  O h !  [[said Paul vaguely  ^ I  t h o u g h t  w h e n  U n c l e  O s c a r  s a i d  filthy
1 1  lucker, i t  m e a n t  m o n e y .
1 2  M :  'Filthy lucre d o e s  m e a n  m o n e y ,  \[said the mother.]] B u t  i t ’ s  l u c r e ,  n o t
1 3  l u c k .
1 4  P :  O h !  [[said the boy] ] . T h e n  w h a t  is l u c k ,  m o t h e r ?
1 5  M :  I t ’ s w h a t  c a u s e s  y o u  t o  h a v e  m o n e y .  I f  y o u ’ r e  l u c k y  y o u  h a v e
1 0  m o n e y .  T h a t ’ s  w h y  i t ’ s  b e t t e r  t o  b e  b o m  l u c k y  t h a n  r i c h .  I f  y o u ’ r e
1 1  r i c h ,  y o u  m a y  l o s e  y o u r  m o n e y .  B u t  i f  y o u ’ r e  l u c k y ,  y o u  w i l l  a lw a y s
1 2  g e t  m o r e  m o n e y .
1 9  P :  O h !  W i l l  y o u ?  A n d  i s  f a t h e r  n o t  l u c k y ?
2 0  M :  V e r y  u n l u c k y ,  I  s h o u l d  s a y ,  [[she said bitterly.]]
2 1  P :  [[The boy watched her with unsure eyes.]]
2 2  W h y ?  [[he asked^
2 3  M :  I  d o n ’ t  k n o w .  N o b o d y  e v e r  k n o w s  w h y  o n e  p e r s o n  i s  l u c k y  a n d
2 4  a n o t h e r  u n l u c k y .
2 5  P :  D o n ’ t  t h e y ?  N o b o d y  a t  a l l ?  D o e s  nobody"know7
2 6  M :  P e r h a p s  G o d .  B u t  H e  n e v e r  t e l l s .
Conversational exchange 5: Jane Austen’s Pride and prejudice
M r B :  M r  B e n n e t ;  a n d  M r s  B :  M r s .  B e n n e t
0 1  M r s  B :  M y  d e a r  M r  B e n n e t ,  \\said his lady to him one day,\] h a v e  y o u  h e a r d
0 2  t h a t  N e t h e r f i e l d  P a r k  i s  l e t  a t  l a s t ?
0 3  M r  B :  [ [ M r  B e n n e t  r e p l i e d  t h a t  h e  h a d  n o t . ] ]
0 4  M r s  B :  B u t  i t  i s ,  [ [returned she; J ]  f o r  M r s  L o n g  h a s  j u s t  b e e n  h e r e ,  a n d  s h e
0 5  t o l d  m e  a l l  a b o u t  i t .
0 6  M r  B :  [[Mr Bennet made no answer.]]
0 7  M r s  B :  D o  n o t  y o u  w a n t  t o  k n o w  w h o  h a s  t a k e n  i t ?  [[cried his wife
0 8  impatiently.]]
0 9  M r  B :  You w a n t  t o  t e l l  m e ,  a n d  I  h a v e  n o  o b j e c t i o n  t o  h e a r i n g  i t .
1 0  [| This was invitation enough.]]
Conversational exchange 6: Cherie Bennett’s Wild Hearts: On the edge
S :  S a n d r a  ( t h e  n a r r a t o r ) ;  a n d  D :  D a r r y l  ( S a n d r a ’ s  b o y f r i e n d )
0 1  D :  Y o u ’ r e  whati [[he asked in shock[\
0 2  S : H a v i n g  d i n n e r  w i t h  m y  b i r t h  f a t h e r ,  [[7  repeated. 1 gave him a short
0 3  version of the story to date, then I  took his hand and waited for his re action.\\
0 4  D :  S o  y o u ’ r e  t e l l i n g  m e  h e  j u s t  s h o w e d  u p  h e r e ?  {[Darryl asked^
0 5  S :  [ [ /  nodded.]]
0 6  D :  A n d  y o u ’ r e  g o i n g  t o  h a v e  d i n n e r  w i t h  h i m ?
0 7  S : [ [ /  nodded again.]]
0 8  D :  E x c u s e  m e ,  S a n d r a ,  b u t  h a v e  y o u  l o s t  y o u r  m i n d ?
0 9  S :  [ [ J  dropped his hand] ]  I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  s o ,  [ [ /  said evenly^
1 0  D :  W h y  w o u l d  y o u  w a n t  t o  l e t  t h i s  l o s e r  i n t o  y o u r  l i f e ?  ^Darryl asked
1 1  me incredulously^
1 2  S :  H e ’ s  m y  f a t h e r — { [ J  began.]]
1 3  D :  O h  b u l l ,  [[Darryl exploded] ]  L a w r e n c e  i s  y o u r  f a t h e r ,  t h a t ’ s  w h a t  y o u
1 4  a lw a y s  s a y .
1 5  S :  O f  c o u r s e ,  b u t —
1 6  D :  B u t  n o t h i n g ,  [[Darryl said] ]  I ’ l l  t e l l  y o u  w h a t  y o u  s h o u l d  d o .  Y o u
1 7  s h o u l d  t e l l  t h i s  f o o l  t o  g o  b a c k  t o  w h e r e v e r  t h e  h e l l  h e  c a m e  f r o m —
1 8  S :  W h y ?  B e c a u s e  y o u  s a y  s o ?  [ [ /  asked heatedly.]]
1 9  D :  N o ,  b e c a u s e  y o u  h a v e  a  b r a i n !  [\Danyl replied.]] W h a t ,  y o u  t h i n k  h e
2 0  w a n t s  t o  b e  y o u r  d a d d y  a l l  o f  a  s u d d e n ?
2 1  S :  N o ,  [ [ 7  replied defensively.]] H e  j u s t  w a n t s  t o  g e t  t o  k n o w  m e ,  h e  s a i d  . .  .
2 2  D :  [[Darrylsighed.]] S a n d r a ,  t h i s  i s  t h e  m a n  w h o  w a l k e d  o u t  o n  y o u  a n d
2 3  y o u r  m o m m a .  T h i s  i s  t h e  m a n  w h o  n e v e r ,  e v e r  f o u n d  t h e  t i m e  t o
2 4  c a l l  y o u  o r  w r i t e  y o u  o r  s e n d  o n e  t h i n  d i m e  t o  h e l p  s u p p o r t  y o u .
2 5  H e ’ s a n  a l c o h o l i c  a n d  a  d r u g  a d d i c t —
2 6  S :  H e  w a s .  H e  i s n ’ t  n o w .
2 7  D :  W h a t ,  a r e  y o u  d e f e n d i n g  h i m  n o w ?  ][D  any I asked me, his voice rising ]^
2 8  S :  N o ,  I ’ m  j u s t  t r y i n g  t o  e x p l a i n —
2 9  D :  S a n d r a ,  b a b y ,  t h i s  g u y  i s  o u t  t o  u s e  y o u  f o r  s o m e t h i n g .  T h a t ’ s  w h a t
3 0  I  t h i n k ,  \[Danyl said intensely?  ^A n d  h e r e  y o u  a r e ,  t o o  b u s y  t o  d o  a l l
3 1  t h e  t h i n g s  y o u  h a v e  t o  d o  a s  i t  i s ,  a n d  y o u  w a n t  t o  l e t  t h i s  n o -
3 2  a c c o u n t  f o o l  i n t o  y o u r  l i f e  t o  m e s s  y o u  u p  e v e n  m o r e ?
3 3  S : A l l  I ’ m  d o i n g  i s  h a v i n g  d i n n e r  w i t h  h i m !  \[Iyelled]\ G o d ,  I ’ m  s o r r y
3 4  I  e v e n  t o l d  y o u !
3 5  f[li7e sat there, breathing hard at each other, not saying a word.]]
3 6  S :  L o o k ,  j u s t  t a k e  m e  b a c k  t o  s c h o o l  s o  y o u  c a n  g e t  y o u r  c a r ,  [[Ifinally
3 7  said.]]
3 8  D :  F i n e ,  [[Danyl replied tersely, and he turned on the ignition.]]
3 9  \[We drove in silence, both of us too mad to talk'.]]
4 0  D :  [ [ H i  pulkdmy Jeep up next 'to his car, shut it off, and turned to me.]] L o o k ,
4 1  m a y b e  I  o v e r r e a c t e d .
4 2  S :  N o  k i d d i n g ,  [[7  muttered.]]
4 3  D :  I  j u s t  d o n ’ t  w a n t  h i m  t o  h u r t  y o u ,  ][Danyl said sofily. ] ]
4 4  S :  I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  y o u  s h o u l d  j u d g e  s o m e o n e  y o u  d o n ’ t  e v e n  k n o w ,  [ [ /
4 5  told him, taking my car keys from him.]]
4 6  D  ^Darrylgot out the jeep and stuck his head back /» .] ]  I  k n o w  e v e r y t h i n g
4 7  a b o u t  a  g u y  l i k e  h i m  t h a t  I  n e e d  t o  k n o w ,  S a n d r a .
4 8  S :  W e l l ,  m a y b e  I  d o n ’ t ,  [ [7  replied.]] M a y b e  t h e r e ’ s  a l l  k i n d s  o f  t h i n g s
4 9  a b o u t  h i m  I  n e e d  t o  k n o w .
5 0  D :  Y o u  d o n ’ t  n e e d  h i m ,  b a b y ,  [[Darryl said earnestly?^  I  l o v e  y o u ,  a n d
5 1  I ’ l l  t a k e  c a r e  o f  y o u .  I ’ l l  a lw a y s  t a k e  c a r e  o f  y o u .
5 2  S :  I  l o v e  y o u ,  t o o ,  [[/finally said^\hut I  d o n ’ t  w a n t  e i t h e r  o n e  o f  y o u
5 3  t o  t a k e  c a r e  o f  m e ,  D a r r y l .  I  w a n t  t o  t a k e  c a r e  o f  m y s e l f .  [[Then I
5 4  started try Jeep, and drove aivay.]]
Conversational exchange 7: Carolyn Keene’s Nancy Drew on campus # 24: In the spotlight
R :  R a y ;  a n d  M :  M o n t a n a
0 1  M :  R a y M ’ m  s o  g l a d  T  f o u n d  y o u ,  [[Montana said, catching himjust outside
0 2  Jason’s office. She reached out andput her hand on his arm.]] T h a t  w a s  a
0 3  g r e a t  f i r s t  s e t .
0 4  R :  T h a n k s ,  M o n t a n a ,  [ [ Ray saidQ T h a n k s  f o r  c o m i n g .
0 5  M :  A r e  y o u  k i d d i n g ?  I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  I ’ v e  m i s s e d  a  s i n g l e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f
0 6  R a d i c a l  M o v e s ;
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0 7  R : Y o u ’v e  b e e n  t h e r e  s i n c e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g ,  h a v e n ’ t  y o u ,  | [Ray said with
0 8 a smile.]] I  r e a l l y  a p p r e c i a t e  t h a t .
0 9 [[A small, awkward silence descended between them, which Montana took as
1 0 her cue.]]
1 1  M r R a y ,  t h e r e ’ s  s o m e t h i n g  I ’ v e  b e e n  w a n t i n g  t o  a s k  y o u  f o r  a  r e a l l y
1 2 l o n g  t i m e ,  \[She took a deep breath^ W o u l d  y o u  g o  o u t  w i t h  m e ?
1 3 - L i k e ,  o n  a  d a t e ?  B e c a u s e  I ’ m  c r a z y  a b o u t  y o u ,  [[Afotitana confessed.]]
1 4  R : Y o u  a r e ?  [[Ray bit his Rp.\] I  d o n ’ t  t h i n k  . . .  I  m e a n ,  I  h a d n ’ t
1 5 t h o u g h t  a b o u t . . .
1 6  M : [[Montana’s heart broke. ( ( D o n ’ t  s a y  a n y t h i n g  m o r e , ) )  she wanted to
1 7 scry, but Ray keptgoing^
1 8  R : M o n t a n a ,  y o u ’ r e  b e a u t i f u l .  A n d  I ’m  r e a l l y  f l a t t e r e d  t h a t  y o u  l i k e
1 9 m e .  [[He took her hand and squeezed it firmly?  ^ I  l i k e  y o u ,  t o o .  B u t  a s a
2 0 f r i e n d ,  n o t  m o r e .
2 1  M : O h .  S - u r e ,  [[Montana stammered]] I u n d e r s t a n d .
2 2  R : M o n t a n a ,  I ’ m  s o r r y ,  [[Ray said]\ A r e  y o u  o k a y ?
2 3  M : I ’ m  f i n e !  [^Montana said, blinking back a tear.]] P h e w ,  i t ’ s  s m o k e y
2 4 b a c k  h e r e ,  y o u  k n o w ?  \\She raised her hand to her eye and caught the tear
2 5 just before itfell!]] L o o k ,  I ’ d  b e t t e r  g o .  I  j u s t  w a n t e d  t o  s a y  y o u  g u y s
2 6 w e r e  g r e a t .  I ’ d  s t i c k  a r o u n d ,  b u t  I ’ v e  g o t  a  t o n  o f  h o m e w o r k  t o  d o .
2 7 G o o d  l u c k  w i t h  y o u r  s e c o n d  s e t .  [[Montana turned around and started
2 8 walking.]] (...)
